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Introduction
Global financial markets are highly complex systems armed with a great variety
of products, services, agents, institutions and authorities. Their functioning or
malfunctioning depends greatly on the interacting mechanisms to which all mar-
ket participants are subject. Mostly, financial crises arise from several failures of
those mechanisms, which consist commonly of underestimation, misinterpretation,
or even oversight of essential risks. Academic research tries to respond to demands
of the financial industry by exploring some of the several aspects and expressions of
risk. In line with academic responses, the purpose of the present dissertation is to
provide an investigation on some praxis-relevant attributes of three major financial
risks: credit, recovery and liquidity.
National and supranational regulation aims to ensure a stable basis for transactions
of financial securities which are undertaken within financial markets. Nonetheless,
legal frameworks are not sufficient to eliminate financial risk. Many multilateral fi-
nancial contracts feature counterparty risk, which is the possibility that an involved
party fails to accomplish some contractual agreement. One of the essential and ba-
sic types of financial contracts are bonds, which are debt obligations issued by a
sponsoring institution, the issuer, who promises to pay in a timely manner some
contractually agreed amount of capital to the counterparty, the bondholder. The
failure of the issuer to fulfill the repayment schedule and eventually other protective
clauses is known as default. Credit risk is the counterparty risk from the viewpoint
of the bondholder or simply the uncertainty of the occurrence of default. Moreover,
almost every financial obligation involving a creditor and a debtor embeds credit
risk. The current financial crisis, originated in the underestimation of credit risk of
mortgage borrowers in the United States, can be regarded as a collective and global
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failure in control and screening systems of financial institutions and authorities.
Although financial entities and market regulators have access to state-of-the-art
methods of risk management, the credit meltdown caused by the subprime crisis
was unavoidable. Financial markets lacked of confidence, financial intermediaries
reduced or abstained of taking credit risk exposure the following days, weeks and
months after the crash of the investment banking industry. This lack of available
capital extended over other business sectors and soon the global economy activity
slowed down because credit risk skyrocketed.
Recovery risk is the immediate relative of credit risk. When payments are not paid
as contractually arranged or some covenant is violated, default event occurs. The
lender faces the uncertainty about the amount to be received in those cases when
some legal clauses of the contract are infringed. This uncertainty is known as recov-
ery risk and embeds two basic unknowns: date and amount of repayment. During
the current financial crisis, when some of the largest investment companies were
about to collapsed, the uncertainty of repayment amount increased and uncertainty
about repayment date augmented even more. Increased credit and recovery risks
depressed investors economic expectations. Because institutions reduced their risk
acceptance, lending and borrowing were two functions of capital markets which were
deficients. Despite of the combine efforts of central banks to reactivate the finan-
cial system, capital was a scarce resource. Capital markets suffered under liquidity
problems, finance and refinance mechanisms evidenced serious traumas. Financial
intermediaries not only reduced their exposure to credit and recovery risks but also
to liquidity risk by maintaining large cash positions. Capital within financial mar-
kets dried up. Many economies entered into recession.
The three fundamental financial risks analyzed in this dissertation - credit, recovery
and liquidity - played a decisive roll in the evolution of the current global crisis.
In the following chapters these risks are investigated in three different scenarios,
considering different aspects and problems. Although the present work is not di-
rectly addressed to unveil the origins and development of the financial crisis, results
presented in this dissertation represent a small but further contribution in under-
standing those risks that shaped the current crisis.
Chapter 1 studies credit risk in an irreversible investment context. An investment
2
project is considered to be irreversible if its initial implementation costs are lost in
case of disinvestment, or if disinvestment is impossible at all. Individuals considering
to invest in such a project, which generates uncertain cash flows after implementa-
tion, face the problem of finding an optimal time to initiate the project, known as
investment time. McDonald and Siegel (McDonald & Siegel 1986) solve the invest-
ment problem by assuming that the implementation costs are paid in cash and that
the value of the project is given by a geometric Brownian motion. In Chapter 1 we
see how the solution of McDonald and Siegel changes if the irreversible investment
project is financed by issuance of defaultable corporate debt. The investor is as-
sumed to be a firm who borrows capital to finance the implementation costs of the
project. As compensation, lenders are rewarded with coupon payments on the face
value of the debt. However, the firm is empowered with the decision whether to con-
tinue or not paying coupons. If the firm opts to abstain of coupon payments, default
event occurs and the project is turned over to bondholders. Accordingly, the firm
faces an investment and default problem. By observing the evolution of the value of
the project, the firm decides on optimal investment and default policies. Intuitively,
the firm invests if cash flows are large and defaults if they are small. The analysis
demonstrates that optimal investment time is influenced unambiguously by credit
risk. A clear cut direction of this influence is not available since debt-financed in-
vestment time depends on the parameters governing the dynamics of the value of the
project, taxes and default costs. If the firm can exploit tax shields and default costs,
then a debt-financed investment occurs earlier than a cash-financed one. Contrary,
if tax shields are low and default costs are large such that capital costs are high,
then cash-financed investments occur earlier than debt-financed ones. Hence, the
framework provides investment policies for debt-financed and cash-financed projects,
which may differ because of tax shields and default costs, and allows firms to choose
between these financing types in order to respond optimally to their corporate goals
and interests.
Chapter 2 studies the risk structure of defaultable zero-coupon bonds which are fi-
nancial obligations paying at expiry a fixed amount of capital, the principal or face
value, in case default does not occur, and paying an unknown amount, the recovery
payment, at some unknown time in case default event occurs. The uncertainty over
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the repayment amount and repayment date is defined as recovery risk. One of the
main contributions of the analysis of Chapter 2 is the formulation of the riskiness of
defaultable zero-coupon bonds. In particular, default time is modeled as a random
variable, recovery time as a further random variable which is not necessarily identi-
cal to default time, and a random recovery payment. This approach has advantages
with respect to main stream methods when trying to project real-world situations,
because real-repayment dates of defaulted debt contracts are mostly unknown at
default and in particular different than default time. The large literature on de-
faultable bonds neglects the differentiation of recovery and default times.
In academic research we find two main methodologies for valuing defaultable bonds:
structural and reduced-form models. Merton (Merton 1974) is the pioneer of the
structural valuation method. He regards the payment of a zero-coupon bond as a
function of the value of the firm which is defined by a geometric Brownian motion,
and assumes that payment date is always at expiry irrespectively of occurrence of
default event. Later structural valuation research allows for recovery time to occur
at any time before expiry, however, it is imposed to equal default time. A different
approach to introduce default is the reduced-form methodology. While structural
models consider default event to be determined as the earliest moment the value of
the firm attains some pre-specified value, reduced-form models define default event
through a stochastic process which is independent of the value of the firm. Reduced-
form models are called intensity-based models when the default process is given by a
(doubly stochastic) Poisson process. Similar as the structural framework, intensity-
based valuation let default time to occur at any time before expiry and imposes no
difference between recovery and default times as in Duffie et al. (Duffie et al. 1996)
and Duffie and Singleton (Duffie & Singleton 1999).
In Chapter 2 we find valuations formulas for defaultable zero-coupon bonds which
include parameters defining default and recovery times as well as recovery payment.
Moreover, these valuations formulas are developed within a pure structural, a pure
intensity-based and a mixed framework. By separating default and recovery times,
we can combine the two main valuation methodologies, which is why the approach
opens new frontiers of research. In addition, the valuation formulas permit a larger
class of recovery payments than intensity-based models as the commonly used re-
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covery rates in line with Duffie et al. (Duffie et al. 1996).
The last part of this dissertation is dedicated to the measurement of financial risks.
In Chapter 3 we consider financial assets whose future prices are random. An in-
vestor holding a portfolio of those assets is interested in measuring the possibility
of value losses of his positions in the future. The investor may measure such risk
by using a conventional measure of risk as value-at-risk or expected shortfall. How-
ever, we acknowledge and warn investors for the shortcomings of conventional risk
measures applied directly on portfolio values: value uncertainty originated by lack
of marketability and by large volume trading is ignored. Contrary to the common
no-transaction-costs assumption, real financial markets exhibit several types of im-
perfections. Among others, buy and sell prices are usually not equal, trading volume
may induce an unambiguous impact on prices, and not all assets can be sold and
bought at every time. These attributes are some typical traces of liquidity risk.
Although liquidity risk represents a major source of risk in real financial markets,
as evidenced in the current financial crisis, academic research has shown little in-
terest for it. The prominent work of C¸etin et al. (C¸etin et al. 2002) introduces
liquidity risk by differentiating asset prices during financial crisis and during normal
trading periods. Nonetheless, other liquidity problems as lack of marketability re-
main excluded. The solid and innovative approach of Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi
& Scandolo 2008) for measuring financial risk under consideration of liquidity risk
tackles some ignored aspects of illiquidity mentioned previously. In particular, the
researchers assume random demand and supply curves and, most important, a liq-
uidity policy to be fulfilled by the investor. Acerbi and Scandolo put forward an
adjustment to the conventional portfolio value consisting of a transaction that op-
timizes the value of the remaining positions while satisfying the required liquidity
policy. The so called liquidity-adjusted risk measure and denoted by ρL is defined
on the space of portfolio weights and implied from a coherent measure of risk ap-
plied to the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L. This risk measure is convex on
the space of portfolio weights, as shown in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). However, this
result holds only if large volume trading does not impact prices and full execution
of transactions is always possible.
In Chapter 3 we use an extended Acerbi and Scandolo setup which includes abrupt
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price changes by large volume transactions and execution restrictions. Within this
framework the liquidity-adjusted risk measure is not convex anymore. Moreover,
large volume trading and partial execution increase the probability of large losses.
Accordingly, we learn from these findings that ignoring and neglecting some aspects
of liquidity risk leads us to wrong conjectures, which may us lead to take larger risks
than wished.
All three chapters deal with different aspects of financial risk which is the most
natural and essential component in the art of investment. Commonly, people accept
risk only when there is some reward, a profit, justifying the risk exposure. If some
aspects of risk are underestimated, misspecified or even neglected agents may take
too much risk for too little reward. This dissertation provides three examples of the
consequences of such misspecifications.
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Chapter 1
Credit Risk and Optimal
Investment
1.1 Introduction
The seminal work of McDonald and Siegel (McDonald & Siegel 1986) in 1986 shows
an alternative approach in investment theory. The authors consider an irreversible
investment project - disinvestment of the project is not possible once installed -
which, once in operation, produces risky cash flows. An agent willing to invest
in such a project will install it at that moment when expected cash flows are high
enough. In other words, investors search for an optimal investment time. In order to
determine this investment time, McDonald and Siegel realize that the opportunity
to invest in an irreversible project can be regarded as an American call option with
the value of the project as underlying asset and with the project’s implementation
cost as strike. By this observation and using techniques from financial engineering
the authors provide the optimal investment time, which is fully defined by an in-
vestment threshold: if the current value of the project rises above this threshold, a
firm should invest in the project at the earliest time this boundary is reached.
After the work of McDonald and Siegel a growing number of publications and arti-
cles on this subject has appeared, some of those relax certain assumptions, consider
more complex scenarios and make further extensions. Some of these improvements
are documented in the work of Dixit and Pindyck (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). Among
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other frameworks these authors consider options to invest in an irreversible project
and options to abandon an operating project. Nonetheless, they do not present a
model where both options are enclosed in one investment problem. Additionally,
none of the models in (Dixit & Pindyck 1994) are subjected to financial constraints.
These shortcomings are addressed in studies of Trigeorgis (Trigeorgis 1993), Trige-
orgis (Trigeorgis 1996) and Sabarwal (Sabarwal 2005). The first author identifies
the advantages of having financial flexibility by considering debt financing. How-
ever, Trigeorgis’ models are time-discrete and highly simplified. Sabarwal develops a
more complex framework, where the firm finances project’s costs with risky coupon
bonds. Default occurs when revenue rate falls below coupon rate, forcing the firm
to turn over current revenue to lenders. However, in case of default the firm is not
obliged to surrender the project or any other asset to the lenders. Since the issued
coupon bonds are perpetuities and given the nature of the dynamics of the value
of the project, default occurs in several occasions. Despite the numerous defaults,
lenders neither cancel nor sell the debt contract, instead they observe passively how
default events occur. This feature makes Sabarwal framework unrealistic.
In the present work we analyze an irreversible investment problem where the
project’s implementation costs are financed by risky debt in form of defaultable cor-
porate bonds. In other words, the investment project in our setup is debt-financed,
different to cash-financed investments as those from McDonald and Siegel, and Dixit
and Pindyck. In that context, firms have to find out not only the optimal investment
time but also the optimal default time of interest payments at which the project is
turned over to lenders. Similar as in the work of McDonald and Siegel (McDonald
& Siegel 1986) we characterize an investment boundary and, additionally, a default
boundary. Optimal investment is determined under these conditions.
In situations when the project is already operating and the value of the project
reaches the default boundary, it is more convenient for the firm to default and turn
over the project to debt holders than keeping the project alive. Thus, debt holders
are exposed to default risk. As compensation for risk taking, debt holders demand
higher coupon payments and lower prices of corporate bonds, lowering proceeds of
the firm from bond sales. In some cases when coupon payments are high, available
capital to cover the implementation costs is low, which delays investment. Hence,
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default risk of corporate bonds has a significant influence on the optimal investment
strategy as well as for the value of the bonds. In order to provide - in some extent
- analytical solutions of the investment problem, the defaultable bonds analyzed in
this model are coupon bonds, without maturity and constant coupon rate, known
as consols. Infinite maturity allows for an analytical valuation formula for the de-
faultable bonds. This in turn facilitates the valuation of the project which depends
on the value of the bonds.
Recently, Sundaresan and Wang (Sundaresan & Wang 2007) present a model of irre-
versible investments where the equity holders of a firm can renegotiate the terms of
debt. Equity holders choose the optimal investment time and coupon to maximize
the value of the firm. Once the investment is operating, equity holders may threaten
to default on debt. In this case debt holders may want to renegotiate the debt con-
tract via a Nash bargaining game. In the present analysis equity holders choose a
default time which maximizes the equity value, given the terms of debt. Hence, the
present work and that of Sundaresan and Wang are complementary works, since
Sundaresan and Wang do not provide an optimal default boundary. Morellec and
Schu¨rhoff in (Morellec & Schu¨rhoff 2007) put forward an irreversible investment
framework where investment and default time are endogenously determined. Fur-
thermore, the firm decides on the coupon level of the issued debt to finance the
investment project. The backbone of the their analysis relies in the personal tax
advantages of the investors. The authors proceed similar as in the framework of this
chapter when computing investment and default boundaries. Contrary to Morellec
and Schu¨rhoff, we use a verification theorem to prove optimality of our results.
Additionally, the present study analyzes the distribution probability of default as
well as expected life (or expected default time) of corporate bonds . Defaultable
bonds have been profoundly investigated in several works. The most relevant re-
search for this framework is rooted in the works of Merton (Merton 1974) and Black
and Cox (Black & Cox 1976). Here the authors price defaultable bonds with finite
maturity, where default can only happen at maturity. Merton’s study, where the
default boundary equals the stock value at maturity, presents a closed-form solution
for zero-coupon bonds with finite maturity as well as for coupon bonds with infinite
maturity. Black and Cox specify the closed-form valuation formula for zero-coupon
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bonds when the default boundary evolves exponentially in time. Further research
as in Leland (Leland 1994), Leland and Toft (Leland & Toft 1996) and Duffie and
Lando (Duffie & D. Lando 2001) among other includes dividend and coupon pay-
ments, taxes and frictional default costs. These advances are incorporated in the
present analysis of defaultable coupon bonds. By assuming existence of taxes and
frictional default costs, investment strategy depends substantially on the financing
form.
There are two main virtues of debt financing absent in cash financing which influ-
ence the investment problem unambiguously. First, debt financing allows firms to
shift some risk to lenders because firms can default on debt. Second, tax and default
costs represent important determinants of the investment boundary . In line with
these characteristics, debt financing induce an earlier or later investment time than
cash financing. Consequently, firms regard debt or cash financing as an additional
alternative to their investment problem, and choose the financing type that matches
their corporate goals the best.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes risky
nature of the irreversible investment project. Section 1.3 presents optimal invest-
ment and default times. At the end of this section debt financed and cash financed
projects are compared. Section 1.4 exhibits risk characteristics of corporate debt.
Section 1.5 summaries and concludes this chapter.
1.2 Risky Investment Projects
Consider an investment project with risky future revenue and a firm which contem-
plates the possibility of investing in that project. In order to make an investment
decision, the firm has to make conjectures about future performance of the project.
Riskiness of the investment problem is captured in a time-continuous stochastic sce-
nario embedded in a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with a filtration (Ft)t≥0 fulfilling all
usual conditions. Conjectures about project’s performance are based on this prob-
ability structure. The project is an irreversible investment meaning that once the
project is installed, disinvestment is not possible or at extremely high costs. The
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value of the irreversible investment project at time t is denoted by Vt and follows a
geometric Brownian motion
dVt = µVtdt+ σVtdWt,
where Wt is a standard Wiener process and parameters µ and σ ≥ 0 represent con-
stant and deterministic drift rate and volatility, respectively. The project generates
after-tax cash flows, which are denoted by Dt and are defined by
dDt = δVtdt,
where δ ≥ 0 represents the dividend rate that flows to equity holders. Assume that
the firm is unlevered and is run by its equity holders. In this sense, equity holders’
cash flow, i.e. dividend payments Dt, is the relevant quantity needed for investment
decisions. Let implementation costs of the project I be deterministic, constant and
positive, and consider no operational costs.
Additionally, assume that the risk-free interest rate r is deterministic and constant,
and all market participants are risk neutral.
1.3 Optimal Investment Time and Endogenous
Default Time
The investment problem for equity holders consists of two issues: (1) to find an
optimal investment time for the project that is financed by defaultable corporate
bonds, and (2) to choose the optimal time to default outstanding bonds, after the
project has been installed. The solution proposed in this analysis is based on back-
ward induction, solving first for the optimal default time, calculating the value of
the investment, and finally determining the optimal investment time.
Following sections are organized as follows: Section 1.3.1 introduces the frame-
work, in Section 1.3.2 optimal default time is determined as well as bonds’s price
and project’s equity value. Section 1.3.3 is addressed to solve for optimal invest-
ment time. Finally, Section 1.3.4 provides a comparison between firms financing the
project with defaultable bonds and firms financing the project with cash.
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1.3.1 Corporate Financing
Before investment, the firm possesses own capital K < I. In order to invest in the
project the firm needs to raise additional capital I − K by selling firm’s shares or
by borrowing from a third party. The former case leads to the same investment
problem proposed by McDonald and Siegel (McDonald & Siegel 1986). Hence, we
draw our attention to the latter case.
The firm issues coupon bonds in order to raise funds. Coupon rate is c ≥ 0 which
is paid continuously over time up to infinity. Lenders are willing to accept the debt
contract if bonds value equals the expected discounted future coupon payments.
By debt financing the firm profits from tax shields on interest payments, because
interests expenses are tax deductible. In other words and assuming a constant tax
rate θ ∈ (0, 1), the firm tax payments are reduced by tax shields of θc. Under these
circumstances, the after-tax cash flows for equity holders equal
δVt − (1− θ)c.
Since the project’s implementation costs are financed by selling corporate bonds,
the firms chooses time τ which maximizes the sum of equity holder and bond values
minus implementation costs, provided that the additional capital from bond sale is
large enough. Let the sum of equity holder value and debt be given by a function f
of the project’s value Vt, hence the firms investment problem is given by
sup
t
E
[
e−rt (f(Vt)− I)
∣∣F0] ,
provided that d(Vτ ) ≥ I −K.
1.3.2 Corporate Bonds and Default Time
To derive optimal investment time τ , we proceed with a backward analysis of the
investment/default problem by assuming that the firm has already installed and op-
erates the project with debt issuance. Once invested in the project, the firm cannot
suspend it or abandon it because it is irreversible. Nonetheless, if the operating
project is tangled in substantially adverse conditions the firm may opt to default
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on debt, in which case the project is turned over to debt holders with a frictional
loss of value α ∈ (0, 1)1. The firm opts to default, only if renouncing on the project
is a better and more profitable option than keeping it operating. Hence, the firm
chooses a default time TB on an operating project such that the expected payoff
of the project is maximized at TB. Optimal default time is the first-passage time
T (VB) = inf {t ≥ 0 : Vt ≤ VB} that the project’s value reaches a deterministic and
constant default boundary VB. The maximizing problem of the firm can be formally
stated as follows. Let current time be t, then default time TB solves
sup
T
E
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(δVs − (1− θ)c)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (1.1)
This problem has been studied in several works, the closest analysis are those in
Duffie and Lando (Duffie & D. Lando 2001) and in Leland and Toft (Leland & Toft
1996). In order to use the results of these studies, consider following assumptions
that are necessary for solving the investment problem.
Assumption 1.3.1.
• Let parameters δ, c, r, I, σ and µ be deterministic, constant, positive and
r > µ.
• There exists no transaction costs and operational costs of the project.
According to Duffie and Lando, optimal equity holders value denoted by w(Vt)
which equals the supremum of after-tax cash flows (1.1) solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman differential equation
w′(v)µv +
1
2
w′′(v)σ2v2 − rw(v) = (1− θ)c− δv, v > VB,
with boundary conditions
w(v) = 0, v ≤ VB,
and
w′(VB) = 0.
1From the irreversible nature of the project one should expect that frictional loss α is close to
1.
13
By solving this differential equations with these conditions we have
VB =
γ(r − µ)(1− θ)c
r(1 + γ)δ
, (1.2)
where γ = −β2 and β2 is the negative solution2 of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0, (1.3)
which is given by
β2 =
−m−√m2 + 2rσ2
σ2
. (1.4)
Thus, whenever current project value Vt falls below VB the firm defaults. Since
maturity of issued bonds and project’s life are infinite, expected value of cash flows
depends only on current value.3 Hence, the expected value of cash flows or equity
holders value is given by
F (Vt) := w(Vt) =
δVt
r − µ −
δVB
r − µ
(
Vt
VB
)−γ
+ (θ − 1)c
r
(
1−
(
Vt
VB
)−γ)
, (1.5)
and the corresponding expected present value of the coupon payments before default
is given by
d(Vt) =
c
r
+
(
δ(1− α)VB
r − µ −
c
r
)(
Vt
VB
)−γ
. (1.6)
Notice that the debt-financed value of the operating project, denoted by f(Vt), is
given by the sum of equity holders value and debt value as following
f(Vt) = F (Vt) + d(Vt) =
δVt
r − µ + θ
c
r
−
(
αδVB
r − µ + θ
c
r
)(
Vt
VB
)−γ
, (1.7)
which coincides with the value of a firm whose unique asset is the irreversible project
and the only liabilities the outstanding coupon bonds. Further, notice that the value
of a firm with the irreversible project as unique asset but without outstanding debt
(and hence no possibility of default) denoted by f˜(Vt) equals the expected present
value of the dividend stream, i.e.
f˜(Vt) = E
[∫ ∞
t
dDs
∣∣∣∣Ft] = δ · E [∫ ∞
t
Vsds
∣∣∣∣Ft] = δVtr − µ.
We left the discussion and investigation on differences between project values f and
f˜ for further sections. In line with our arguments, we call projects financed by debt
levered projects and projects financed with cash unlevered projects.
2The solutions of the quadratic equation (1.3) are denoted with β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 as in Dixit
and Pindyck (Dixit & Pindyck 1994).
3For more details consult (Leland & Toft 1996).
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1.3.3 Investment Threshold
After debt and equity values are determined, it is possible to move to the next
level in the backward analysis to infer optimal investment time. For this consider
the problem of the firm already proposed in Section 1.3.1, where equity holders are
interested in financing the implementation costs by debt issuance. At investment
time τ , the project yields an equity value of F (Vt), bonds are issued and sold for
d(Vt) and implementation costs amount I. This implies that the firm’s problem at
current time t = 0 can be written as
sup
t
E
[
e−rt (F (Vt) + d(Vt)− I)
∣∣F0] . (1.8)
Recall that the expected value of the project f at time t is the sum of debt and
equity values. Consequently, the optimal reward function for the firm can be written
as
g∗(V0) = ess sup
t
E
[
e−rt (f(Vt)− I)
∣∣F0] .
Similar as before, the firm invests in the project at the first-passage time τ(VI) =
inf {t ≥ 0 : Vt ≥ VI} at which the value of the project reaches a deterministic, con-
stant investment boundary VI . Notice that at investment time τ(VI) the revenue
from bonds’ sale plus initial own capital of the firm must be large enough to cover
project’s implementation costs, i.e. we must have d(Vτ ) ≥ I−K. Otherwise the firm
does not have enough capital to meet implementation expenses of the project and
cannot invest. Closed-form solutions for g∗(v) as for VI are not available. However,
it is possible to characterize the investment threshold as follows.
Proposition 1.3.2. Under Assumption 1.3.1, let VB be given by (1.2) and VI be
the solution of
−
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
β1 + γ
β1
)
V γBV
−γ
I +
δ
r − µ
(
β1 − 1
β1
)
VI − I + θ c
r
= 0, (1.9)
where β1 is the positive solution of (1.3). Provided that d(VI) ≥ I − K, then VI
solves the investment problem in (1.8) if
VI ≥ rI − θc
δ
. (1.10)
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Proof. Let g(t, Vt) = e
−rt (f(Vt)− I) be the reward function and g∗(v) the optimal
reward function with g∗(v) = ess supt E [g(t, Vt)| v]. Note that the project is not
executed if the reward function is negative. Hence the investment problem can be
regarded as
g∗(V0) = ess sup
t
E [ g˜(t, Vt)| F0] ,
where g˜(t, v) := max [g(t, v), 0] is continuous and non-negative. Consider the optimal
investment time as the first-passage time τ(Vτ ) = inf {t ≥ 0 : Vt ≥ VI}. The optimal
reward function g∗, solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman differential equation
µv
∂g∗(v)
∂v
+
1
2
σ2v2
∂2g∗(v)
∂v2
− rg∗(v) = 0 for v < VI , (1.11)
with boundary condition
g∗(v) = f(v)− I for v ≥ VI , (1.12)
and smooth fit condition
∂g∗(VI)
∂v
=
δ
r − µ + γ
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)
V γBV
−γ−1
I . (1.13)
Condition (1.12) indicates that at any transgression of boundary VI it is optimal to
exercise the option, i.e. to invest in the project. Expression (1.13) is the smooth-
pasting condition derived from f(Vt) in (1.7). Assume that optimal reward function
has the following form g∗(v) = A1vβ1 +A2vβ2 where A1, A2, β1 and β2 are constants.
Coefficients β1/2 can be calculated easily from (1.11), where
β1/2 =
−m±√m2 + 2rσ2
σ2
, (1.14)
with m = µ− σ2
2
, β1 > 1, β2 < 0 and γ = −β2 as in the previous subsection4. Since
the value of the investment project g∗(v) needs to be zero when v = 0, we have
A2 = 0. Hence
A1 =
δ
r − µ
V 1−β1I
β1
+
γ
β1
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)
V γBV
−γ−β1
I . (1.15)
Equation (1.9) follows straightforwardly from this expression.
Existence of VI . Let the left hand side of equation (1.9) be a function h(x) with
domain R++ given by
h(x) = −ηx−γ + φx+ χ, (1.16)
4The coefficients β1 and β2 coincide with those in (1.3).
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where
η =
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
β1 + γ
β1
)
V γB , φ =
δ
r − µ
(
β1 − 1
β1
)
,
χ = θ
c
r
− I.
Notice that η, φ > 0 for α, δ, θ, r σ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that h′(x) > 0 and h′′(x) <
0 for x > 0, i.e. h is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Furthermore, h is
continuous and limx→0+ h(x) = −∞ and limx→∞ h(x) =∞. Thus, as a consequence
of the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique value x∗ > 0 such that
h(x∗) = 0.
Furthermore, in the exercise region v ≥ VI , the optimal regard function can never
be less than the induced equity value F (v) and the initial endowment K, i.e.
g∗(v) ≥ F (v)−K ≥ 0 for v ≥ VI ,
or equivalently
F (v) + d(v)− I ≥ F (v)−K ⇔ d(v) ≥ I −K,
for v ≥ VI . In particular, we must have d(VI) ≥ I −K.
Optimality of τ(VI). This part of the proof is based on the verification Theorem
10.4.1 in Øksendal (Øksendal 2003). Consider the function
ψ(v) =
{
A1v
β1 ; 0 ≤ v < VI
f(v)− I v ≥ VI ,
(1.17)
defined on R+, where A1 is given by equation (1.15) and VI from (1.9). Let w(s, v) =
e−rsψ(v). Most conditions (i)-(xi) of Theorem 10.4.1 in Øksendal are fulfilled by
construction of investment time τ(VI) and investment boundary VI . Note that
w ∈ C1, w ∈ C2 for v 6= VI , and Lw = 0 for v ≤ VI where L is the second order
partial differential operator. Thus, it remains to be shown:
(1) w ≥ g on R2+, i.e. we need to verify that
A1v
β1 ≥ f(v)− I.
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Define u(v) := A1v
β1 − (f(v)− I). Notice that limv→0 u(v) =∞, limv→∞ u(v) =∞,
u(VI) = 0, u
′(VI) = 0 and u′′(v) > 0 for v ∈ R+. Hence, the global minimum of u
occurs at v = VI , which implies w ≥ g.
(2) Lw ≤ 0 on v > VI . Equivalently, it must be shown that for all v > VI
µv
∂ψ(v)
∂v
+
1
2
σ2v2
∂2ψ(v)
∂v2
− rψ(v) ≤ 0.
This expression yields the following inequality
− δv − θc+ rI +
[
r + γ
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
− 1
2
σ2γ2
](
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)
V γBv
−γ ≤ 0. (1.18)
Recall that m = µ− 1
2
σ2 and consider the following quadratic function
Q(x) := −1
2
σ2x2 +
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
x+ r = −1
2
σ2x2 +mx+ r,
with roots
x1/2 =
−m±√m2 + 2rσ2
−σ2 .
By definition of γ and equation (1.4), we have Q(γ) = 0. Further, note that the term
in the brackets of inequality (1.18) is Q(γ). Thus, inequality (1.18) is equivalent to
−δv − θc+ rI ≤ 0.
Accordingly, last equation is satisfied for all v > VI if and only if
VI ≥ rI − θc
δ
. (1.19)
Hence, τ is the optimal investment strategy and
g∗ = w, (1.20)
is the optimal reward function if condition (1.19) holds. This completes the proof.

For applicability of the proposed solution to the investment problem it is necessary
to compare investment and default boundaries. For this purpose, suppose that
conditions d(VI) ≥ I−K and VI ≥ rI−θcδ are satisfied and that VB > VI . In this case,
if the project’s value reaches the investment threshold at some time, the optimal
18
strategy is to invest in the project and default on debt immediately thereafter.
Although the strategy is optimal, it seems unrealistic. A firm may not want to incur
in investment decisions and debt issuance if in the next second debt is going to be
defaulted and the project is going to be turned over. In this model default threshold
is never greater than the investment threshold, i.e. VI > VB, if initial investment
costs are larger than present value of coupon payments multiplied by a certain factor
ξ.
Proposition 1.3.3. Investment threshold that solves equation (1.9) is never smaller
than default threshold given in (1.2), i.e. VI > VB, if and only if
I > ξ
c
r
, (1.21)
where
ξ :=
γ
(1 + γ)β1
[β1 − 1− (β1 + γ) (θ + α(1− θ))] . (1.22)
Proof. Let h(x) by defined as in the proof of Proposition 1.3.2. Since h is strictly
increasing then VI > VB if and only if h(VI) > h(VB). Notice that h(VI) = 0, hence
it must hold h(VB) < 0. After rearrangement of terms, the function h(v) at VB can
be written as
h(VB) = −θ γc
β1r
− I + δ
r − µ
VB
β1
(β1(1− α)− 1− αγ) (1.23)
=
γc
r(1 + γ)β1
[β1 − 1− (β1 + γ) (θ + α(1− θ))]− I, (1.24)
where the last equality is obtained by plugging the expression for VB of (1.2) in the
first equality and by redistributing terms. Thus, h(VB) < 0 whenever
I >
γc
r(1 + γ)β1
[β1 − 1− (β1 + γ) (θ + α(1− θ))] . (1.25)

Note that the coupon rate c is an important determinant of the investment boundary
VI . When the coupon rate is low enough, the lower the coupon rate c, the lower
financing costs of a levered project and the earlier the investment time. These
consequences occur because default boundary is so low that capital collected from
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bond issuance is also remarkably low and defaulting seems to be very unlikely. Under
these conditions, debt financing exhibits almost no differences to cash financing. On
the other hand, if the coupon rate is high enough, then the greater the coupon rate
c, the earlier the investment time. This implication follows from the increased tax
shields the firm captures by debt financing. In this sense, the increased financing
costs are compensated by the increased tax benefits which can be only received if
the firm invests. Thus, as tax shields grow the firm has more incentives to invest
earlier. The following lemma formalizes this discussion.
Lemma 1.3.4. Investment threshold VI that solves equation (1.9) is inversely related
to coupon rate if c < M , and positively related if c > M , i.e.
V ′I (c) < 0 if c < M and V
′
I (c) > 0 if c > M, (1.26)
where
M =
 θ
r (1 + γ)
(
αδ
r−µκ+
θ
r
)(
β1+γ
β1
)
 1γ v
κ
, (1.27)
with κ = γ(r − µ)(1− θ)/r(1 + γ)δ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.1.

We examine next the difference between financing the project with debt and cash.
1.3.4 Unlevered and Levered Projects
Consider the case of a firm which finances the implementation costs without debt
issuance. In this case the firm cannot default on coupon payments and henceforth,
once invested, it has to keep operating the project ad infinitum. Formally, let Vt
be a geometric Brownian motion described in (1.2) and I the project’s costs. The
equity holders’ problem is to find an optimal reward function g(v) such that
g(v) := sup
t
E
[
e−rt
(∫ ∞
t
δe−r(s−t)Vsds− I
)∣∣∣∣F0] , (1.28)
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where v = V0. Let again τ(V
∗) = inf {t ≥ 0 |Vt ≥ V ∗} be the optimal investment
time given the low boundary V ∗. Following Øksendal (Øksendal 2003), function
g(v) solves the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman differential equation
∂g(v)
∂v
µv +
1
2
σ2v2
∂2g(v)
∂v2
(v)− rg(v) = 0, for v < V ∗, (1.29)
with the following boundary conditions:
g(V ∗) =
δ
r − µV
∗ − I, (1.30)
∂g(V ∗)
∂v
=
δ
r − µ. (1.31)
Let the optimal reward function be of the form g(v) = Avβ for some constants A
and β. Then using differential equation (1.29) and boundary conditions (1.30) and
(1.31) the investment threshold for unlevered project is given by
V ∗ =
r − µ
δ
β1
β1 − 1I, (1.32)
where β1 is again the positive solution of quadratic equation (1.3). This investment
boundary corresponds to results in (Dixit & Pindyck 1994).
Consider now a firm which is planning to finance the project’s costs with debt.
The firm invests in the project whenever v ≥ VI , where VI is given in (1.9), and
d(v) ≥ I −K, where d(v) corresponds to the value of debt given in (1.6). Assume
a special case of no taxes and no liquidation costs in case of default, i.e. θ = α = 0.
By equation (1.9), the optimal investment threshold for the levered project is given
by
VI =
r − µ
δ
β1
β1 − 1I,
and hence VI = V
∗. In a frictionless world without taxes the manner how the
firm finances investment project is not relevant, although the firm can default on
coupon payments in case of debt financing. The reason for this result is rooted in
the Modigliani Miller Theorem in (Modigliani & Miller 1958). To see this, recall the
interpretation of the project’s present value made in previous sections as a company
with only one asset. Accordingly, consider an unlevered company which value equals
equity value since there is no debt. The investment project yields dividend cash flows
δVt and where their expected value is give by
f˜(V0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rsδVsds
∣∣∣∣F0] = δr − µV0,
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which represents equity value. Now consider a levered company. The value of the
firm at time zero is the sum of equity and debt value and is given by
f(V0) =
δV0
r − µ + θ
c
r
−
(
αδVB
r − µ + θ
c
r
)(
V0
VB
)−γ
. (1.33)
If there are no taxes and no default costs, θ = 0 and α = 0, then the value of the
levered firm is
δ
r − µV0, (1.34)
just the same as the unlevered firm. Hence, both companies face the same problem
at investment time and henceforth their investment thresholds coincide.
Consequently, optimal investment thresholds of unlevered and levered projects differ
because the existence of tax shields and default costs. Dependencies of the invest-
ment threshold on taxes and default costs are characterized as follows.
Lemma 1.3.5. Let α, θ ∈ (0, 1). Optimal investment threshold VI is increas-
ing in frictional default costs α and it is decreasing in tax rate θ whenever VI ≥(
β1+γ
β1
)1/γ
VB.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.

Moreover, because of tax benefits and default costs, investment threshold VI may
differ from investment threshold V ∗. In other words, when taxes and default costs
exist, optimal investment time among financing types may differ. Firms invest in
unlevered projects earlier than in levered ones when tax benefits are low and default
costs are high. In this situation firms are not able to extract value from the issuance
of defaultable bonds since their value is low. Similarly, if tax benefits are high and
default costs are low firms will invest earlier in levered projects than in unlevered
ones. This intuitive reflexions can be stated as follows.
Lemma 1.3.6. Firms invest earlier in unlevered projects than in levered projects,
i.e. τ(V ∗) ≤ τ(VI), if
V ∗ ≤
[(
1 + (1− θ) αδ
θ(1 + γ)
(
γ + β1
β1
))] 1
γ
VB.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.6.3.

Hence, firms can, with information about taxes and default costs, determine which
financing option is of their convenience. The reader should be aware that this model
does not aim to provide arguments which indicate why investing early (or later) can
be convenient for a firm. However, these arguments can be found straightforwardly
by glancing at R&D investment projects for example, where the first firm that devel-
ops a new product not only obtains the patent of the project but also monopolistic
control over the product’s market. In such a scenario, the firm is interested in
investing optimally and as early as possible.
Numerical Example
Consider the following example which has similar parameter values as the illustration
in the work of Duffie and Lando (Duffie & D. Lando 2001):
µ = 0.0113, r = 0.06, σ = 0.05, δ = 0.05, I = 100, c = 8.
For these parameters, the quadratic equation previously introduced has solutions
γ = 12 and β1 = 4. Assuming current value V0 = 100, taxes θ = 0.35 and default
costs α = 0.3, the optimal thresholds are
VB = 78, VI = 96.8150, V
∗ = 130,
where V ∗ is the optimal investment trigger for unlevered projects. Under this pa-
rameter constellation, firms financing the project with debt invest earlier than firms
financing the project with cash.
As examined in Section 1.3.4, tax shields and default costs constitute a fundamental
key for the determination of optimal investment and default strategies of levered
firms. The next figures illustrate this importance.
Figure 1.1 presents default and investment thresholds VB and VI for levered projects
when default costs are α = 0.3. We observe that for this parameter constellation
1) the investment threshold is always greater than default threshold and 2) both
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boundaries decrease when taxes increase. Tax shields increase along with the tax
rate. Since the firm benefits from tax shields only if it invests in the project, the
opportunity costs of waiting increase if the tax rate increases. Hence, the firm waits
less if taxes increase, i.e. the investment threshold falls as taxes grow. This ex-
plains the falling shape of the investment threshold. Similarly, once the project is
installed, the firm exploits tax shields as long coupons are paid. Hence, cash flows
increase along increments in the tax rate only if coupon payments are made on a
timely manner. Therefore, the firm waits longer to default on debt if the tax rate
increases. In this example, the value of the debt at investment time d(VI) is always
larger than implementations costs and ranges between 128.93 and 125.19. Since in-
vestment threshold for unlevered projects V ∗ equals 130, firms invest always earlier
in levered than in unlevered projects.
Figure 1.1: Investment VI and default VB thresholds for different tax rates θ
Figure 1.2 shows the impact of default costs in investment threshold when taxes are
θ = 0.35. Default threshold VB stays constant at level 78 and investment threshold
for unlevered projects at 130. As default costs α increase the value of the bonds at
investment time d(VI) falls. Clearly, the greater α, the less the bondholders recover
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at default and the less they are willing to pay for the bonds. Hence, for each V0
the profitability of the project decreases as default costs α increase. Thus, the firm
waits longer in order to attained a larger profit.
The last two figures present a more detailed illustration of Proposition 1.3.2. Figure
1.2 exhibits function h(v) of the proof of that proposition. We can identify the
strictly increasing and strictly concave shape of the function, which guaranties the
existence of only one optimal investment threshold VI .
Figure 1.2: Investment VI and default VB thresholds for different default costs α
Figure 1.4 displays two functions: G(v) and f(v)− I. The former is given by
G(v) = A1v
β1 ,
and corresponds to the solution of the differential equation in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1.3.2. The function f(v)− I is the sum of the equity holders value and bonds
value minus implementation costs. As demonstrated in the mentioned proof, G(v)
is always greater than f(v)− I. The optimal reward function g∗(v) consists of G(v)
for v < VI and of f(v)− I for v ≥ VI .
25
Figure 1.3: h(v) function
1.4 Credit Risk
This section analyzes the risk exposure associated with defaultable bonds. Buyers
of bonds are referred as lenders or debt holders and the firm issuing bonds is referred
as borrower or issuer. Lenders are subjected to firm’s default decision. Nonetheless,
within this framework, the firm sticks to an optimal default strategy meaning that it
is forced to default only when maintaining the project alive is suboptimal for equity
holders. Hence, lenders are able to measure default risk studying default threshold
given in equation (1.2) and the dynamics that govern the evolution of project’s value
Vt. Below we derive probability of default and expected default time.
1.4.1 Default Probability
We consider only situations when the project has been installed and is oper-
ating. Conditional default probability represents the likelihood of the project’s
value falling below default boundary at some future time given a current stock
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Figure 1.4: G(v) and f(v)− I functions
value. Formally, for an installed project with current value v and default time
TB := inf {τ ≥ t : Vτ ≤ VB} the conditional default probability is given by
Pv (TB <∞) = 1− Pv (TB =∞) =
{ (
VB
v
)|ν|+ν
for v > VB
1 otherwise,
where ν := µ/σ2−1/2. The last equality is obtained from the results in Borodin and
Salminen (Borodin & Salminen 2002) because Vt is a geometric Brownian motion
and since TB = inf {τ ≤ t : Vτ ≤ VB} = inf {τ ≤ t : Vτ = VB} for Vt > VB.
Notice that default probability is always one in cases where ν ≤ 0, that is when
the expected instantaneous mean return on the stock of the project lies below one
half of the project instantaneous volatility, formally µ ≤ σ2/2. Analogously, if the
project’s volatility is smaller than twice the expected mean return of the project’s
stocks, then default probability is less than one as long as v > VB. Following these
ideas, one can intuitively conjecture that high-volatility projects with poor rate of
return are more likely to get into financial distress than low-volatility projects with
high rate of return.
Moreover, denote Pv(TB ∈ dt) as the density of default time TB and consider the
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probability of default occurring before time T as follows5
Pv(TB < T ) =
∫ T
0
|ln (VB/v)|
σ
√
2pit3
(
VB
v
)ν
exp
(
−ν
2σ2t
2
− ln
2 (VB/v)
2σ2t
)
dt. (1.35)
Consider now the α-quantile function qα(Fv) of the conditional distribution function
Fv(t) := Pv(TB ≤ t) given by
qα(Fv) = inf {t ≥ 0 |Fv(t) ≥ α} .
This quantile gives the earliest time at which default occurs with probability of α.
Let
τˆ := qα(Fv),
and denote it as α-default time. When α is small, e.g. 0.1 per cent, investors may
use τˆ as an approximation for calculating maturity time of a non-defaultable coupon
bond with coupon rate c and face value (1−α)δVB/(r−µ). Lenders may make this
approximation in order to hedge their position in the bond or money market.
1.4.2 Expected Conditional Default Time
In addition, firm and lenders are interested in knowing the expected life of the bonds,
which is equivalent to find the expected value of default time TB. To determine this
expected time recall the density function of TB associated to the expression in (1.35).
Hence, expected default time conditional on current project value v can be calculated
by
Ev [TB| TB <∞] =
∫ ∞
0
tPv (TB ∈ dt)
=
∫ ∞
0
∣∣ln (VB
v
)∣∣
σ
√
2pit
(
VB
v
)ν
exp
(
−ν
2σ2t
2
− ln
2
(
VB
v
)
2σ2t
)
dt.
Notice that expected default time TB is conditioned on the set {TB <∞}. Re-
arranging terms and noting that ln2 (VB/v) = ln
2 (v/VB) the last equality can be
written as (
VB
v
)ν ∫ ∞
0
|ln (VB/v)|
σ
√
2pit
exp
(
−1
2
(
ln2 (v/VB) + ν
2σ4t2
σ2t
))
dt.
5See Borodin and Salminen (Borodin & Salminen 2002) for details.
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After some algebra this term can be expressed as
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| ∫ ∞
0
|ln (VB/v)|
σ
√
2pit
exp
(
−1
2
(
ln (v/VB) + |ν|σ2t
σ
√
t
)2)
dt.
Consider this integral as the following limit
lim
T→∞
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| ∫ T
0
|ln (VB/v)|
σ
√
2pit
exp
(
−1
2
(
ln (v/VB) + |ν|σ2t
σ
√
t
)2)
dt. (1.36)
The next computational steps are based on the work of Leland and Toft (Leland
& Toft 1996). Let σ¯ = 2 |ν|σ, Y = v2|ν| and YB = V 2|ν|B . Substitute this terms in
(1.36) which yields the following expression:
lim
T→∞
|ln (VB/v)|
Y σσ¯
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| ∫ T
0
σ¯Y√
2pit
exp
(
−1
2
(
ln (Y/YB) +
1
2
σ¯2t
σ¯
√
t
)2)
dt.
Substituting  = σ¯
√
t√
T
the last integral is given by
lim
T→∞
2 |ln (VB/v)|
Y σσ¯
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| ∫ σ¯
0
√
TY√
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(
ln (Y/YB) +
1
2
2T

√
T
)2)
d.
(1.37)
The integral in this term is the integral over the partial derivative of a European
call option with respect to volatility with underlying Y , strike YB, maturity T and
dividend yield as well as interest rate equaling zero. Assume v > VB as previously
which implies Y > YB. By the fundamental theorem of calculus and the valuation
formula for European options in the Black-Scholes model the expression in (1.37) is
given by
lim
T→∞
2 |ln (VB/v)|
Y σσ¯
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| [
Y N
(
ln (Y/YB) +
1
2
σ¯2T
σ¯
√
T
)
−YBN
(
ln (Y/YB)− 12 σ¯2T
σ¯
√
T
)
− (Y − YB)
]
= lim
T→∞
|ln (VB/v)|
|ν|σ2
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| [
−
(
1−N
(
ln (Y/YB) +
1
2
|ν|σ2T
σ
√
T
))
+
YB
Y
(
1−N
(
ln (Y/YB)− 12 |ν|σ2T
σ
√
T
))]
,
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where N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. In the last equality one
can substitute again Y and use the attributes of the normal distribution which yields
lim
T→∞
|ln (VB/v)|
|ν|σ2
(
VB
v
)ν−|ν| [
−N
(− ln (v/VB)− 12 |ν|σ2T
σ
√
T
)
+
(
VB
v
)2|ν|
N
(− ln (v/VB) + 12 |ν|σ2T
σ
√
T
)]
.
Notice that |ln (VB/v)| = ln (v/VB) because v > VB > 0. Hence, expected default
time follows straightforwardly from the last expression.
Proposition 1.4.1. Assume v > VB. The expected default time conditional on
current stock value v is given by
Ev [TB| TB <∞] = ln (v/VB)|ν|σ2
(
VB
v
)ν+|ν|
.
Accordingly, the expected life of bonds is the longer the further away the project’s
value v is from default boundary VB. This result confirms economic intuition. Fur-
ther, observe that expected default time is increasing in current stock value v and
decreasing in default boundary VB.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents an optimal investment strategy for an irreversible project fi-
nanced by defaultable bonds. In addition to investment threshold, the chapter shows
an optimal default strategy for the issued bonds. Projects financed with defaultable
debt and projects financed with cash are compared as well as their optimal invest-
ment strategy. In presence of taxes and default costs, optimal investment strategy
depends on the financing method. Moreover, risk embedded in defaultable bonds
allows those firms who choose this financing method to invest in the project earlier
than firms financing the project’s costs with cash, if the default threshold is small
enough. Default probability and expected default time are calculated in order to
quantify risk of the defaultable bonds.
Various extensions and modifications can be considered for the enrichment of the
model. Regarding a stochastic interest rate as a second risk factor or a variable
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coupon rate are two fundamental extensions that can be made. Irreversible invest-
ment problems with stochastic interest rates are analyzed in the work of Schulmerich
(Schulmerich 2005). However, the author does not consider issuance of defaultable
coupon bonds as a financing alternative. Analytical solutions of a model includ-
ing stochastic interest rates will be presumably not available and we will be likely
forced to recur to numerical methods. Nonetheless, a model that incorporates these
features would replicate real-world investment problems more accurately.
31
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1.3.4.
The lemma follows from the implicit function theorem used for the function h(VI , c)
presented in (1.16). Thus, consider
∂h
∂c
=
θ
r
− (1 + γ)
(
θ
r
+
αδκ
r − µ
)(
β1 + γ
β1
)(
VI
κ
)−γ
cγ,
∂h
∂VI
= γ
(
θ
r
+
αδκ
r − µ
)(
β1 + γ
β1
)
(VI)
−γ−1κγcγ−1 +
δ
r − µ
(
β1 − 1
β1
)
,
where κ = γ(r − µ)(1 − θ)/r(1 + γ)δ. The first order derivative of VI with respect
to c is given by
V ′I (c) = −
∂h
∂c
∂h
∂VI
,
by noticing that ∂h
∂VI
> 0. Hence, V ′I (c) < 0 if and only if
θ
r
− (1 + γ)
(
θ
r
+
αδκ
r − µ
)(
β1 + γ
β1
)(
VI
κ
)−γ
cγ > 0,
which is equivalent to
c <
 θ
r (1 + γ)
(
αδ
r−µκ+
θ
r
)(
β1+γ
β1
)
 1γ VI
κ
.

1.6.2 Proof of Lemma 1.3.5
To show the statement consider again the implicit function theorem for equation
(1.9). Hence, assuming that the investment trigger is a function of α and θ, one has
to show that
∂VI
∂α
≥ 0 and ∂VI
∂θ
≤ 0, (1.38)
for VI ≥ VB. Using the implicit function theorem for h given in (1.16) with respect
to α yields
∂VI
∂α
=
[
γ
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
γ + β1
β1
)
V γBV
−γ−1
I +
δ
r − µ
(
β1 − 1
β1
)]−1
· δVB
r − µ
(
γ + β1
β1
)
V γBV
−γ
I ≤ 0. (1.39)
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The partial derivative of h with respect to θ is given by
∂h
∂θ
= −V ′B
[
αδ
r − µ
(
γ + β1
β
)
V γBV
−γ
I + γ
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
γ + β1
β1
)
V γ−1B V
−γ
I
]
−c
r
((
β1 + γ
β1
)
V γBV
−γ
I − 1
)
, (1.40)
Since ∂h
∂VI
> 0,
∂VI
∂θ
= −
∂h
∂θ
∂h
∂VI
≤ 0 iff − ∂h
∂θ
≤ 0.
Because ∂VB
∂θ
= −γ(r−µ)c
r(1−γ)δ < 0 and the term in the brackets of (1.40) is positive, we
have ∂VI
∂θ
≤ 0 if (
β1 + γ
β1
)
V γBV
−γ
I − 1 ≤ 0,
or equivalently
VI ≥
(
β1 + γ
β1
)1/γ
VB,
which completes the proof.

1.6.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3.6.
Let h(v) be the function in the left side of equation (1.9) as defined in the proof of
Proposition 1.3.2. By inserting V ∗ in h one gets
h(V ∗) = −
(
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
γ + β1
β1
)(
VB
V ∗
)γ
+ θ
c
r
. (1.41)
Since h is strictly increasing and h(VI) = 0, then VI ≥ V ∗ is equivalent to h(V ∗) ≤ 0,
i.e. (
θ
c
r
+
αδVB
r − µ
)(
γ + β1
β1
)(
VB
V ∗
)γ
≥ θ c
r
. (1.42)
Solving this inequality for V ∗ one gets the condition of the Corollary:
V ∗ ≤
[(
1 + (1− θ) αδ
θ(1 + γ)
(
γ + β1
β1
))] 1
γ
VB. (1.43)

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Chapter 2
A Model on Default and Recovery
Times of Defaultable Bonds
2.1 Introduction
In order to analyze and value defaultable securities, we firstly need to set up a
framework describing default event. Issuers may default for different reasons, for
example lack of operating earnings, failure of maintaining certain financial ratios,1
bankruptcy, fraud, etc. The two most popular approaches for modeling default are
the structural and the intensity-based frameworks. In the first setup, pioneered
by Merton (Merton 1974), default occurs because the value of the issuer’s assets
falls below an acceptable level. In the second framework default is a random event
described by a point process unobservable on the default-free market. In this case,
default probability may be modeled in order to include some of the factors mentioned
above. Intensity-based models are presented in Duffie, Schroeder and Skiadas (Duffie
et al. 1996), Duffie and Singleton (Duffie & Singleton 1999), Jarrow and Yu (Jarrow
& Yu 2001) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2004) among others.
A further essential issue when modeling defaultable securities is the formulation
of recovery payment in case of default. In structural models, recovery payment is
defined as the remaining value of the issuer’s assets after or at default time, while
in intensity-based setups recovery payment is usually conceived as a fraction of a
1For example debt-to-equity and debt-to-assets ratio among others.
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similar but riskless security, a fraction of a fixed money amount or as a fraction of
its pre-default value. In case of default event, both valuation methodologies assume
that recovery payment occurs either at maturity or at default time, which clearly is
not always consistent with the real world. We drop the restrictive assumption that
recovery time must match either default time or maturity.
In addition, one of the main challenges that arises from market observations is the
need to incorporate correlation between default probability and recovery payment.
The empirical analysis in Altman et al. (Altman et al. 2005) and Frye (Frye 2000)
demonstrates that there exits a strong relationship between default and recovery
rates. Furthermore, recovery payments of defaulted companies may also depend
on economic-wide factors as documented in Acharya et al. (Acharya et al. 2007).
Results of their study indicate that recovery payments are lower during economy-
downturns and large during economy-upturns. Under the assumption of recovery
payment at maturity or default, recovery rates reflect only the state of the economy
at those points in time and will be inconsistent with empirical observations if real
recovery differs from those points in time. By letting recovery time occur at any
time after default, recovery rates will reflect the actual market conditions at the time
of payment which is in accordance with Acharya et al. (Acharya et al. 2007). In
line with this observation, we justify introducing a framework of defaultable bonds
where recovery time occurs at any time after default. Moreover, in our model we
can straightforwardly incorporate economic factors in default probabilities and in
recovery payments. In this sense, our model allow for integration of real world as-
pects that neither intensity-based nor structural models can offer.
Aware of the weaknesses of intensity-based and structural models, Jarrow (Jarrow
2001) introduces a new approach of valuing defaultable bonds where recovery rates
and default probabilities are correlated and depend on an economy-wide state vari-
able. Within his approach, equity prices depend on default event which results in
zero value of equity when default occurs. A zero equity value can only be accepted if
the company is liquidated. Thus, in cases when firms are reorganized, the approach
of Jarrow cannot be applied because equity value must not necessarily equal zero.
In this chapter we analyze an alternative valuation method defaultable for bonds
based on stochastic default and recovery times. The setup considers three method-
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ologies when defining default and recovery times: an intensity-based approach where
both times are defined via point processes, a structural approach where default and
recovery times occur at first-passage times of default-free market processes, and a
mixture approach which is a combination of the previous setups. The separation of
default and recovery times allow us to conceive and consider more realistic recovery
payments, which can support empirical evidence. In this chapter we face two pos-
sible formulation of recovery payments: a company-specific and an economy-wide
approach. For the company-specific approach the underlying determinant of recov-
ery payment is the company’s asset value2 and for the economy-wide factor a market
index or cycle-index is used.
By construction, the present model of defaultable bonds can combine aspects
of structural and reduced-form models. Bond valuation formulas as in Merton
(Merton 1974) and as in Duffie and Singleton (Duffie & Singleton 1999) can be de-
rived from the following general specification. Moreover, the pricing formula derived
in this chapter provides a pre-default bond value, as structural and intensity-based
valuation models, and additionally a post-default-pre-recovery bond value. The lat-
ter is known as distressed value.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces default and recovery pro-
cesses as well as the general market structure. In Section 3 we derive the main
result of the paper which is the price of defaultable bonds with stochastic recovery
and default times. The same section provides an analytical example of our valu-
ation formula for the intensity-based approach. We discuss company-specific and
an economy-wide specifications of recovery payments in Section 4. In Section 5 we
cover examples and applications of those recovery payments. Section 6 concludes
the chapter.
2Current and liquid asset as well as marketable securities can be consider as underlying factors
of recovery. Nonetheless, all company’s assets may be considered when the company is forced to
liquidation.
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2.2 Framework
2.2.1 Financial Market
Consider a financial market embedded in a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with a com-
plete and right-continuous filtration (Ft)t≥0 representing arrival of overall informa-
tion over time. Furthermore, assume the market is arbitrage-free and let P be an
equivalent martingale measure.
Securities are discounted with the instantaneous, continuously compounded inter-
est rate or short-rate rt. For instance let the interest rate be a ca`dla`g Ft-adapted
process and let the bank account or money-market account at time t ≥ 0 be
Bt = e
∫ t
0 rudu,
and the value, at time t, of a default-free zero-coupon bond with face value 1 and
maturity T be given by
P (t, T ) = EP
[
B−1T Bt
∣∣Ft] = EP [e− ∫ Tt rudu∣∣∣Ft] .
Additionally, consider two ca`dla`g Ft-adapted stochastic processes Yt and Zt repre-
senting the value of the assets of the firm and the recovery payment, respectively.
In Section 2.4 we provide some examples of the recovery process Zt which is de-
fined as a function of the assets’ value Yt which is seen as a solvency proxy of the
firm. Since the functional dependency between Zt and Yt is not required to derive
the pricing formulas below, we introduce these processes here without any further
specification. Moreover, we consider an Rn-valued, ca`dla`g Ft-adapted stochastic
process Vt = (V
1
t , . . . , V
n
t ) which describes other relevant state variables observed
in the financial market. In particular, under the structural and mixture approaches
presented at the end of this section, some V it represent additional solvency proxies
of the firm.3 We assume that all processes of the default-free market are traded.4
On the default-free market information is generated by the interest rate, the value
3The case V it = Yt for some i = {1, . . . , n} for all t ∈ R+ is not ruled out.
4Instead we can assume that the process Vt is not traded and that there are traded processes
Vi,t with i = 1, . . . , k, k ∈ N, which replicate Vt.
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of the assets, by recovery payment and by other state variables, i.e. information is
generated by the real-valued vector Σt = (rt, Yt, Zt, Vt), the state process, such that
for all5 t ≥ 0
Gt := σ (Σu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t) , (2.1)
where Gt ⊆ Ft for any t ∈ R+. Recovery payment is defined on the default-free
market because it depends on solvency of the firm as well as refinancing options,
which are all observed on the default-free market.
2.2.2 Default Time and Recovery Time
Before introducing the definitions of default and recovery times consider the fol-
lowing structure of the filtration (Ft)t≥0. Let the complete and right-continuous
sub-filtrations6 (Gt)t≥0, (Ht)t≥0 and (H∗t )t≥0 be such that for any t ∈ R+,
Ft = Gt ∨Ht ∨H∗t ,
i.e. the filtration Ft coincides with the smallest σ-field containing Gt, Ht and H∗t .
We define below the sub-filtrations Ht and H∗t , which represent the information
flow generated by default and recovery times, respectively. For the intensity-based
approach we demand Ht 6⊆ Gt and H∗t 6⊆ Gt for any t ∈ R+, for the structural
approach Ht,H∗t ⊆ Gt for all t ∈ R+, and for the mixture approach either Ht 6⊆ Gt
or H∗t 6⊆ Gt for any t ∈ R+.
Intensity-Based Approach
In an intensity-based context, default event is usually modeled by an Ft-adapted
point process Nt, in the sense, that default occurs at the first jump of Nt. Analo-
gously, we define a process Nt whose jump represents default event. For this and
following Jarrow and Yu (Jarrow & Yu 2001) and Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki
& Rutkowski 2004) let λt be a non-negative Gt-progressively measurable process
5We call σ(X) the σ-field generated by the random variable X.
6Where (Gt)t≥0 is defined in (2.1).
39
such that for all t ≥ 0
Λt :=
∫ t
0
λudu < ∞ P− a.s., (2.2)
and
Λ0 = 0 and Λ∞ =∞. (2.3)
The process λt is called the intensity process.
We assume that the underlying probability space on which the state process Σt is
defined is large enough in order to support a unit exponential random variable ξ1
independent of the process7 Σt. This setup is known as the canonical construction
of the first jump of a point process, see for example Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki
& Rutkowski 2004). Accordingly, default time τ is given by
τ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λudu ≥ ξ1
}
, (2.4)
the process Nt := 1{τ≤t} represents the default process and
Ht := σ(Nu : u ≤ t),
the information flow generated by default time. By definition, the distribution
function of default time τ conditioned on G∞ is given by
P ({τ > t} |G∞ ) = e−Λt ,
where G∞ = σ(Σu : u ∈ R+), and the unconditional distribution is given by
P ({τ > t}) = EP [e−Λt] .
In addition, by construction we have
P ({τ > t} |Gt ) = EP [P ({τ > t} |G∞ ) |Gt ] = e−Λt ,
and
P ({τ ≤ t} |Gt ) = P ({τ ≤ t} |G∞ ) , (2.5)
7Alternatively, we could defined explicitly the structure of an enlarged probability space such
that admits the existence of ξ1 defined above. Since the assumption made above is equivalent
to the explicit construction of the enlarged probability space, we opt to present the analysis in
the short form and refer for technical details to Lando (Lando 1998) or Bielecki and Rutkowski
(Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004).
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i.e. Λt represents the hazard process of τ with respect to the filtration (Gt)t≥0. As
pointed out in Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004), note that Λt is
not the hazard process of τ with respect to (Gt)t≥0 ∨ (H∗t )t≥0.
Recovery time τ ∗ is similarly defined as default time. Let ηt be a non-negative Gt-
progressively measurable process satisfying the conditions (2.2), (2.3) and consider
the process
λ∗t := ηt1{τ≤t}. (2.6)
If default event has not occurred, recovery intensity is zero, i.e λ∗t = 0 for t < τ .
After default t > τ , we have λ∗t = ηt. Moreover, we assume again that the probability
space is large enough such that it admits an additional independent unit exponential
random variable ξ2, which is independent of the state process Σt and default time τ .
Note that the definition of λ∗t is similar to the definition of equivalent processes in
Jarrow and Yu (Jarrow & Yu 2001), where several random default times are model
in order to illustrate counterparty risk.8 Within our model, recovery time is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.2.1. Recovery time τ ∗ is given by
τ ∗ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λ∗udu ≥ ξ2
}
,
where λ∗t is given in (2.6), the process N
∗
t := 1{τ∗≤t} represents the recovery process
and
H∗t := σ(N∗u : u ≤ t),
the information flow generated by recovery time.
Analogous to the arguments above and since ξ2 is independent of Σt and τ , the
conditional distribution of recovery time τ ∗ is given by9
P ({τ ∗ > t} |G∞ ∨H∞ ) = e−Λ∗t ,
where Λ∗t =
∫ t
0
λ∗udu. As previous and by construction of recovery time we have
P ({τ ∗ ≤ t} |Gt ∨Ht ) = P ({τ ∗ ≤ t} |G∞ ∨H∞ ) , (2.7)
8Particularly, default time τ and recovery time τ∗ correspond to default times of primary and
secondary firms in Jarrow and Yu (Jarrow & Yu 2001), respectively.
9Again, we set H∞ = σ(Nu : u ∈ R+).
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i.e. Λ∗t represents the hazard process of τ
∗ with respect to the filtration (Gt)t≥0 ∨
(Ht)t≥0. In order to maintain the economic interpretation, recovery event should
never occur before default event. For this regard the assumption below.
Assumption 2.2.2. For all t ≥ 0,
P ({τ > t} ∩ {τ ∗ ≤ t}) = 0 and P ({τ > t} ∩ {τ ∗ ≤ t} |Gt ∨Ht ) = 0.
Particularly, if the conditional probability of default time occurring after time t given
that recovery time has already occurred is well defined, then it must be zero, i.e.
P ({τ > t} |{τ ∗ ≤ t}) = 0,
for all t ∈ R+ with P({τ ∗ ≤ t}) > 0.
Since we are interested in valuing defaultable bonds, the probability of default
and recovery is supposed to be positive. We assume that neither default nor recovery
occur at the origin but some time later. Formally, for ν ∈ {τ, τ ∗}
P({ν < +∞}) = 1, P({ν = 0}) = 0 and P({ν > t}) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Structural Approach
Alternatively, default and recovery times can be defined by some Rn-valued, Gt-
adapted process Vt which represents the solvency of the firm. Accordingly, let default
time τ be defined as the first-passage time of the real-valued, ca`dla`g Gt-adapted
process V 1t such that default time is given by
τ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : V 1t ≤ κ1
}
, (2.8)
where κ1 ∈ R. We denote the filtration generated by default event by
Ht = σ(V 1u : 0 ≤ u ≤ t), for any t ∈ R+.
Similarly, let recovery time τ ∗ be described by the real-valued, ca`dla`g Gt-adapted
processes V 1t and V
2
t in the following
Definition 2.2.3. Recovery time is defined by
τ ∗ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : min
0≤u≤t
V 1u ≤ κ1, V 2t ≥ κ2
}
,
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where10 κ2 ∈ R. As previous, the filtration generated by recovery event is denoted by
H∗t = σ((V 1u , V 2u ) : 0 ≤ u ≤ t), for any t ∈ R+.
Since V 1t and V
2
t are Gt-adapted processes, default and recovery times are Gt-
stopping times, which implies Ht ⊆ H∗t ⊆ Gt = Ft for any t ∈ R+. In this section
we omit any further interpretation of the solvency proxies V 1t and V
2
t in order to
maintain the introduction of the model as general as possible.
Mixture Approach
Clearly, we can conceive some defaultable bonds such that default event is governed
by a process unobservable in the default-free market and recovery event (after de-
fault) by a process observable in the default-free market. In such a case, we are in
the setup defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.4. Let default time by defined as in (2.4) and recovery time by
τ ∗ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : V 2t ≥ κ2, Nu > 0 for 0 ≤ u ≤ t
}
,
where Nt = 1{τ≤t}. The information flow is given by
Ft = Gt ∨Ht,
for all t ∈ R+. We denote this setup as Mixture Approach 1 or MA1.
Of course, we can think of default event being described by a process observable
in the default-free market and recovery event (after default) by a process unobserv-
able in the default-free market. The following definition presents this case.
Definition 2.2.5. Let default time be given by (2.8) and recovery time by Definition
2.2.1. The information flow is given by
Ft = Gt ∨H∗t ,
for all t ∈ R+. This setup is denoted as Mixture Approach 2 or MA2.
10Equivalently, we have τ∗ = inf
{
t ≥ τ : V 2t ≥ κ2
}
.
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Note that under MA2, the definition of λ∗t has not change. In addition, λ
∗
t is a
non-negative Gt-progressively measurable process since 1{τ≤t} is a ca`dla`g Gt-adapted
process. Again, we postpone interpretation of the underlying stochastic processes
V 1t and V
2
t defining default and recovery times.
2.3 Financial Claims
Within this section we revise pricing rules of defaultable bonds considering default
time τ and recovery time τ ∗ as previously introduced. Results of Sections 2.3.1 and
2.3.2 are general and are independent of the definition of default and recovery times.
Thereafter, we use the general results for the different approaches presented above.
2.3.1 Dividend Price Process
By definition of martingale measures,11 the price process of a dividend stream Dt
with settlement date θ is given by
St = BtE
P
[
B−1θ Sθ +
∫
(t,θ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t ≤ θ. (2.9)
By assuming that the price process reflects only future dividends, it must necessarily
be zero at settlement date, i.e. Sθ = 0. This treatment is usually known as ex-
dividend price process12 because past and present dividends are omitted from the
price of the analyzed claims. The ex-dividend price process St of a financial claim
that pays dividends Dt, with settlement date θ is given by
St = BtEP
[∫
(t,θ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < θ. (2.10)
The dividend process Dt of a defaultable claim consists of three elements: payoff
at maturity, payoff during the life of the claim and payment at recovery time. At
11Equation (2.9) can be derived from a self-financing strategy and by some martingale arguments
as presented in Appendix 2.7.1.
12Following the definition in Duffie et al. (Duffie et al. 1996), Duffie and Singleton (Duffie
& Singleton 1999), Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004) and Collin-Dufresne et
al.(Collin-Dufresne et al. 2004) among others.
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maturity T a claim with notional value X pays its face value if no default has
occurred. If default takes place during the life of the claim, payment at maturity is
R. So payoff at maturity is given by
XdT = X · 1{τ>T} +R · 1{τ≤T},
where R is a GT -measurable and bounded random variable. A defaultable claim may
offer a stream of payments At before maturity and default, which equals∫
1{τ>u}dAu.
Finally, if default occurs before maturity the claim pays at recovery time τ ∗ an
amount Zτ∗ which is a Gt-adapted, non-negative bounded process. Hence payment
at recovery time can be written as∫
Zud1{τ∗≤u}.
Combining these elements together we derive the dividend process Dt which is given
by
Dt = X
d
T · 1{t≥T} +
∫
(0,t]
1{τ>u}dAu +
∫
(0,t]
Zud1{τ∗≤u}, t > 0. (2.11)
2.3.2 Zero-Coupon Bonds Valuation
In case of zero-coupon bonds there is no payment stream before maturity and so
At = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, if default occurs recovery payment is made at
recovery time and not necessarily at maturity, thus R = 0. A defaultable claim will
be priced and traded until maturity T in case of no default previous maturity or
until recovery time τ ∗ if default occurs before maturity. In this sense, the random
settlement date of a defaultable claim is given by
θ := T · 1{τ>T} + τ ∗ · 1{τ≤T}.
Note that there are only two possible repayment dates for a defaultable zero-coupon
bond either θ or τ ∗. Since St is the ex-dividend price process of a defaultable claim
that pays at maturity or recovery time, St given in (2.10) is the pre-repayment price,
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i.e. St is only given for t < τ
∗∧θ. Hence, combining definitions (2.10) and (2.11) the
price process13 of a zero-coupon bond with face value X, maturity T and random
settlement14 θ is given by
St = BtEP
[∫
(t,θ]
B−1u X
d
Td1{u≥T} +
∫
(t,θ]
B−1u Zud1{τ∗≤u}
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < τ ∗ ∧ θ.
Notice that on {θ = τ ∗} payoff at maturity is zero, XdT = 0, because R = 0 and so
inducing
St = BtEP
[
1{τ>T} ·
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u X
d
Td1{u≥T} +
∫
(t,θ]
B−1u Zud1{τ∗≤u}
∣∣∣∣Ft] ,
for all t < τ ∗ ∧ θ. Integrating the first term the expression is equivalent to
St = BtEP
[
B−1T X
d
T · 1{τ>T} +
∫
(t,θ]
B−1u Zud1{τ∗≤u}
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < τ ∗ ∧ θ. (2.12)
Notice that the integral in (2.12) is zero on {τ > T}. Hence, it suffices to consider
the price process
St = BtEP
[
B−1T X
d
T · 1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T} ·
∫
(t,τ∗]
B−1u Zud1{τ∗≤u}
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < τ ∗ ∧ θ.
By adopting the notation Bd(t, T ) := St it follows
Bd(t, T ) = BtEP
[
B−1T X
d
T · 1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T} ·B−1τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Ft] , ∀t < τ ∗ ∧ θ.
On the set {τ ∗ ≤ t} the price process is zero. Therefore the price of a defaultable
zero-bond results after plugging the definition of XdT as follows.
Proposition 2.3.1. The ex-dividend price process Bd(t, T ) of a defaultable zero-
coupon bond with maturity T and notional value X for 0 < t < T is given by
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t} ·BtEP
[
B−1T X · 1{τ>T} +B−1τ∗ Zτ∗ · 1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] .
Remark 2.3.2. A special case of this framework is the model introduced in Duffie,
Schroeder and Skiadas (Duffie et al. 1996) and Duffie and Singleton (Duffie &
Singleton 1999). By letting recovery time equal default time, τ = τ ∗, the intensities
of jump processes describing default and recovery must be identical, i.e. λt = λ
∗
t for
13From now on all prices of defaultable bonds are ex-dividend.
14For a discussion of the validity of the pricing rule St see Appendix 2.7.1 and 2.7.2. An
alternative derivation of Proposition 2.3.1 can be also found in Appendix 2.7.2.
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all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since recovery can never occur after maturity, settlement
date must equal maturity, θ = T . So the price process corresponding to definition
(2.10) reads
St = BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < T.
Moreover, the integral of recovery payment in (2.12) is∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zud1{τ≤u}.
By noticing that Mt := 1{τ>t} − Λt∧τ follows an Ft-martingale under P, the last
expression can be divided in two integrals∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuλu · 1{τ>u}du+
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u ZudMu, t ∈ [0, T ].
If Zt is a Gt-predictable process, the second integral is a local martingale and so the
price process examined by Duffie et al. follows from (2.12)
St = BtEP
[
B−1T X · 1{τ>T} +
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuλu · 1{τ>u}du
∣∣∣∣Ft] , t < T.
Obviously, information arrival of default and recovery time coincide, that is Ht = H∗t
for all t ≥ 0, implying Ft = Gt ∨Ht.
2.3.3 Integral Representation for the Intensity-Based Ap-
proach
In order to introduce our results consider the next assumption.
Assumption 2.3.3. Let the expectations
EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)ds |X|
]
,
EP
[∫
(t,∞)
|Zuηu| e−
∫ u
t (rs+ηs)dsdu
]
,
and
EP
[∫
(t,T ]
∫
(t,T ]
∣∣Zuηu1{q≤u}λq∣∣ e− ∫ ut (rs+ηs1{q≤s})ds−∫ qt λvdvdudq] ,
be finite.
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In view of Proposition 2.3.1, the value of a defaultable bond under the intensity-
based approach can be expressed via the processes λt and ηt as shown in the following
result.
Proposition 2.3.4. Under Assumption 2.3.3 the ex-dividend price process Bd(t, T )
of a defaultable zero-coupon bond with maturity T and notional value X for any
0 < t < T is given by
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ>t} · (I1t + I2t ) + 1{τ≤t}1{τ∗>t} · I3t , (2.13)
where
I1t = EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)dsX
∣∣∣Gt] ,
I2t = EP
[∫
(t,T ]
∫
(t,T ]
Zuηu1{q≤u}λqe−
∫ u
t (rs+ηs1{q≤s})ds−
∫ q
t λvdvdudq
∣∣∣∣Gt] ,
and
I3t = EP
[∫
(t,∞)
Zuηue
− ∫ ut (rs+ηs)dsdu
∣∣∣∣Gt] .
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.3.

The price of defaultable bonds is divided into pre-default and post-default-pre-
recovery prices. The pre-default value is represented by I1 + I2 and it is influenced
by default and recovery parameters λt and ηt, respectively. In the case default event
occurs, then the term 1{τ>t}(I1 + I2) vanishes and the price of the financial claim
equals I3, which is commonly called distressed price (post-default bonds are usually
denoted as distressed debt). In the expectation I3 only the recovery parameter ηt is
present and the upper limit of the integral is ∞ reflecting the randomness of recov-
ery time τ ∗. Furthermore, note that nothing has been said about the joint density
of recovery payment Zt, default intensity λt and the process ηt conditioned on Gt.
Hence, correlation between default event and recovery payment can be introduced
in order to be consistent with empirical evidence.15
15See Altman et al. (Altman et al. 2005) and Frye (Frye 2000).
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Example
Regard now a simple application for the valuation rule of Proposition 2.3.4 of default-
able zero-coupon bonds under the intensity-based approach. Let default intensity
λt and the process ηt be deterministic and constant such that λt = λ > 0 and
ηt = η > 0 for any t ≥ 0. Furthermore, suppose that current time t = 0 and assume
the σ-field G0 is trivial. Recovery payment is a deterministic fraction of par value,
i.e. Zt = φ for all t ≥ 0 where 0 ≤ φ ≤ X (we implicitly suppose that par value
is deterministic X > 0). In view of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (Cox et al. 1985), the
dynamics of the instantaneous short rate process are
drt = k(θ − rt)dt+ σ√rtdWt,
under P where r0, k, θ, σ > 0 and 2kθ > σ2. Since the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross setup
corresponds to the class of affine term-structure models16, the value at time t of a
default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity T is given by
P (t, T ) = A(t, T )e−C(t,T )rt ,
where
A(t, T ) =
(
2h exp {(k + h)(T − t)/2}
2h+ (k + h)(exp {(T − t)h} − 1)
)2kθ/σ2
,
C(t, T ) =
2(exp {(T − t)h} − 1)
2h+ (k + h)(exp {(T − t)h} − 1) ,
h =
√
k2 + 2σ2.
Notice, that we can still apply Proposition 2.3.4 for t = 0, which consists of
Bd(0, T ) = I10 + I
2
0 ,
since the third summand in (2.13) vanishes17. Hence, the first term is given by
I10 = EP
[
B−1T e
−λTX
]
= e−λTXP (0, T ). (2.14)
By applying Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem repeatedly, Appendix 2.7.4 shows that for
λ 6= η the second term is given by
I20 =
φηλ
η − λ
∫
(0,T ]
(
e−λu − e−ηu)A(0, u)e−C(0,u)r0du.
16See Brigo and Mercurio (Brigo & Mercurio 2006) for details.
17Recall that P({τ = 0}) = 0 is assumed.
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In order to appreciate the insights of modeling recovery time as a random time
that may differ from default time, we consider the value of the same bond under
the assumption that recovery and default events occur simultaneously, i.e. τ = τ ∗
P-a.s., and we denote that bond’s price by B˜d(t, T ). By assuming τ = τ ∗, default
and recovery processes coincide, as well as the corresponding σ-fields. In particular,
we have Ht = H∗t for all t ≥ 0, which implies Ft = Gt ∨Ht for all t ≥ 0. Hence, the
ex-dividend price process of a defaultable zero-coupon bond with par value X and
maturity T under the assumption τ = τ ∗ P-a.s. is given by
B˜d(t, T ) = BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] , ∀t < τ,
where
Dt = X · 1{t≥T} +
∫
(0,t]
Zud1{τ≤u}, t > 0.
Following the same arguments of Section 2.3.2, the price of the defaultable security
under τ = τ ∗ P-a.s for t < T is given by
B˜d(t, T ) = 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X · 1{τ>T} +B−1τ Zτ1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] ,
which is well known18 to be equivalent to
B˜d(t, T ) = 1{τ>t}EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)dsX +
∫
(t,T ]
λuZue
− ∫ ut (rs+λs)dsdu
∣∣∣∣Gt] .
In the present example this formula yields the following expression
B˜d(0, T ) = I10 + I˜
2
0 ,
where I10 is given in (2.14) and
I˜20 = λφ
∫
(0,T ]
A(0, u)e−C(0,u)r0−λudu,
whose derivation is shown in Appendix 2.7.4. Differences between Bd(t, T ) and
B˜d(t, T ) are explained by differences between I20 and I˜
2
0 , which are generated by the
existence of the recovery parameter η. In order to highlight these, we present below
a numerical illustration for which we additionally consider the credit spread s(t, T )
at time t = 0 of a defaultable bond Bd(0, T ) with face value X defined by
s(0, T ) = − 1
T
ln
(
Bd(0, T )
PX(0, T )
)
,
18See Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004) for example.
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where PX(0, T ) = P (0, T )X.
For the numerical example, we assume the following values of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
term structure parameters corresponding to empirical observations19
k = 0.0373, θ = 0.0697, σ = 0.0283.
Furthermore, we set the remaining parameters of the model as follows.
X = 1000, T = 5, φ = 0.5, r0 = 0.0295, λ = 0.04, η = 0.064.
Table 2.1 shows the differences in the components of the defaultable bonds Bd(0, T )
and B˜d(0, T ). Recall that the latter price excludes the possibility of τ ∗ 6= τ . Hence,
we abbreviate this description and refer to B˜d(0, T ) as the price ignoring τ ∗ 6= τ and
to Bd(0, T ) as the price including τ ∗ 6= τ .
For the given parameters, the value of a default-free zero coupon bond with par
Bond Price I10 I
2
0 or I˜
2
0 Spread
Including τ∗ 6= τ 706.5763 694.4216 12.1547 365.2960
Excluding τ∗ 6= τ 778.4423 694.4216 84.0207 171.5687
Table 2.1: Price Differences Depending on Recovery Time Risk
value X and maturity T is PX(0, T ) = 848.1684. Figures 3.1 and 2.2 display some
interesting comparative statics.
2.3.4 Valuation under the Structural Approach
Recall pricing formula of Proposition 2.3.1
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T} +B
−1
τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] , for t < T,
or equivalently,
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T}
∣∣Ft]+ 1{τ∗>t}BtEP [B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}∣∣Ft] .
The determinants of default and recovery events are the processes V 1t and V
2
t . In
general, these solvency proxies cannot be assumed to be independent of the default-
free interest rate rt. For example, let V
1
t be the market value of the stock of the issuer
19See Nowman (Nowman 1997).
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Figure 2.1: Defaultable Bond Price Bd(0, T ) Including τ∗ 6= τ
firm. In addition, let the firm have variable-coupon debentures of higher seniority
with a coupon formula based on the default-free interest rate rt. If these debentures
are protected by covenants, then V 1t cannot be supposed to be independent of rt
because the analyzed zero-coupon bond has a lower priority. However, in cases
where default time and bank account are independent, we find the following pricing
formula.
Corollary 2.3.5. Assume default time τ and default-free interest rate rt are in-
dependent. The value of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T and par value X for
0 < t < T is given by
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}PX(t, T )P ({τ > T} |Gt ) + 1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Gt] .
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from the independence of τ and rt and from the
property of the structural approach of Gt = Ft for all t ∈ R+.

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Figure 2.2: I20 Including τ
∗ 6= τ
In general, the computation of the second expectation in Corollary 2.3.5 is a com-
plex task. Black and Cox (Black & Cox 1976), Kim et al. (Kim et al. 1993),
Longstaff and Schwartz (Longstaff & Schwartz 1995) and Briys and de Varenne
(Briys & de Varenne 1997) among others examine defaultable bonds within a struc-
tural framework considering recovery payment at default time. In the spirit of those
analysis, let recovery process be given by Zt := Btφ where φ is a constant with
0 ≤ φ ≤ X. Consequently, for t < T we have
BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Gt] = BtφEP [1{τ≤T}∣∣Gt] = BtφP ({τ ≤ T}| Gt) .
Hence, for t < T the price of a defaultable bond is given by
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}PX(t, T )P ({τ > T} |Gt ) + 1{τ∗>t}BtφP ({τ ≤ T}| Gt) .
Note that we must take great caution when choosing the term structure model
otherwise the value of the bond may explode on {τ ≤ T}.
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2.3.5 Pricing under the Mixture Approach
From previous comments in the derivation of a pricing rule under the structural
approach, the reader may already have noted that in most cases we have to recur
to the joint density function of default and recovery times in order to compute
the bonds value. Within the mixture approach this is also true. However, there
are some cases where we can avoid finding a joint density. We assume again the
recovery payment process Zt = Btφ, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ X. Using the same assumption
of independence between default time and default-free interest rate as before, the
value of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T and par value X under both MA1
and MA2 is given by
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}PX(t, T )P ({τ > T} |Ft ) + 1{τ∗>t}BtφP ({τ ≤ T}| Ft) ,
for t < T . Note that the expectations are conditioned on Ft and not on Gt. For
MA1 observe that for t < T
1{τ∗>t}EP
[
1{τ>T}
∣∣Ft] = 1{τ∗>t}EP [1{τ>t}1{τ>T}∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
= 1{τ∗>t}
EP
[
1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt]
P ({τ > t} |Gt )
= 1{τ∗>t}
P ({τ > T} |Gt )
P ({τ > t} |Gt ) = 1{τ
∗>t}e−
∫ T
t λsds,
since default process Nt is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with intensity λt.
Similarly, for t < T we have
1{τ∗>t}EP
[
1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ∗>t}EP
[
1{t<τ≤T}
∣∣Ft]+ 1{τ∗>t}EP [1{τ≤t≤T}∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}EP
[
1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft]+ 1{τ≤t}1{τ∗>t}EP [1{τ≤T}∣∣Ft] . (2.15)
By previous arguments the first summand in (2.15) equals
1{τ>t}
EP
[
1{τ>t}1{τ≤T}
∣∣Gt]
P ({τ > t} |Gt ) = 1{τ>t}
(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
Hence, the pre-default value of zero-coupon bonds is given by
Bd(t, T ) = PX(t, T )e
− ∫ Tt λsds + φBt
(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
, t < T,
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and the post-default-pre-recovery value of distressed debt is given by
Bd(t, T ) = φ,
since the second summand in (2.15) is one on {τ ≤ t}. Hence, after default the value
of the bond stays constant. If we neglect the possibility of τ ∗ 6= τ , i.e. recovery
occurring at default, then at default time we receive φ amount of money which we
can invest in the bank account and earn the default-free interest rate on it. When we
allow for τ ∗ 6= τ , we receive φ at recovery and we forgo interests for the time period
τ ∗−τ . Although in this simple example we avoid modeling the joint density function
of recovery and default time, the consequences of letting recovery time differ from
default time still have an impact in the value of defaultable bonds.
2.4 Recovery Modeling
Once a company defaults on its outstanding debt, recovery payment is most likely
lower than the original contractual arrangement. Recovery payment depends on the
causes of default. In case of a technical default, i.e. when a protective covenant
has been violated, recovery payment may be close to the face value. If default is
originated by insolvency or bankruptcy recovery depends on whether the company is
reorganized or liquidated. In case the company is reorganized, its capital structure is
modified, its debt refinanced and the company keeps its operations. In a liquidation
the company ceases to exist and its assets are sold in order to repay creditors. Hence,
recovery depends on the solvency of the issuer company at repayment date.
Firm-specific solvency proxies can be regarded as cash flows, net income, market
value of current assets, impairment-adjusted total assets and financial statement
liquidity ratios among others. Refinancing possibilities are also relevant for covering
outstanding debt in case of default. Additional to company-specific factors it is also
necessary to consider an economy-wide proxy reflecting company solvency within
the current economic situation. A company in financial distress is most likely to
have more problems reorganizing its capital structure during market-wide financial
crisis or industry-wide crashes than during normal economic conditions.
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In the present analysis we discuss the process governing recovery rates both from a
firm-specific and from an economy-wide point of view.
2.4.1 Firm-specific Solvency Proxy
Suppose that liquid assets of a company, which could effortlessly be sold to repay
debt, are represented by a ca`dla`g Gt-adapted process Y˜t. Let Y˜t be the portion of
assets designated to repayment of the face value X of a certain bond. Furthermore,
suppose that a company may obtain capital from refinancing which is represented by
a ca`dla`g Gt-adapted process RFt. Thus, in case of default the firm’s available capital
to redeem its obligations at recovery time equals Yτ∗ = Y˜τ∗ + RFτ∗ . Of course, we
can assumed that sale of assets and refinancing occur at an earlier point of time t′
than at recovery time τ ∗. In this case, we can model Yt as a constant after t′ or as the
value of assets’ sale and refinancing at time t′ and the corresponding accrued interest
of the bank account for the time elapse τ ∗ − t′, i.e. Yτ∗ = Bτ∗B−1t′ Yt′ by abuse of
notation. If Yt represents the value of regularly traded financial instruments, we can
also make the accurate assumption that recovery payment at recovery time is defined
as some function of the market price of those financial instruments. Independently
of the modeling and interpretation of Yt, consider the following definition of recovery
payment Zt.
Specification 2.4.1 (MR). Once defaulted, repayment is a fraction δ, with δ ∈ [0, 1]
of the remaining of face value and current assets, i.e.
Zτ∗ = δ(X −max(X − Yτ∗ , 0)).
The fraction δ may be specified stochastically at costs of rising complexity for
estimation methods. For practical means, δ can be fixed as the maximum recovery
rate observed from historical data within that economy and industry or equal to one
in order to reduce assumptions and calibrations. Following these ideas we denote
this specification as maximum recovery (MR).
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2.4.2 Economy-wide Solvency Proxy
During financial crisis defaults are more common than during financial stability, re-
covery rates tend to decrease and their volatility augments.20 In an economy-wide
crisis, reorganization of companies in financial distress is more difficult since there
are fewer institutions willing to provide capital for reorganization. Additional, de-
faulted companies may produce a contagion effect21 on their creditors and other
companies, increasing defaults and lowering recoveries.
In order to capture the market-wide business condition, let the process Yt repre-
sent the “state” of the economy. One can regard this process as an index reflect-
ing financial-economic cycles or a benchmark of economic climate. Further, define
economy-wide distress whenever Yt < K for some constant and deterministic K.
Hence, the specification of an economy-wide recovery rate can take the following
form.
Specification 2.4.2 (TSR). Let δ > γ be two recovery rates with δ, γ ∈ [0, 1] for
different scenarios:
Zτ∗ =
(
δ1{Yτ∗≥K} + γ1{Yτ∗<K}
)
X,
We denote this specification as two-scenario recovery (TSR). A generalization
can be achieved by differentiating between several scenarios.
Remark 2.4.3. Notice that the firm-specific framework MR can be adjusted to reflect
economy-wide effects. This can be done by letting δ be a function of macroeconomic
variables. Similarly, the economy-wide specification, TSR, can be defined such that
δ and γ are recovery rates determined by firm-specific factors.
2.5 A Special Case: Intensity-Based Approach
with Deterministic Recovery Time τ ∗ = T
Stochastic recovery time, which may differ from default time, introduces additional
uncertainty in models of defaultable claims, which leads to changes in pricing rules
20See Altman et al. (Altman 2006)
21See Jarrow and Yu (Jarrow & Yu 2001).
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as can be seen comparing Proposition 2.3.4 and results of conventional models, e.g.
Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004). However, within our intensity-
based approach and by fixing recovery time equal to maturity, differences of bond
prices between conventional models and the present study remain. Traditionally,
intensity-based models consider recovery processes corresponding to fractions of face,
treasury or pre-default value. However, in case of liquidation recovery payment
depends mainly on solvency of the firm while in case of reorganization depends on
refinancing alternatives. In the present framework recovery process reflects the firms
solvency and not necessarily the value of other bonds.
When setting τ ∗ = T , it becomes clear that settlement date in definition (2.10)
equals maturity, that is θ = T . Moreover, information arrival of recovery time is
neglected. Accordingly, arrival of all information available on the market is driven
by default-free processes and default time, that is Ft = Gt ∨Ht. Hence, the value of
a defaultable zero-coupon bond is given by
Proposition 2.5.1. The arbitrage-free price at t < T of a defaultable zero-coupon
bond with face value X and recovery payment at maturity R is given by
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
e
∫ T
t rsdsR
∣∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t} · EP [e∫ Tt (rs+λs)ds(X −R)∣∣∣Gt] ,
where R is a GT -measurable random variable.
Proof. Recall that θ = T , set Zt = At = 0 for all t ≥ 0 in definition (2.11) and
combine it with equation (2.9) to obtain
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
BtB
−t
T X
d
T
∣∣Ft]
= EP
[
BtB
−t
T (1{τ>T}X +R(1− 1{τ>T}))
∣∣Ft]
= BtEP
[
B−tT R
∣∣Ft]+BtEP [1{τ>t}1{τ>T}B−tT (X −R)∣∣Ft] .
For the first conditional expectation information contained in Ht is irrelevant.
Hence, the last equality can be written as
Bd(t, T ) = BtEP
[
B−tT R
∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t}BtEP [1{τ>T}B−tT (X −R)∣∣Gt]P({τ > t}| Gt) .
Since R is GT -measurable and iterating expectations we obtain after substituting
P({τ > t}| Gt) for e−
∫ t
0 λsds
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
B−tT BtR
∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t}EP [B−tT Bte− ∫ Tt λsds(X −R)∣∣∣Gt] .
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The following examples of recovery payment specifications are based on the assump-
tion of the special case of recovery time τ ∗ = T .
2.5.1 Valuation under the MR Specification
Below we present an application of Proposition 2.5.1 for Specification 2.4.1 by setting
R = Zτ∗ , where Zt = δ(X − [X − Yt]+) and δ is constant.
Corollary 2.5.2. The value of defaultable zero-bond under MR specification for
t < T is given by
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
e−
∫ T
t rsdsδX
∣∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t} · EP [e− ∫ Tt (rs+λs)ds(1− δ)X∣∣∣Gt]
−EP
[
e−
∫ T
t rsdsδ[X − YT ]+
∣∣∣Gt]
+1{τ>t} · EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)dsδ[X − YT ]+
∣∣∣Gt] . (2.16)
If default has not occurred until time t, the price of a defaultable zero-bond is
a combination of default-free zero-bonds and European put options on the value of
current assets of the company Yt. The first term in (2.16) represents the value of a
default-free zero-bond with face value δX, the second term can be interpreted as a
synthetic default-free zero-bond whose face value (1− δ)X is discounted by rt + λt.
The third term is a short position in δ put options with respect to the assets of
the company Yt and strike X, while using rt to discount. Finally, the last term
represents a δ long position in an identical put option using rt + λt for discounting.
Let Put[Yt, X, t, T, rt; δ] be the expected value under the equivalent martingale mea-
sure P at time t of δ units of the payoff of a European put option with underlying Yt,
strike X, maturity T and interest rate rt. Hence the price of a defaultable zero-bond
is given by
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
e−
∫ T
t rsdsδX
∣∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t} · EP [e− ∫ Tt (rs+λs)ds(1− δ)X∣∣∣Gt]
−Put[Yt, X, t, T, rt; δ] + 1{τ>t} · Put[Yt, X, t, T, rt + λt; δ].
Denote the difference of put values in the last equation as put differential given by
∆Put(t, δ) := 1{τ>t} · Put[Yt, X, t, T, rt + λt; δ]− Put[Yt, X, t, T, rt; δ].
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By recalling that λt is non-negative for all t ≥ 0 and assuming rt is also non-negative
for any t ∈ R+, we have ∆Put(t, δ) ≤ 0. Moreover, notice
P (t, T ) = EP
[
B−1T Bt
∣∣Ft] = EP [B−1T Bt∣∣Gt] ,
because there is no relevant information in Ht for Bt. Assuming that δ is determin-
istic and using the introduced notation22, the value of a defaultable zero bond can
be expressed as
Bd(t, T ) = PδX(t, T ) + 1{τ>t} · (1− δ)XEP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)ds
∣∣∣Gt]+ ∆Put(t, δ). (2.17)
For the special case δ = 1, the price of a defaultable bond is given by
Bd(t, T ) = PX(t, T ) + ∆Put(t, 1),
which consists of a default-free zero-bond with face value X and the difference of put
options on the assets of the company. Note that defaultable bonds pay either the
face value or the sale value of the company’s asset, i.e. Bd(T, T ) = X on {τ > T}
and Bd(T, T ) = min{YT , X} on {τ ≤ T}, respectively. The same bonds’ payoff
profile can be found in the structural model of Merton (Merton 1974). However, the
present framework does not impose a default trigger given by some predefined asset
value as in Merton. Instead, we let default event be governed by a point process
which is not observable in the default-free market. Evidently, even in this simplified
illustration our framework offers more modeling flexibility than the model of Merton.
Depending on the underlying assumptions on the processes rt, λt and Yt, it can be
advantageous to formulate Corollary 2.5.2 under the T-forward measure QT .
Corollary 2.5.3. The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond under the MR speci-
fication for t < T is given by
Bd(t, T ) = P (t, T )
(
EQT [δX| Gt] + 1{τ>t}EQT
[
e−
∫ T
t λsds(1− δ)X
∣∣∣Gt]
−EQT [δ[X − YT ]+∣∣Gt]+ 1{τ>t}EQT [e− ∫ Tt λsdsδ[X − YT ]+∣∣∣Gt]) ,
where QT is defined by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQT
dP
∣∣∣∣
GT
:=
P (T, T )B0
P (0, T )BT
=
e−
∫ T
0 rsdsP (T, T )
P (0, T )
, (2.18)
where P (t, T ) is the price of default-free zero-bond with face value 1.
22Particularly, P (0, T ) ·X = PX(0, T ).
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Proof. Let the Radon-Nikodym derivative defining QT be given by (2.18). The price
of a default-free zero-coupon bond is given by
P (t, T ) = EP
[
B−1T Bt
∣∣Ft] = EP [B−1T Bt∣∣Gt] ,
by previous arguments. Since P (0, T ) > 0 is a martingale under P, the expression in
(2.18) represents a density function and QT is equivalent to P. For a GT -measurable
payoff HT , its present value under the risk neutral measure at time t is determined
by
EP
[
Bt
BT
HT
∣∣∣∣Gt] = P (t, T )EP [ P (T, T )BtP (t, T )BT HTP (T, T )
∣∣∣∣Gt] = P (t, T )EQT [HT | Gt] ,
because P (T, T ) = 1. Applying this procedure to Corollary 2.5.2 the proof is com-
pleted.

Example 2.5.4. Assume δ = 1, t = 0 and the following conditions:
• Asset values Yt are lognormally distributed under QT with deterministic volatil-
ity σ,
dYt = σYtdW
T
t .
• Default intensity and asset values are stochastically independent.
Hence, we obtain
YT = Yt exp
{
−σ
2
2
(T − t) + σ(W TT −W Tt )
}
,
where W TT −W Tt ∼ N(0, T − t) and
YT = Yt exp
{
−σ
2
2
(T − t) + σ√T − t · z
}
,
with z as a standard normally distributed random variable. Thus, X ≥ YT for
z ≤ ln (X/Yt) +
1
2
σ2(T − t)
σ
√
T − t =: d1,t.
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The value of a simple put option is given by
Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt; 1] = P (0, T )EQ
T [
[X − YT ]+
]
= P (0, T )
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2
[
X − Y0e−σ
2
2
T+σ
√
T ·z
]+
dz
= P (0, T )
∫ d1,0
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2
(
X − Y0e−σ
2
2
T+σ
√
T ·z
)
dz
= PX(0, T ) ·N(d1,0)− PY0(0, T ) ·
∫ d1,0
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
(z−σ√T )2
2 dz
= PX(0, T ) ·N(d1,0)− PY0(0, T ) ·N(d1,0 − σ
√
T ).
By defining
d2,0 = d1,0 − σ
√
T ,
the put option value is
Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt; 1] = P (0, T )(X ·N(d1,0)− Y0 ·N(d2,0)).
Similarly, Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt + λt; 1] is determined using the assumption of indepen-
dence between Yt and λt, which yields
Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt + λt; 1] = P (0, T ) · EQT
[
e−
∫ T
t λsdsδ[X − YT ]+
∣∣∣G0]
= EQT
[
e−
∫ T
t λsds
∣∣∣G0] · Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt; 1]
= QT0 ({τ > T}) · Put[Yt, X, 0, T, rt; 1],
where QT0 ({τ > T}) is the survival probability under the T-forward measure condi-
tional on information in G0. The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond is given
by
Bd(0, T ) = PX(0, T )− (1−QT0 ({τ > T}) · Put[Yt, X, 0, T, r0; 1]
= P (0, T )
[
X − (1−QT0 ({τ > T})(X ·N(d1,0)− Y0 ·N(d2,0))
]
.
The credit spread, which is the difference of the continuously compounded yield to
maturity of a defaultable and a default-free zero-coupon bond, can be computed using
the last equation. For this note that we need the yield of a default-free bond with
face value X. Accordingly, the credit spread s(0, T ) is given by
s(0, T ) = − 1
T
ln
(
Bd(0, T )
PX(0, T )
)
= − 1
T
ln
(
1− (1−QT0 ({τ > T}))
(
N(d1,0)− Y0
X
·N(d2,0)
))
.
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By analyzing the credit spread, one can see that default risk (captured in the survival
probability) and recovery risk (illustrated in the expression for the value of the put)
are components of credit risk.
Further, the special case of zero recovery in the MR specification is given when δ = 0.
Here the company can neither sell its assets nor reorganize its capital structure when
default occurs. Thus, the value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond corresponds to
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ>t} ·XEP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)ds
∣∣∣Gt] .
As mentioned previously specification TSR can be used to model recovery rates
when the underlying process represents current assets or the state of the econ-
omy/industry. This specification is analyzed in the next section.
2.5.2 Valuation under the TSR Specification
During economic/industry crisis reorganization and liquidation of financially dis-
tressed companies are more difficult to conduct which induces lower recovery pay-
ments of defaulted bonds. We differentiate between a recovery rate δ during for
stable phases and a recovery rate γ during crisis. Let business cycles of the econ-
omy/industry be represented by the process Yt and the critical crisis value be given
by some constant K. This framework is the two-scenario recovery rate specification
discussed previously, where R = (δ1{Yt≥K} + γ1{Yt<K})X. By Proposition 2.5.1 the
value of a defaultable bond under TSR is given as follows.
Corollary 2.5.5. The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond under TSR for t < T
is given by
Bd(t, T ) = EP
[
e−
∫ T
t rsdsγX
∣∣∣Gt]+ EP [e− ∫ Tt rsds(δ − γ)X · 1{YT≥K}∣∣∣Gt]
+1{τ>t} · EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)ds(1− γ)X
∣∣∣Gt]
−1{τ>t} · EP
[
e−
∫ T
t (rs+λs)ds(δ − γ)X · 1{YT≥K}
∣∣∣Gt] .
Proof. The corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.5.1, Specification
2.4.2 and of
X −R = (1− δ · 1{YT≥K} − γ · 1{YT<K})X
=
(
1− γ − (δ − γ) · 1{YT≥K}
)
X.
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The first two expectations in Corollary 2.5.5 represent the value of the bond when
default has occurred. It is given by the sum of conditionally expected, discounted
values of the minimum recovery payment γX and the difference of loss given defaults
δ− γ only if at maturity there is no financial crisis. If default has not occurred, the
value of the claim must be adjusted for possible future default. This adjustment is
expressed in the two last expectations of the corollary. The first of these adjusts
the minimum recovery payment by the maximum loss given default (1− γ)X. Note
that rt + λt is used for discounting. The last term corrects the loss given default
differential using rt+λt as discount rate. Hence, the second and fourth expectations
in the corollary do not cancel out. Instead a small positive value remains. So the
expectation of the discounted value of the smallest recovery payment is adjusted by
possible outcomes of no-default and default when no financial crisis takes place.
Changing numeraire in Corollary 2.5.5 by the T-forward measure and using the same
techniques as explained in the previous section, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2.5.6. The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond under TSR for t < T
is given by
Bd(t, T ) = P (t, T )
(
EQT [γX| Gt]
+EQT
[
(δ − γ)X · 1{YT≥K}
∣∣Gt]
+1{τ>t} · EQT
[
e−
∫ T
t λsds(1− γ)X
∣∣∣Gt]
−1{τ>t} · EQT
[
e−
∫ T
t λsds(δ − γ)X · 1{YT≥K}
∣∣∣Gt]) . (2.19)
Example 2.5.7. Assume that the maximum recovery rate in both scenarios can
be identified with certainty. Therefore, let δ and γ be deterministic. Additionally,
consider the same assumptions from the previous example.
• The state process Yt is lognormally distributed under QT with deterministic
volatility σ,
dYt = σYtdW
T
t .
• Default intensity and state process are stochastically independent.
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Notice that
EQT
[
1{YT≥K}
∣∣G0] = QT0 (YT ≥ K)
= QT0
(
ln(YT )− (ln(Y0)− σ22 T )
σ
√
T
≥ −dˆ2,0
)
= QT0
(
Z ≤ dˆ2,0
)
= N(dˆ2,0),
where dˆ2,0 =
ln(Y0/K)− 12σ2T
σ
√
T
. From Corollary 2.5.6 we have
Bd(0, T ) = P (0, T )
[
γX + (δ − γ)X ·N(dˆ2,0) + (1− γ)X ·QT0 ({τ > T})
−(δ − γ)X ·N(dˆ2,0) ·QT0 ({τ > T})
]
.
By rearranging terms we obtain
Bd(0, T ) = PX(0, T )
[
1 +
(
1−QT0 ({τ > T})
) (
(δ − γ)N(dˆ2,0)− (1− γ)
)]
.
Notice that the term in the brackets is never larger than 1, since ((δ − γ)N(dˆ2,0)−
(1− γ)) < 0. Again, the credit spread s(0, T ) embeds default and recovery risks
s(0, T ) = − 1
T
ln
(
1 +
(
1−QT0 ({τ > T})
) [
(δ − γ)N(dˆ2,0)− (1− γ)
])
.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The model on defaultable bonds of this chapter incorporates stochastic default and
recovery times which may differ from each other. Observing real-world situations
where recovery payment may neither occur at default time nor at maturity, the sep-
aration of default and recovery times is well founded. Moreover, recovery payment
is modeled considering company’s solvency and governing economic conditions. The
resulting models which gathers all these concepts combines virtues of intensity-based
and structural approaches.
In this chapter we regard default and recovery times without three setups: intensity-
based, structural and mixture approaches. Under these specifications we derived a
general pricing rule for defaultable zero-coupon bonds. Furthermore, we discussed a
model for recovery processes that can take firm-specific and economy-wide settings.
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Finally, we analyzed different examples in the special case when recovery time equals
maturity.
Empirical evidence has uncovered relationships between default events and recovery
payments. Theoretical work has started to react on this findings. This chapter con-
tributes to that cause by providing a more flexible framework capable to consider
recovery risk as the uncertainty about recovery payment and the uncertainty about
the time of this payment. Within this framework correlation of recovery rates and
default have a straight economic foundation. We do not need to make unrealistic
assumptions about the bond price at default (value of distressed debt at default
time) because it is derived from the model.
Further research should concentrate in 1) empirical verification of the pricing rule
proposed and 2) hedging strategies that can be used. Additionally, other types of de-
faultable securities should be investigated. A more extensive analysis on correlation
between default and recovery rates should be also undertaken.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Self-financing strategy
Note that St given in (2.9) is defined for an arbitrary dividend process Dt. We
rephrase the borrowed derivation of the pricing rule for some non-defaultable se-
curity St from Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski 2004). Consider an
admissible self-financing, buy-and-hold trading strategy φt = (φ
1
t , φ
2
t ) = (1, φ
2
t ),
where we buy one unit of asset St and hold it until settlement date θ, and deposit
all gains in the bank account. Accordingly, the wealth process Ut of φt is given by
Ut = St + φ
2
tBt, t ∈ [0, θ], (2.20)
with initial capital U0 = S0 + φ
2
0B0. Since φt is self-financing, we obtain
Ut − U0 = St − S0 +Dt +
∫
(0,t]
φ2udBu, t ∈ [0, θ], (2.21)
and by defining U˜t = B
−1
t Ut it follows
U˜t − U˜0 = S˜t − S˜0 +
∫
(0,t]
B−1u dDu, t ∈ [0, θ], (2.22)
which corresponds to Lemma 2.1.1 in Bielecki and Rutkowski (Bielecki & Rutkowski
2004). Because the discounted wealth process is an Ft-martingale under P, we have
for all t ≤ θ
EP
[
U˜θ − U˜t
∣∣∣Ft] = 0, (2.23)
implying
S˜t = EP
[
S˜θ +
∫
(t,θ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (2.24)
By assuming S˜θ = Sθ = 0 equation (2.9) results.
In Appendix 2.7.2 we provide arguments for the validity of the pricing formula for
St of Section 2.3.2 when it represents the price of a defaultable zero-coupon bond
when settlement is random and recovery time may differ from default time.
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2.7.2 Random θ
Equation (2.24) is not altered when θ is random, i.e. the ex-dividend pricing rule
St = EP
[∫
(t,θ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣∣∣Ft] for t < τ ∗ ∧ θ, (2.25)
is valid. For this consider the following ideas.
As in Duffie and Singleton (Duffie & Singleton 1999), let any traded contingent claim
be characterized by a pair (X , ν), where ν is a stopping time and X an Fν-measurable
random variable. Given the equivalent martingale measure P, the ex-dividend price
of this contingent claim is denoted by Ct and given by
Ct = BtEP
[
B−1ν X
∣∣Ft] ,
for all t < ν. In our case, a defaultable claim is a combination of two contingent
claims (X 1, ν1) and (X 2, ν2), where
ν1 := τ ∧ T, ν2 := τ ∗,
and
X 1 := X1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T}C2τ , X 2 := Zτ∗ ,
where C2τ represents the value of the second contingent claim at time τ . Formally,
the value of our defaultable claim at t < ν1 is given by
St = BtEP
[
B−1ν1
(
X1{τ>T} +X1{τ≤T}C2τ
)∣∣Ft]
= BtEP
[
B−1ν1
(
X1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T}BτEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Fτ])∣∣Ft] .
This implies
St = BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T}B
−1
τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Ft] , for t < ν1.
We assume that at default time τ on {τ ≤ T} there is no exchange of money. Instead
the investor holding the contingent claim (X 1, ν1) becomes owner of the second con-
tingent claim (X 2, ν2). Consequently, the payment of the combination of contingent
claims occur only at T or τ ∗. Thus, last equation is equivalent to
St = 1{τ∗>T}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T} + 1{τ≤T}B
−1
τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Ft] , for t < T,
which matches the results of Proposition 2.3.1 and is equivalent to (2.25) for t < T
with At = 0 for all t ∈ R+ and R = 0. Hence, the definition of the ex-dividend price
process can be applied even if settlement θ is a random time.
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2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.4
By Proposition 2.3.1 the price of a defaultable zero-coupon bond is given by written
as
Bd(t, T ) = 1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T}
∣∣Ft]+ 1{τ∗>t}BtEP [B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}∣∣Ft] .
(2.26)
Consider the first summand
1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T}
∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ∗>t}
BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ∗>t}1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
P({τ ∗ > t}| Gt ∨Ht) . (2.27)
Equality holds because the Ft-conditional expectation is zero on the set {τ ∗ ≤ t},
and so the only relevant information of H∗t is on the set {τ ∗ > t}. Since
1{τ∗>t}1{τ>t} = 1{τ>t} and by noticing that the expression (2.27) is zero on {τ ≤ t},
it is equivalent to
1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ∗>t}1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
P({τ ∗ > t}| Gt ∨Ht)
= 1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
B−1T XEP
[
1{τ∗>t} |G∞ ∨H∞
]
1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
P({τ ∗ > t}| Gt ∨Ht) ,
which follows because the term B−1T X1{τ>T} is G∞ ∨ H∞. By the properties of the
hazard process of τ ∗ pointed out in (2.7) the last argument is given by
1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
= 1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
B−1T X1{τ>t}1{τ>T}
∣∣Gt]
P({τ > t}| Gt)
= 1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
B−1T XP({τ > T}| G∞)
∣∣Gt]
P({τ > t}| Gt)
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1T e
Λt−ΛTX
∣∣Gt] , (2.28)
where the third equality follows from the properties of the hazard process of τ
presented in (2.5). Now consider the second term in (2.26)
1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}1{τ∗>t}
∣∣Ft] . (2.29)
Equivalently, for t < T this expression is given by
1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{t<τ≤T} +B
−1
τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤t≤T}
∣∣Ft] . (2.30)
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Consider the first summand of (2.30)
1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{t<τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] = 1{τ∗>t}BtEP [B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ>t}1{τ≤T}∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] .
Similarly, the second summand of (2.30) can be reformulated as follows.
1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤t≤T}
∣∣Ft] = 1{τ∗>t}BtEP [B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤t}∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Ft] .
Hence, for t < T the conditional expectation (2.29) is given by
1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft]+ 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP [B−1τ∗ Zτ∗∣∣Ft] . (2.31)
Consider the first conditional expectation above
1{τ>t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
EP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗1{τ≤T} |G∞ ∨H∞ ∨H∗t
]∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
EP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗ |G∞ ∨H∞ ∨H∗t
]
1{τ≤T}
∣∣Ft] .
Since the density of recovery time conditionally on G∞ ∨H∞ for τ ∗ > t is given by
∂P
∂s
({τ ∗ ≤ s} |τ ∗ > t;G∞ ∨H∞ ) = λ∗se−
∫ s
t λ
∗
udu = λ∗se
Λ∗t−Λ∗s for s > t, (2.32)
the last expression can be written as
1{τ>t}BtEP
[
1{τ∗>t}
∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuλ
∗
ue
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu1{τ≤T}
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}1{τ∗>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu1{τ≤T}
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u≤T}e
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu
∣∣∣∣Ft] .
We use the definition of λ∗t for the first equality. Note that the conditional expecta-
tion above is zero on the set {τ ∗ ≤ t}. Thus, the last expression results in
1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
1{τ∗>t}
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu
∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
P ({τ ∗ > t} |Gt ∨Ht ) .
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Using the exact previous arguments of the hazard process of τ ∗ and while noticing
that the integral in the conditional expectation is G∞ ∨ H∞-measurable, the last
term is equivalent to
1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
Λ∗t−Λ∗udu
∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
= 1{τ>t}BtEP
[
EP
[∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
− ∫ ut ηs1{τ≤s}dsdu
∣∣∣∣G∞ ∨Ht]∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht] .
Note that the density of default conditionally on G∞ for τ > t is given by
∂P
∂s
({τ ≤ s} |τ > t;G∞ ) = λse−
∫ s
t λudu for s > t.
Thus, last expression is given by
1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{q≤u}e
− ∫ ut ηs1{q≤s}dsduλqe− ∫ qt λvdvdq
∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht] ,
or, equivalently,
1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{q≤u}λqe
− ∫ ut ηs1{q≤s}ds−∫ qt λvdvdudq
∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht] ,
since u cannot be greater than T . By noting that the expression is zero on {τ ≤ t},
we have
1{τ>t}
BtEP
[
1{τ>t}
∫
(t,T ]
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{q≤u}λqe
− ∫ ut ηs1{q≤s}ds−∫ qt λvdvdudq∣∣∣Gt]
P ({τ > t} |Gt ) .
Since the double integral conditionally is G∞-measurable, we use the properties of
the hazard process of τ to derive the equivalent expression
1{τ>t}BtEP
[∫
(t,T ]
∫
(t,T ]
B−1u Zuηu1{q≤u}λqe
− ∫ ut ηs1{q≤s}ds−∫ qt λvdvdudq
∣∣∣∣Gt] . (2.33)
Finally, we proceed with the second term of (2.31)
1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[
EP
[
B−1τ∗ Zτ∗
∣∣G∞ ∨H∞ ∨H∗t ]∣∣Ft] .
By the density of τ ∗ conditioned on G∞ ∨ F∞ given in (2.32), we can write last
expression as
1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
− ∫ ut ηs1{τ≤s}dsdu
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}
BtEP
[
1{τ∗>t}
∫
(t,∞) B
−1
u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
− ∫ ut ηs1{τ≤s}dsdu∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
P ({τ ∗ > t} |Gt ∨Ht ) .
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By the same procedure as before, the last term equals
1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηu1{τ≤u}e
− ∫ ut ηs1{τ≤s}dsdu
∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
Since the conditional expectation is zero on {τ > t}, then the last expression is given
by
1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηue
− ∫ ut ηsdsdu
∣∣∣∣Gt ∨Ht]
= 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}
BtEP
[
1{τ≤t}
∫
(t,∞) B
−1
u Zuηue
− ∫ ut ηsdsdu∣∣∣Gt]
P ({τ ≤ t} |Gt )
= 1{τ∗>t}1{τ≤t}BtEP
[∫
(t,∞)
B−1u Zuηue
− ∫ ut ηsdsdu
∣∣∣∣Gt] , (2.34)
where the second equality follows from the properties of the hazard process of τ
conditioned on G∞. The value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond is the sum of
(2.28), (2.33), and (2.34).

2.7.4 Computation of I20 and I˜
2
0 of Section 2.3.3
First, we calculate I20 .
I20 = EP
[∫
(0,T ]
∫
(0,T ]
B−1T φη1{q≤u}λe
− ∫ u0 η1{q≤s}ds−λqdudq
]
= φηλEP
[∫
(0,T ]
∫
(0,T ]
B−1T 1{q≤u}e
− ∫ u0 η1{q≤s}ds−λqdqdu
]
= φηλEP
[∫
(0,T ]
B−1T
∫
(0,u]
e−
∫ u
q ηds−λqdqdu
]
= φηλEP
[∫
(0,T ]
B−1T
∫
(0,u]
eq(η−λ)−ηudqdu
]
.
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For µ 6= η, we have
I20 = φηλEP
[∫
(0,T ]
B−1T
1
η − λ
(
e−λu − e−ηu) du]
=
φηλ
η − λ
∫
Ω
∫
(0,T ]
B−1T
(
e−λu − e−ηu) dudP
=
φηλ
η − λ
∫
(0,T ]
(
e−λu − e−ηu) ∫
Ω
B−1T dPdu
=
φηλ
η − λ
∫
(0,T ]
(
e−λu − e−ηu)P (0, u)du
=
φηλ
η − λ
∫
(0,T ]
(
e−λu − e−ηu)A(0, u)e−B(0,u)r0du,
where A(0, u) and B(0, u) are define in Section 2.3.3. Consider I˜20 ,
I˜20 = λφEP
[∫
(0,T ]
B−1u e
−λudu
]
= λφ
∫
Ω
∫
(0,T ]
B−1u e
−λududP
= λφ
∫
(0,T ]
e−λu
∫
Ω
B−1u dPdu
= λφ
∫
(0,T )
e−λuP (0, u)du
= λφ
∫
(0,T ]
A(0, u)e−B(0,u)r0−λudu.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity Risk Under Partial
Execution and Block Trading
3.1 Introduction
The urge of a comprehensive, tractable and computationally light model to measure
liquidity risk has increased since the last financial crisis. During the credit crunch
we have observed how liquidity risk can manifest itself in a wide variety of forms, as
for example the uncertainty about the width of the bid-ask spread, the uncertainty
about the marketability of assets, the uncertainty about the price of infrequently
traded assets, etc. Most researchers and practitioners identify mainly two types of
liquidity risks: solvency and market-price. Solvency risk is the uncertainty about
capital flows needed to cover operating costs of a firm, such as interest expenses
and debenture repayments. Exposure to solvency risk is of great concern of banks
and other financial intermediaries since their operations are based on daily lending
and borrowing of large amounts of capital. Financial institutions are also exposed to
market liquidity risk, which is the uncertainty about 1) the asset prices at which they
can be bought and sold and 2) the volume which can be traded. Generally, highly
traded assets qualify as liquid assets. Infrequently traded securities which exhibit
large price movements when medium and large volumes are traded may be regarded
as illiquid assets. One of the common approaches to measure liquidity risk is the
analysis of transaction costs represented by the bid-ask spread. Market participants
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surely agree that the bid-ask spread, as a measure of liquidity risk, explains the
problem of illiquidity only partially. Empirical models have analyzed other relevant
factors which help to explain the liquidity conundrum of assets and portfolios. Two
of the most important of these factors are trading volume and transaction price-
impact, as presented in Holthausen et al. (Holthausen et al. 1987) and (Holthausen
et al. 1990), Gallant et al. (Gallant et al. 1992) and Keim and Madhavan (Keim &
Madhavan 1996). These studies indicate that trading large volumes, specially trad-
ing large block orders, have consequences on asset prices. In particular, trading large
blocks has a great effect on the price and marketability of infrequently traded assets.
The present chapter presents a framework which includes not only the uncertainty
about the bid and ask prices but also includes price-impact originated from block
trading and the uncertainty of marketability.
This chapter analyzes market price liquidity risk on asset portfolios. According to
empirical work, the present framework formulates block trading effects as a change
in the future best bid and ask quotes after fulfillment of a large block transaction.
Additionally, marketability is modeled here as a set of executable trades, leaving all
trades outside of this set as non-executable. Hence, execution of sell or buy orders
may be partial. In addition, the framework imposes a solvency restriction on the
asset portfolio, later denoted as liquidity policy, which reflects solvency risk. Hence,
the framework introduced in the following sections covers both market price liquid-
ity and solvency risks.
Jarrow and Protter (Jarrow & Protter 2005) present a framework of liquidity risk.
Their contribution is based on the celebrated model of C¸etin et al. (C¸etin et al. 2002)
of liquidity risk. Concretely, they consider different states of the financial market:
business as usual and liquidity crisis. Under a liquidity crisis, asset values deterio-
rate implying a decline in portfolio values. Liquidity risk captured by their model
consists of only of a fraction of the market price liquidity risk, because the authors
neglect the importance of trading volume as a factor of risk.
Recently, Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008) put forward an alternative
adjustment to portfolio values which relies on an optimization problem of portfolio
and transaction values. The authors model liquidity risk through the uncertainty
concerning future bid and ask quotes. Under a specified liquidity policy/restriction,
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the value of the asset portfolio is corrected. They denote the liquidity-adjusted port-
folio value by V L. This approach tackles issues with respect to solving risk and up
to some extent market price uncertainty .However, the authors neglect the existence
of block trading and partial execution effects. Furthermore, Acerbi and Scandolo
define a liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL on the space of portfolio weights P us-
ing the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L. In their setup V L has the necessary
properties such that ρL is a convex risk measure on P .
We borrow the setup of Acerbi and Scandolo and undertake the same liquidity ad-
justment on portfolio values but we admit the existence of block trading and partial
execution effects. Under this treatment the following main contributions arises.
The liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL fails to be convex on P whenever block trading
and partial execution effects are present,...
...and the probability distribution of V L shifts to lower values, the expected value
falls and the Value-at-Risk rises.
In other words, the fact that ρL is not convex on P indicates that the risk of the
average portfolio of a collection of portfolios is not necessarily lower than the aver-
age risk of the collection of the portfolios. The liquidity adjustment of any portfolio
consists in a correction of the mark-to-market portfolio value by answering the ques-
tion: what is the price of those positions after executing a necessary transaction in
order to maintain some liquidity restriction, while considering that this transaction
- if execution is possible - may cause an impact on the bid-ask spread? It is evident,
that this type of correction will adjust the mark-to-market portfolio downwards,
which explains why V L and its whole probability function shift to lower values than
the liquidity-adjusted value of Acerbi and Scandolo.
The remainder is organized as follows. The model and some helpful preliminary
results are introduced in Section 3.2. We advise the reader to skip Section 3.2.2
and advance to Section 3.3, where we define and investigate the properties of the
liquidity-adjusted portfolio value. Section 3.4 presents the analysis on the liquidity-
adjusted measure of risk and the consequences of introducing block trading and
partial execution effects. In Section 3.5 we find a numerical example that illustrates
the impact of those effects on ρL. We conclude in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Framework
3.2.1 Setup, Partial Execution and Block Trading
The following setup is a one-period financial model. Hence, fix some arbitrary
point in time and consider N + 1 traded assets in the financial market, N securities
denoted by Ai for i ∈ I := {1, . . . , N} := I ⊂ N and the bank account denoted by
A0. Trading takes place in a market which functions under a continuous matching
mechanism, i.e. buy and sell orders are processed immediately by their arrival,
in particular there are no auctions. Our market is order driven. Investors have
access to information of the order book, where sell orders and buy orders are listed
and ordered using a price-time priority. In other words, an asset is traded with
prices corresponding to the prices given1 in the order book. Following Acerbi and
Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008) the order book implies a ‘Marginal Supply-
Demand Curve’ or MSDC. Formally, the MSDC describes the prices at which asset
i ∈ I can be traded is given by a map mi : X → R with X := R\{0} which satisfies
1. If x1 < x2, then mi(x1) ≥ mi(x2).
2. mi is ca`dla`g for x < 0 and la`dca`g for x > 0.
As in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), cash has an special MSDC: m0(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X.
An order x < 0 (x > 0) in the order book represents a buy (sell) order. Thus, the
price of the dx-th share is given by the bid (ask) price mi(x) for x < 0 (x > 0).
Remark 3.2.1. Since our purpose is to model partial order execution, the set X
represents the set of orders and not the set of transactions as in (Acerbi & Scandolo
2008).
Each asset traded in financial markets has a finite trading volume, e.g. the
stock shares of a company, the number of futures contracts, the number of bonds,
the number of asset-backed securities. The largest possible trading volume equals
the sum of the posted orders and we call it the maximal executable transaction.
1Or implied, in case of market orders or other special cases.
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Obviously, for each asset there are a maximal executable buy transaction and a
maximal executable sell transaction, which we define as follows.
Definition 3.2.2. The maximum executable sell and buy transactions are given by
the sum of all sell and buy orders of the order book and are denoted by y
i
≤ 0
and y¯i ≥ 0 for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, respectively. The set of executable transactions is
denoted by Y := Y0×Y1×. . .×YN , where2 Yi := [yi, y¯i] ⊂ R. Additionally, we denote
the upper- and lower-bound vectors by y¯ := (y¯0, y¯1, . . . , y¯N) and y := (y0, y1, . . . , yN).
Note that Y is a set of transactions. Moreover, observe that the set of orders
RN+1 is larger than the set of executable transactions, i.e. Y ⊂ RN+1. In the
present analysis we are interested in the value of portfolios after execution of some
specific executable transactions. In this view, we focus on transactions and not on
orders. We find below the definition of a function that translates any order into an
executable transaction.
Definition 3.2.3. For any order θi ∈ R the corresponding executable transaction is
given by a mapping fi : R→ Yi,
fi(θi) = 1{θi∈Yi}θi + 1{θi<yi}yi + 1{θi>y¯i}y¯i.
We denote θˆi := f(θi).
An investor trying to sell (buy) θi shares places a sell (buy) order θi which will
be matched against buy (sell) orders of the order book and receives (pays) all bid
(ask) prices mi(x) until the transaction θˆi is completed. Hence, trading proceeds of
asset Ai from transaction θˆi ∈ Yi is given by the function pi : Yi → R,
pi(θˆi) =
∫ θˆi
0
mi(x)dx.
In this sense pi(θˆi) is the cash amount the investor receives when selling θˆi > 0
shares and the cash amount he pays when buying |θˆi| shares when θˆi < 0. The
proceeds from submitting an order of θi ∈ R shares are represented by the function
Pi(θi) where Pi := pi ◦ fi. Recall that submitting order θi does not necessary
2We impose cash bounds, which can represent all current money amount on the market, just
for technical reasons.
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imply a transaction amounting θi, because of the existence of maximal executable
transactions it is possible to have θi 6= θˆi. Since our interest is the analysis of
transactions, we focus on pi.
Based on the definition in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), a portfolio is a vector ψ =
(ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) in RN+1 =: P . A long, short and flat position in asset Ai for
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} is denoted by ψi > 0, ψi < 0 and ψi = 0, respectively. Market
participants hold portfolios ψ ∈ P and execute transactions θˆ ∈ Y and are interested
to correctly identify corresponding transaction proceeds and mark-to-market values
of asset positions. Following (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), the transaction proceeds of
an arbitrary transaction θˆ ∈ Y are given by the map L : Y → R,
L(θˆ) =
N∑
i=0
pi(θˆi) = θˆ0 +
N∑
i=1
∫ θˆi
0
mi(x)dx.
In order to introduce the mark-to-market value of a portfolio, consider the best
bid and the best ask which are denoted by m+i := mi(0
+) and m−i := mi(0
−),
respectively.3 In practice is common to use prevailing bid and ask prices for valuing
long and short portfolio positions, respectively. This usage is known as mark-to-
market and is given for portfolio ψ ∈ P by
U˜(ψ) = ψ0 +
N∑
i=1
(
m+i ψi1{ψi>0} +m
−
i ψi1{ψi<0}
)
. (3.1)
The mark-to-market value U˜ reflects only prevailing best bid and ask prices. As
mentioned before, the bid-ask spread is a limited measure of liquidity risk, which is
why we opt to consider the liquidity adjustment of portfolio positions ψ put forward
by Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). Tis adjustment is based on a
specific transaction θˆ∗ which is introduced later in the analysis. For now, it is enough
to keep in mind that by adjusting portfolio ψ we end up with the mark-to-market
value U˜(ψ − θˆ). We should note, however, that U˜ is not capable to internalize any
possible liquidity effects such as block trading produced by transaction θˆ. The men-
tioned disadvantage is evident since best bids m+i and best asks m
−
i are independent
of the execution of any transaction θˆ ∈ Y . Accordingly, we call U˜ the pre-execution
mark-to-market portfolio value. Aware of the shortcomings of U˜ we consider an
3Hence, the bid-ask spread is m−i −m+i .
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extended version of the conventional mark-to-market value for which we define the
post-execution best bid and ask prices.
Definition 3.2.4. The post-execution best bid and ask prices after transaction θˆi ∈
Yi are given by functions m
+,θˆi
i with m
+,·
i : Yi → R+ and m−,θˆii with m−,·i : Yi → R+,
respectively.
Thus, if no transaction is undertaken post-execution best bids and asks coincide
with pre-execution best bids and asks, i.e. m−i = m
−,θˆi
i and m
+
i = m
+,θˆi
i for all i ∈ I.
However, from empirical observations presented in Klein and Madhavan (Keim &
Madhavan 1996) there are transactions that shift temporarily or permanently best
bids and asks. These transactions usually consist of large volume trades executed in
one piece (if possible), which are commonly called large block trades. Execution of
large trades may take a longer time than small transactions and may carry unveiled
essential information which is reflected in an abrupt price change. Hence, the post-
execution best bid and ask prices of a block transaction may not coincide with the
pre-execution best bid and ask prices, respectively. The possible difference between
pre- and post-execution prices represents a liquidity effect that is missing in Acerbi
and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008).
In order to incorporate this additional liquidity effect originated by block trading
we recur to the following simple but effective approach. Assume lower and upper
bounds bi and b¯i such that large block trades are those transactions outside these
bounds.
Definition 3.2.5. For any non-cash asset Ai for i ∈ I suppose there exits lower
and upper bounds bi, b¯i ∈ R\ {0}, which define the set
Bi = { x ∈ R
∣∣x /∈ [bi, b¯i]} .
Denote b¯ := (b¯1, . . . , b¯N) and b := (b1, . . . , bN). A transaction θˆi ∈ Yi for i ∈ I is
called block trade or block transaction if θˆi ∈ Bi. Additionally, denote the set of
large block transactions by
B := {ψ ∈ P | ∃ i ∈ I with ψi ∈ Bi} .
Remark 3.2.6. Note that the cash positions ψ0 and cash transactions θˆ0 are irrel-
evant for the definition of block transactions. Furthermore, notice that
Bc = {ψ ∈ P | ∀i ∈ I, ψi /∈ Bi} .
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By previous arguments, we expect that a block transaction θˆ ∈ B induce a
difference between pre-execution and post-execution best bids and best asks. When
executing a block buy trade θˆi < bi for asset Ai market participants interpret the
large volume of that single transaction as relevant information. For example, some
agents will foresee a future imminent increase of the price of Ai and will try to
make a trading gain by buying that asset. This will overflow momentarily the
market for asset Ai with buy orders, which will induce an increase of the best ask,
i.e. m−,θˆii > m
−
i for θˆi < bi. Similarly, during the execution of a block sell trade
θˆi > b¯i for asset Ai market participants will expect a drop in the price of Ai and
try to ‘dump’ their positions as fast as possible inducing a fall in the best bid, i.e.
m+,θˆii < m
+
i for θˆi > b¯i. We assume that large buy trades affect only best asks while
large sell trades affect only best bids. The following assumption summarize these
ideas.
Assumption 3.2.7. For any θˆi ∈ Yi, i ∈ I, it holds m−i ≤ m−,θˆii and m+i ≥ m+,θˆii .
In particular, we have m−,θˆii > m
−
i for any θˆi < bi and m
+,θˆi
i < m
+
i for θˆi > b¯i.
Note that only the best bids and asks shift after execution of block transactions.
The previously introduced MSDCs are those price curves prevailing during the ex-
ecution of transactions. We do not model a post-execution MSDC. In addition, we
impose a nontrivial bid-ask spread, which is a common assumption when handling
liquidity risk.
Assumption 3.2.8. The bid-ask spread is always positive, i.e. for all i ∈ I we have
m−i −m+i > 0 and m−,θˆii −m+,θˆii > 0 for any θˆi ∈ Yi.
In order to present the analysis as simple as possible without losing generality,
we introduce the following assumption which is consistent with Assumption 3.2.7.
Assumption 3.2.9. Consider the post-execution best bid and ask prices of asset Ai
after some transaction θˆi ∈ Yi
m+,θˆii =
{
m+,b¯ii for θˆi > 0, θˆi ∈ Bi
m+i else
,
and
m−,θˆii =
{
m
−,bi
i for θˆi < 0, θˆi ∈ Bi
m−i else
,
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respectively, where m+i > m
+,b¯i
i ≥ mi(b¯i) ∈ R++, m−i < m−,bii ≤ mi(bi) ∈ R++,
whenever b¯i, bi ∈ Yi, and m+,b¯ii ≥ 1.
Assuming the existence of the set of block trades B is not sufficient to guarantee
the existence of block trading effects. We define block trading effects as the price
change in either a best bid or a best ask caused by execution of some block transac-
tion. In other words, block trading effects exist only if block trades are executable.
If none executable transaction produces a change in best bid or ask prices, then
there is no block trading effect.4 Formally, consider the following
Definition 3.2.10. There are no block trading effects if for all executable transac-
tions all post-execution best bid and ask prices match the pre-execution best bid and
ask prices, respectively, i.e. there are no block trading effects if for all θˆ ∈ Y we
have m+,θˆii = m
+
i and m
−,θˆi
i = m
−
i for all i ∈ I.
Equivalently, we rephrase this definition by a more handy statement, which is of
great help for the presentation of the results of the next sections.
Proposition 3.2.11. There are no block trading effects if and only if Y ⊆ Bc.
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Assumption 3.2.9 and Definition 3.2.10.

Because the execution of a block buy (ask) order induces a rise (fall) in the best ask
(best bid) price, any investor undertaking a block transaction must acknowledge the
impact of this transaction in the value of its portfolio. For example, if an investor
holding a large long position in asset Ai executes a block sell trade, the remaining
long position after execution will be priced with the post-execution best bid m+,b¯ii
which is strictly smaller than the pre-execution best bid m+i . Hence, the investor’s
portfolio experience a loss in its value due to block trading effects. Consequently,
we propose to use a concept of mark-to-market value that embeds block trading
4Usually in reality execution of small and large transactions will induce changes in best bids and
asks, which are mostly small and momentarily. We refer to block trading effects to large changes
in best bids and ask, which may bepermanently or last a long period of time.
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effects. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of post-execution mark-to-market value
as follows.
Definition 3.2.12. The post-execution mark-to-market value (MtM) value of port-
folio ψ ∈ P after execution of transaction θˆ ∈ Y is given by the mapping
U : P × Y → R,
U(ψ, θˆ) = ψ0 +
N∑
i=1
(
m+,θˆii ψi1{ψi>0} +m
−,θˆi
i ψi1{ψi<0}
)
.
As pointed out in Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), a mark-to-
market valuation approach based only on best bids and best asks fails to capture the
depth of the market, i.e. we miss the information contained in the whole MSDCs
because we regard only best bids and best asks. Alternatively, Acerbi and Scandolo
propose to consider the sum of the mark-to-market value of a portfolio after the
execution of some transaction and the value of the proceeds of that transaction as
a more informative valuation method. Formally, for some portfolio ψ ∈ P and by
choosing θ optimally they consider
U˜(ψ − θ) + L(θ), (3.2)
as a valuation method that reflects the overall market situation more accurately
than just U˜ . Valuation method (3.2) gives an answer to the question: how much
cash can an investor holding an initial portfolio ψ collect by executing transaction
θ, and what is the mark-to-market value of the resulting portfolio? Note that val-
uation approach (3.2) evidences some weak points concerning the incorporation of
market-liquidity conditions since it neglects block trading and partial execution ef-
fects because Acerbi and Scandolo assume that any order can be traded. In order
to avoid these shortcomings we consider the following valuation of some portfolio
ψ ∈ P by choosing optimally some θˆ ∈ Y ,
U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ). (3.3)
As mentioned previously, in Section 3.3.1 we introduce the notion of liquidity-
adjusted portfolio value, which is based on (3.3) for some special transaction θˆ∗ ∈ Y .
We denote expression (3.3) as the post-execution portfolio value of ψ ∈ P given trans-
action θˆ ∈ Y .
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In order to provide a further argument for the validity of post-execution portfolio
values as a valuation approach reflecting liquidity effects, we discuss next portfolio
liquidation. An investor trying to liquidate an entire portfolio will face execution
restrictions if the portfolio positions are too large for the governing market situation.
In cases when the market depth does not permit full liquidation, the investor re-
ceives the liquidation proceeds from the executable portion and hold the unexecuted
portion of his portfolio. The executable portion of a portfolio ψ ∈ P is given by
ψˆ = f(ψ) ∈ Y and the unexecutable portion by ψ− ψˆ. Hence, differently as Acerbi
and Scandolo, the liquidation value of portfolio ψ ∈ P is given by
U(ψ − ψˆ, ψˆ) + L(ψˆ),
which is the post-execution value of ψ given transaction ψˆ. Liquidation value of
portfolio ψ reflects the underlying market depth involving MSDCs, executable trans-
actions and price impacts caused by block trading, all of which are important com-
ponents of liquidity risk.
Liquidity costs of any transaction θˆ ∈ Y are the difference of the post-execution
portfolio value given no transaction and the post-execution portfolio value given
transaction θˆ. Formally, the liquidity costs of transaction θˆ ∈ Y for portfolio ψ ∈ P
is given by the function C : P × Y → R
C(ψ, θˆ) = U(ψ, 0)− (L(θˆ) + U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ)). (3.4)
Consequently, the liquidation costs of any portfolio ψ ∈ P are given by C(ψ, ψˆ) =
U(ψ, 0)−(L(ψˆ)+U(ψ− ψˆ, ψˆ)). Consider the following characterization of portfolios
from (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). Let ψ, ξ ∈ P be two portfolios.
1. They are concordant, ψ  ξ , if ψiξi ≥ 0 for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
2. They are discordant, ψ  ξ , if ψiξi ≤ 0 for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
3. ψ ≥ ξ, if ψi ≥ ξi for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
As mentioned earlier, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is based on the post-
execution portfolio value given some specific transaction. Since we are modeling
85
liquidity risk, we are interested only in transactions that fulfill some liquidity con-
straint or liquidity policy. By (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), a liquidity policy L is any
closed convex subset L ⊆ P satisfying the following conditions.
1. If ψ ∈ L, then ψ + (a, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L for all a > 0.
2. If (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) ∈ L, then (ψ0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L.
Accordingly, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value of ψ ∈ P is given by U(ψ −
θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗), where the resulting portfolio ψ − θˆ∗ is in L for transaction θˆ∗ ∈ Y
which is defined in Section 3.3.1.
3.2.2 Preliminary Results
In this section we present some useful insights and results concerning post-execution
MtM value U , transactions proceeds L, post-execution portfolio value U + L and
liquidity costs C, which are needed later in the analysis. However, we advice the
reader to skip this section and proceed with Section 3.3.1. Results there cite propo-
sitions, lemmas and corollaries of this section, which can be read on timely demand.
In Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), we find that U , L, U +L and C
are continuous functions, the latter is convex and the rest concave. However, follow-
ing our setup and in presence of block trading and partial execution effects, we learn
from this section that continuity of U , L, U + L and C is destroyed. Furthermore,
when these effects exist U , L and U + L are not concave and C is not convex. We
develop these results meticulously as follows.
Proposition 3.2.13. Consider the function L : Y −→ R and for every θˆ ∈ Y the
function U(·, θˆ) : P −→ R.
1. L is increasing5, continuous and concave on Y, subadditive on concordant
portfolios and superadditive on discordant portfolios.
2. U(·, θˆ) is increasing, continuous and concave on P, additive on concordant
portfolios and superadditive on P.
5A function f : X −→ R, X ⊆ P, is increasing if f(ψ) ≥ f(ξ) for ψ, ξ ∈ P with ψ ≥ ξ.
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Proof. Continuity of L and U(·, θˆ) follows from their definitions. By definition of
MSDC, for each i ∈ I the proceeds function pi(θˆi), θˆi ∈ Yi, is increasing. Hence,
L(θˆ) =
∑N
i=0 pi(θˆi) is increasing on Y . Similarly, because of the definition of MSDC
and by construction, U is an increasing function on P . The rest of the proof can
be found in Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008) by noticing that the
functions L(·) and U(·, θˆ) are decomposable.

Last proposition almost coincides with results in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). There
are two differences: transactions proceeds L is defined on the set of executable
transactions Y and we use the post-execution MtM value U given some transaction
θˆ ∈ Y instead of the pre-execution mark-to-market value U˜ as Acerbi and Scandolo.
Note that the function U has the same characteristics as U˜ if we fix transaction
θˆ. Let us next draw our attention to the post-execution value U for the resulting
portfolio ψ − θˆ ∈ P after transaction θˆ ∈ Y ,
U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ),
where ψ ∈ P is the initial portfolio. For each ψ ∈ P denote the function zψ : Y → R
defined by
zψ(θˆ) := U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) for θˆ ∈ Y . (3.5)
The proposition below states that zψ is continuous and concave when the underlying
portfolio is not too large and on the set of small executable transactions Bc ∩ Y . If
however, the portfolio is large and block trades are executable, then zψ looses those
characteristics.
Proposition 3.2.14. Given ψ ∈ P, y¯, y ∈ P and b¯, b ∈ RN ,
1. zψ is continuous and concave
(a) if ψ ∈ Bc.
(b) on6 Bc ∩ Y.
6By definition Bc ∩ Y 6= ∅.
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2. zψ is neither concave nor continuous if there exists some i ∈ I such that
(a) ψi < bi and yi < bi, or
(b) ψi > b¯i and y¯i > b¯i.
Proof. For any ψ ∈ P , zψ(x) is a decomposable function, i.e. for x ∈ Y
zψ(x) =
N∑
i=0
fψi (xi), with f
ψ
i (xi) =
∫ ψi−xi
0
gψi (u)du
where
gψi (xi) = m
+,xi
i · 1{ψi−xi>0} +m−,xii · 1{ψi−xi<0},
for i ∈ I, with gψi (ψi) = 0 and gψ0 (xi) = 1 for all xi ∈ Yi.
1. (a) Continuity. By Assumption 3.2.9, we have for b¯i ≥ ψi ≥ 0 and bi ≤ ψi ≤ 0
fψi (xi) =

m+i (ψi − xi) for xi < ψi
0 for xi = ψi
m−i (ψi − xi) for xi > ψi.
For the cases xi < ψi and xi > ψi, the function f
ψ
i is clearly continuous. For xi = ψi,
consider a sequence (ξni ), with yi ≤ ξni < ψi for all n ∈ N and ξni → ψi as n → ∞,
and another sequence (ηni ), with ψi < η
n
i ≤ y¯i for all n ∈ N and ηni → ψi as n→∞.
Since fψi (ξ
n
i ) → 0 and fψi (ηni ) → 0 as n → ∞ and fψi (ψi) = 0, the function fψi is
continuous. Because all components fi of f are continuous, f is also continuous.
1. (a) Concavity. Note that
fψi (xi) =

∫ ψi−xi
0
gψi (u)du if ψi − xi > 0
− ∫ 0
ψi−xi g
ψ
i (u)du if ψi − xi < 0.
Furthermore, for ψi − xi > 0 and ψi − xi < 0 the derivative of fψi is given by
dfψi (xi)
dxi
= −gψi (ψi − xi).
Additionally, for b¯i ≥ ψi ≥ 0 and bi ≤ ψi ≤ 0 we have
−gψi (ψi − xi) =
{
−m+i for xi < ψi
−m−i for xi > ψi.
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For b¯i ≥ ψi ≥ 0 and bi ≤ ψi ≤ 0 and ψi = xi observe the left and right derivatives
are given by
d+fψi (ψi)
dxi
= lim
→0
fψi (ψi + )− fψi (ψi)

= lim
→0
−m−i 

= −m−i ,
and
d−fψi (ψi)
dxi
= lim
→0
fψi (ψi − )− fψi (ψi)

= lim
→0
−m+i 

= −m+i ,
where  > 0. Thus, the slope of any tangent on fψ at xi = ψi takes values in
[−m−i ,−m+i ], i.e. −m−i ≤ df
ψ
i (ψi)
dxi
≤ −m+i . Since −m+i > −m−i , df
ψ
i (xi)
dxi
is decreasing
in xi. Thus, f
ψ
i is concave, hence z
ψ is also concave7.
1. (b) Continuity and Concavity. Since xi ∈ Bci ∩ Yi we have as before
fψi (xi) =

m+i (ψi − xi) if xi < ψi
0 if xi = ψi
m−i (ψi − xi) if xi > ψi,
and
dfψi (xi)
dxi
=
{
−m+i for xi < ψi
−m−i for xi > ψi,
for any ψi ∈ R. As observed previously df
ψ
i (ψi)
dxi
is decreasing. Hence, fψi is continuous
and concave, which implies that zψ is continuous and concave on Bc ∩ Y .
2. Non-Concavity. As previously found the derivative of fψi with respect to xi equals
−gψi (ψi − xi).
Let y¯i < b¯i. For ψi > b¯i we have
−gψi (ψi − xi) =

−m+i for xi ≤ b¯i
−m+,b¯ii for b¯i < xi < ψi
−m−i for xi > ψi.
Since −m+i < −m+,b¯ii > −m−i , then −gψi is not a decreasing function. Hence, fψi is
not concave for ψi > b¯i and y¯i > b¯i. Now let yi < bi. Similarly, for ψi < bi
−gψi (ψi − xi) =

−m+i for xi < ψi
−m−,bii for ψi < xi < bi
−m−i for xi > bi.
7A decomposable function is concave if and only if all of its components are concave.
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Since −m+i > −m−,bii < −m−i , −gψi is not a decreasing function. Hence, fψi is not
concave for ψi < bi and yi < bi. Thus, f
ψ is not concave.
2. Non-Continuity. Consider ψ, ψ′ ∈ P with ψj < bj, ψ′k > b¯k for some j, k ∈ I.
Additionally, regard two sequences (ξn), (ηn) ⊂ Y , with
ξni =
{
ψi for i 6= j
ξnj for i = j
, and ηni =
{
ψ′i for i 6= k
ηnk for i = k
,
where y
j
< ξnj < bj, ψj < ξ
n
j and y¯k > η
n
k > b¯k, ψ
′
k > η
n
k for all n ∈ N. Assume
ξn → ξ and ηn → η with ξnj → bj and ηnk → b¯k as n→∞. Hence,
fψj (ξ
n) = m
−,bj
j (ψj − ξnj ) n→∞−→ m
−,bj
j (ψj − bj) < m−j (ψj − bj) = fψj (ξ),
and
fψ
′
k (η
n) = m+,b¯kk (ψ
′
k − ηnk ) n→∞−→ m+,b¯kk (ψ′k − b¯k) < m+k (ψ′k − b¯k) = fψ
′
k (η).
Thus, fψi and z
ψ are not continuous if either 1) ψi < bi and yi < bi or 2) ψi > b¯i
and y¯i > b¯i.

By this proposition, the function zψ is continuous and concave whenever block trad-
ing effects are not present.8
The same statements of the previous proposition hold true for the post-execution
portfolio value U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ) and for the liquidity costs C(ψ, θˆ). For this we
consider the next convenient representations. For every ψ ∈ P consider the function
vψ : Y → R given by
vψ(θˆ) := U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ), (3.6)
for θˆ ∈ Y , and the function C(ψ, ·) : Y → R defined in (3.4). The auxiliary
function vψ represents the post-execution portfolio value when portfolio ψ is fixed
and transactions θˆ vary.
Corollary 3.2.15. Given ψ ∈ P, y¯, y ∈ P and b¯, b ∈ RN ,
1. vψ and C(ψ, ·) are continuous, vψ is concave and C(ψ, ·) is convex
8Recall that these effects are not present if Bc ⊆ Y.
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(a) if ψ ∈ Bc.
(b) on Bc ∩ Y.
2. vψ and C(ψ, ·) are not continuous, vψ is not concave and C(ψ, ·) is not convex
if there exists some i ∈ I such that
(a) ψi < bi and yi < bi, or
(b) ψi > b¯i and y¯i > b¯i.
Proof. By Proposition 3.2.13 and Proposition 3.2.14 statement 1. holds true. For
point 2., observe that
vψ(x) =
N∑
i=0
Fψi (xi),
where
Fψi (xi) =
∫ ψi−xi
0
gψi (u)du+
∫ xi
0
mi(u)du,
with gψi defined in the proof of Proposition 3.2.14. Hence and by Proposition 3.2.14,
vψ is not continuous if either conditions (a) or (b) holds true, because the derivative
dFψi
dxi
= −gψi (ψi − xi) + mi(xi) is not decreasing in cases (a) and (b). Thus, the
remaining statements hold also true by the definition of C(ψ, ·) in (3.4).

Last corollary and following lemma indicate that block trading effects induce dis-
continuity and non-concavity in the post-execution portfolio value vψ. This result
suggests that valuation approaches based on vψ are expected to be discontinuous
and non-concave in presence of block trading effects. In the next section we intro-
duced a liquidity-adjusted portfolio value based on vψ, which we prove to obey this
rule.
Lemma 3.2.16. Given some portfolio ψ ∈ P, y¯, y ∈ P and b¯, b ∈ RN , the function
vψ is not continuous if and only if there exists some nonempty set J ⊆ I such that
ψj > b¯j with y¯j > b¯j for some j ∈ J or ψk < bk with yk < bk for some k ∈ J .
Proof. By Corollary 3.2.15 the existence of J is sufficient in order to have a dis-
continuous function vψ. We show here that its existence is a necessary condition.
91
Consider the function vψ defined in Corollary 3.2.15 as a decomposable function
vψ(θˆ) =
∑N
i=0 v
ψ
i (θˆi), where θˆi ∈ Yi, with
vψi (θˆi) = m
+,θˆi(ψi − θˆi)1{ψi−θˆi>0} +m−,θˆi(ψi − θˆi)1{ψi−θˆi<0} +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du,
for i ∈ I and vψ0 (θˆ0) = ψ0. By Corollary 3.2.15, the function vψ(θˆ) is continuous
for the following cases: (i) ψi ∈ [bi, b¯i] for all i ∈ I, and (ii) ψi /∈ [bi, b¯i], (a)
bi ≤ yi ≤ y¯i ≤ b¯i for all i ∈ I. We have the following cases left:
(b) bi > yi and (c) b¯i < y¯i. Additionally, for (b) we have the possibilities (1) ψi < bi
and (2) ψi > b¯i. For (ii.b.1), we obtain
vψi (θˆi) =

m−i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du θˆi ≥ bi
m
−,bi
i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du ψi ≤ θˆi < bi
m+i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du θˆi > ψi,
and for (ii.b.2)
vψi (θˆi) =
{
m−i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du θˆi ≥ ψi
m+i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du θˆi < ψi.
By Proposition 3.2.14 in case (ii.b.1) the function vψi is not continuous and in case
(ii.b.1) it is continuous. Analogously, non continuity of the function vψi follows for
case (c) for the possibilities (3) ψ < b¯i and (4) ψ > b¯i.

From Corollary 3.2.15 and Lemma 3.2.16 is clear that the post-execution portfolio
value vψ presents discontinuities and non-concavity when block trading effects exist.
Hence, regard the following corollary whose proof is the collection of last results.
Corollary 3.2.17. In general the function vψ is neither concave nor continuous.
In Acerbi and Scandolo’s setup we consider the pre-execution portfolio value
v˜ψ : Y → R, given by
v˜ψ(θˆ) := U˜(ψ − θˆ) + L(θˆ), (3.7)
for θˆ ∈ Y . The authors show that v˜ψ is a continuous concave function. The liquidity-
adjusted portfolio value proposed by Acerbi and Scandolo turns out to be also
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continuous and concave because it is based on the pre-execution portfolio value v˜ψ.
In our framework, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value introduced in the following
section is based on the post-execution portfolio value vψ, inheriting the discontinuity
and non-concavity from vψ.
However, if block trading effects are not present, i.e. Y ⊆ Bc, the post-execution
mark-to-market value U coincides with the pre-execution value U˜ . Formally, if
Y ⊆ Bc, we have by construction
U(ψ, θˆ) = U˜(ψ),
for all ψ ∈ P and any θˆ ∈ Y . Following this observation, we obtain the next evident
result.
Corollary 3.2.18. If Y ⊆ Bc, for all ψ ∈ P and any θˆ ∈ Y,
vψ(θˆ) = v˜ψ(θˆ).
Hence, in absence of block trading effects, i.e. Y ⊆ Bc, and by borrowing results
from (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), vψ is continuous, concave and for λ > 1
vλψ(λθˆ) ≤ λvψ(θˆ). (3.8)
Additionally, the function C is continuous, convex and for λ > 1
C(λψ, λθˆ) ≥ λC(ψ, θˆ).
Block trading effects cause not only discontinuities, non-concavity and non-
convexity, they also induce lower mark-to-market values. To see this, recall that
Acerbi and Scandolo’s framework neglects block trading effects. Relevant mark-to-
market values of their framework are U˜ and v˜ψ. Our model conceives block trading
effects as possible. Our relevant mark-to-market values are U and vψ. Hence, con-
sider the following
Proposition 3.2.19. For any ψ ∈ P and θˆ ∈ Y
U˜(ψ) = U(ψ, 0) ≥ U(ψ, θˆ),
and
v˜ψ(θˆ) ≥ vψ(θˆ).
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Proof. The results follow from observing that m+,θˆii ≤ m+i and m−,θˆii ≥ m−i for any
θˆi ∈ Yi for i ∈ I and from the definition of U , U˜ , vψ and v˜ψ.

By this proposition we see in Section 3.3.3 that block trading effects reduce the
liquidity-adjusted portfolio value, which is introduced next.
3.3 Liquidity-Adjusted Portfolio Value
In this section we present the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L and prove that
it is well defined for every portfolio ψ. Then we show that V L is not concave in
general. Last, we identify the effects of block trading and partial execution on V L.
3.3.1 Liquidity Adjustment
Previously we introduced the pre-execution mark-to-market value for portfolio ψ ∈
P , which is given by U˜(θˆ). As pointed out, this valuation approach can not reflect
liquidity conditions of the market. Moreover, U˜(θˆ) can neither capture the specific
liquidity needs or constraints of the investor holding that position.
A more appropriate value that considers market-liquidity conditions as MSDCs,
executable transactions and block trading is the post-execution value U(ψ− θˆ, θˆ) +
L(θˆ) of portfolio ψ for some transaction θˆ ∈ Y . In order to adequate this valuation
approach to reflect liquidity restrictions of the investor, we need to impose that the
resulting portfolio from the transaction must meet the requirements of some given
liquidity policy L to which the investor is subjected. Starting from a portfolio ψ ∈ P
and executing transaction θˆ ∈ Y , the resulting portfolio including cash proceeds of
the transaction is given by
ψ − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0),
where (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ P represents a cash portfolio with a cash position which
equals the proceeds from transaction θˆ. Hence, given some liquidity policy L we are
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interested for liquidity adjustments θˆ to portfolio ψ whose adjusted value is given
by
vψ(θˆ) = U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ), (3.9)
such that θˆ ∈ Y , and ψ − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L. Note that there may be several
transactions θˆ that fulfill last conditions but with different vψ(θˆ). Following Acerbi
and Scandolo, we impose a further condition for transaction θˆ: it must be chosen
optimally, i.e. it must maximize vψ(θˆ). Formally, we define the liquidity-adjusted
portfolio value of ψ ∈ P under liquidity policy L as a map V L : P → R given by
V L(ψ) = sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ)} , (3.10)
with
CL(ψ) =
{
θˆ ∈ Y
∣∣∣ψ − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L} .
Additionally, if CL(ψ) = ∅, then V L(ψ) = −∞.
Although the function U(ψ− θˆ, θˆ)+L(θˆ) of optimization problem (3.10) is in general
non-concave in Y as shown in the previous section, the problem is solvable, i.e. the
liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L is well defined. We show this in the following
two propositions.
Proposition 3.3.1. For all ψ ∈ P with CL(ψ) 6= ∅, the set CL(ψ) is compact and
vψ(θˆ) is bounded.
Proof. Firstly, we verify the compactness of the set CL(ψ) ⊆ Y ∩ L under the
assumption CL(ψ) 6= ∅. Consider a sequence (ξn) in CL(ψ) with ξn → ξ. Hence,
ψ − ξn + (L(ξn), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L. Due to the continuity of L and the fact that L is
closed we have
ψ − ξn + (L(ξn), 0, . . . , 0) −→ ψ − ξ + (L(ξ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L.
Thus the set CL(ψ) is closed. Since Y is a bounded set, CL(ψ) is compact.
Secondly, we show that for every ψ ∈ P the function vψ(θˆ) is bounded. For this fix
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some ψ ∈ P and note that for all θˆ ∈ Y follows
K¯(ψ, y¯, y) := ψ0 +
∑
i∈I
(
m+i (ψi − yi) +
∫ y¯i
0
mi(u)du
)
≥ ψ0 +
∑
i∈I
(
1{ψi−θˆi>0}m
+,θˆi
i (ψi − θˆi) + 1{ψi−θˆi<0}m
−,θˆi
i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du
)
≥ ψ0 +
∑
i∈I
(
m−,bi (ψi − y¯i) +
N∑
i=1
∫ y
i
0
mi(u)du
)
=: K(ψ, y¯, y). (3.11)
Notice that the second expression after the first inequality in (3.11) is vψ(θˆ). Fur-
thermore, note that |K¯(ψ, y¯, y)|, |K(ψ, y¯, y)| <∞ for any ψ ∈ P , and any y¯, y ∈ Y .
Hence, |vψ(θˆ)| <∞ for any θˆ ∈ Y .

Remark 3.3.2. If ψ ∈ Bc, problem (3.10) is a convex optimization problem due to
the concavity of gψ by Corollary 3.2.15 and to the convexity of CL(ψ).
Remark 3.3.3. The function U(ψ− θˆ, θˆ) +L(θˆ) does not depend on θˆ0. Hence, for
any trade θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1, . . . , θˆN) ∈ Y we set θˆ0 = 0 for the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 3.3.4. For every ψ ∈ P with CL(ψ) 6= ∅, the supremum of optimization
problem (3.10) is attained, i.e. there is some θˆ∗ ∈ CL(ψ) such that
V L(ψ) = U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗). (3.12)
Proof. Assume CL(ψ) 6= ∅ and there is no θˆ∗ ∈ CL(ψ) that satisfies (3.12). Because
CL(ψ) is compact and vψ is bounded, the assumption is equivalent to the existence
of some sequence (θˆn) ⊂ CL(ψ) with θˆn → θ˜ as n→∞ such that
V L(ψ) = lim
n→∞
U(ψ − θˆn, θˆn) + L(θˆn) > U(ψ − θ˜, θ˜) + L(θ˜). (3.13)
Since CL(ψ) is closed, we have θ˜ ∈ CL(ψ). Clearly, such cases can only occur on those
regions where vψ(θˆ) = U(ψ − θˆ) + L(θˆ) is discontinuous. We prove that inequality
(3.13) does not hold true.
By Lemma 3.2.16, there are only two cases at which the function vψ is discontinuous:
(1) if there exists some j ∈ I with ψj > b¯j and y¯j > b¯j, or (2) if there exists some
k ∈ I with ψk < bk and yk < bk. Since the function v
ψ
i is discontinuous only at
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θˆj = b¯j if condition (1) holds, or at θˆk = bk if condition (2) holds, any sequence (ξ
n)
in CL(ψ) with ξn → ξ as n→∞ such that
vψ(ξ) 6= lim
n→∞
vψ(ξn). (3.14)
must be of the form ξn = (ξn0 , ξ
n
1 , . . . , ξ
n
N) ∈ CL(ψ) with at least one i ∈ I such that
ξni
n→∞−→ b¯i and ξni > b¯i, ∀n ∈ N,
if i satisfies condition (1), or
ξni
n→∞−→ bi and ξni < bi, ∀n ∈ N,
if i satisfies condition (2). By Lemma 3.7.1 of the Appendix we have
vψi (b¯i) ≥ vψi (θˆi) for θˆi ∈ (b¯i, y¯i],
if i satisfies condition (1), and
vψi (bi) ≥ vψi (θˆi) for θˆi ∈ [y¯i, b¯i),
if i satisfies condition (2). Hence, for any sequence (ξn) which converges to a dis-
continuous point of vψ and satisfies expression (3.14), we have
vψ(ξ) > lim
n→∞
vψ(ξn),
which contradicts (3.13).

3.3.2 General Properties of V L
We begin this section by presenting the basis of the main result of this chapter.
As mentioned earlier, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L is non-concave in
general because vψ is not concave.
Proposition 3.3.5. The liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L is not necessarily con-
cave.
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The proof of this proposition is undertaken via counterexample, for which we
need to introduce some concrete liquidity policies. Following Acerbi and Scandolo,
the cash liquidity policy L(a) is given by
L(a) = {(ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) ∈ P|ψ0 ≥ a} , a ∈ R,
the total liquidation policy LL is defined by
LL = {(ψ0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ P|ψ0 ∈ R} ,
and the unrestricted liquidation policy LU is given by
LU = P .
Additionally, we introduce the cash liquidity policy without buy transactions LS(a)
which is given by9
LS(a) = {(ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) ∈ P|ψ0 ≥ a and ψi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I} , a ∈ R.
Now we provide a simple counterexample in order to prove that V L is not concave
in general. For this we consider L as a cash liquidity policy or as a cash liquidity
policy without buy transactions.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.5. For sake of simplicity we impose N = 1. Consider
a > 0, L ∈ {L(a),LS(a)}, 0 < b¯1 < y¯1 ∈ R++. Let the MSDC satisfy the following
assumption
m1(x) =
{
m for x ∈ (0, b¯1]
m′ for x ∈ (b¯1, y¯1],
where m,m′ ∈ R++. Further assume∫ b¯1
0
m1(u)du < a and
∫ y¯1
0
m1(u) > a, (3.15)
which is equivalent to assuming b¯1m < a and (y¯1 − b¯1)m′ − b¯1m > a, respectively.
Set β := a − ∫ b¯1
0
m1(u)du = a − b¯1m and note that β > 0. Choose some large
γ > 0 such that γ − y¯1 > 0 and consider the portfolios ψ1 = (β, γ) and ψ2 = (0, γ).
By construction we have CL(ψ1) 6= ∅ and CL(ψ2) 6= ∅. Denote the corresponding
9LS(a) is clearly convex and closed.
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solutions of optimization problem (3.10) for ψ1 and ψ2 by θˆ1 and θˆ2, respectively.
By Lemma 3.7.2 of the Appendix we demand that optimal transactions θˆ1 and θˆ2
satisfy β + L(θˆ1) = a and L(θˆ2) = a. Clearly, θˆ1 = (0, b¯1). Optimal transaction
θˆ2 = (0, θˆ21) must satisfy the following
(θˆ21 − b¯1)m′ − b¯1m = a,
or, equivalently,
θˆ21 =
β
m′
+ b¯1.
Denote ψλ := λψ1 + (1− λ)ψ2 = (λβ, γ) for λ ∈ [0, 1] and note that CL(ψλ) 6= ∅ by
condition 3.15. Hence, let the solution of problem (3.10) for ψλ be given by θˆ∗ ∈ Y ,
which satisfies
λβ + L(θˆ∗) = a, (3.16)
which is equal to
(λβ + θˆ∗1 − b¯1)m′ − b¯1m = a,
implying
θˆ∗1 = (1− λ)
β
m′
+ b¯1.
Further, consider the mapping F : [0, 1]→ R given by
F (λ) := V L(ψλ) = U(ψλ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗) = a+m+,b¯1
(
γ − (1− λ) β
m′
− b¯1
)
,
for λ ∈ [0, 1], and the mapping G : [0, 1]→ R given by
G(λ) := λV L(ψ1) + (1− λ)V L(ψ2)
= λ
(
U(ψ1 − θˆ1, θˆ1) + L(θˆ1)
)
+ (1− λ)
(
U(ψ2 − θˆ2, θˆ2) + L(θˆ2)
)
= a+ λm+1 (γ − b¯1) + (1− λ)m+,b¯11
(
γ − β
m′
− b¯1
)
,
for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Last, note that the difference of G and F
G(λ)− F (λ) = λm+1 (γ − b¯1) + (1− λ)m+,b¯11
(
γ − β
m′
− b¯1
)
− m+,b¯1
(
γ − (1− λ) β
m′
− b¯1
)
=
(
λm+1 + (1− λ)m+,b¯11 −m+,b¯1
)
(γ − b¯1)
>
(
λm+,b¯11 + (1− λ)m+,b¯11 −m+,b¯1
)
(γ − b¯1) = 0
is positive. Hence, we have λV L(ψ1) + (1− λ)V L(ψ2) > V L(ψλ).
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A further general property of the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value valid for any
liquidity policy is its translation supervariance, introduced in (Acerbi & Scandolo
2008). This concept states that augmenting a cash position to a portfolio induces a
larger liquidity-adjusted portfolio value than the sum of the liquidity-adjusted value
of the initial portfolio and the cash amount.
Proposition 3.3.6. Given a liquidity policy L the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value
is translation supervariant, i.e. for ψ ∈ P, e ≥ 0
V L(ψ + (e, 0, . . . , 0)) ≥ V L(ψ) + e.
Proof. By noting that the MtM value U of a portfolio is additive on cash portfolios,
i.e. for ψ ∈ P , e ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Y we obtain U(ψ + (e, 0, . . . , 0), θ) = U(ψ, θ) + e, the
proof follows by the same arguments used in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008).

When valuing portfolios under liquidity constraints, translation supervariance is a
more natural concept than translation invariance. The liquidity adjustment defined
at the beginning of the section takes into account multiple liquidity issues such
as MSDCs, partial execution, block trading and liquidity policy. These market
imperfections influence mark-to-market portfolio values U and vψ in a non-linear
manner. Accordingly, it is intuitive that the adjustment to the value of a portfolio
with a cash position is less severe than the adjustment to the value of the same
portfolio without the cash position. The severity of the liquidity adjustment is such
that adding the cash position after the adjustment to the latter portfolio is not
enough to equate the liquidity-adjustment of the former portfolio.
In addition to translation supervariance, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is
monotonic on P for unrestricted liquidation and cash liquidity policies.
Proposition 3.3.7. Consider some liquidity policy L ∈ {L(a),LS(a),LU}. The
function V L is monotone increasing on P, i.e. for any ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P with ψ1 ≥ ψ2,
V L(ψ1) ≥ V L(ψ2).
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Proof. Let ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P with ψ1 ≥ ψ2 and L ∈ {L(a),LS(a),LU} be given. First
note that
CL(ψ2) ⊆ CL(ψ1). (3.17)
First, we verify this inclusion for the case CL(ψ2) 6= ∅. Consider some θˆ ∈ Y
satisfying
ψ2 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L, (3.18)
i.e. θˆ ∈ CL(ψ2). Because LU = P and ψ10 − ψ20 ≥ 0, every θˆ ∈ Y satisfying (3.18)
also fulfills
(ψ1 − ψ2) + ψ2 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L,
for L ∈ {L(a),LS(a),LU ,}. Hence, θˆ ∈ CL(ψ1). Further,
V L(ψ1) = sup
{
U(ψ1 − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣θˆ ∈ Y ; ψ1 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L}
= sup
{
U((ψ1 − ψ2) + ψ2 − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣θˆ ∈ Y ;
ψ1 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L
}
= sup
{
U(ψ1 − ψ2, θˆ) + U(ψ2 − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣θˆ ∈ Y ;
ψ1 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L
}
≥ U(ψ1 − ψ2, b) + sup
{
U(ψ2 − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣θˆ ∈ Y ;
ψ1 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L
}
≥ U(ψ1 − ψ2, b) + sup
{
U(ψ2 − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣θˆ ∈ Y ;
ψ2 − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L
}
= U(ψ1 − ψ2, b) + V L(ψ2) ≥ V L(ψ2),
where b ∈ P has elements bi = bi if ψ1i −ψ2i < 0 and bi = b¯i if ψ1i −ψ2i > 0 for i ∈ I.
The first inequality follows from the definition of the post-execution best bid and
ask prices, the second follows from (3.17) and the third from definition of U and
from ψ1 − ψ2 ≥ 0.
For the case CL(ψ2) = ∅, we have either CL(ψ1) 6= ∅ or CL(ψ1) = ∅. In the first
case, it holds V L(ψ1) > −∞ and in the latter V L(ψ1) = −∞. Since V L(ψ2) = −∞
whenever CL(ψ2) = ∅, inclusion 3.17 is satisfied and V L(ψ1) ≥ V L(ψ2) is also
fulfilled.
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Monotonicity of V L is consistent with economic intuition. For this, regard two
portfolios ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P with ψ1 > ψ2. Consequently, consider all short positions of
portfolio ψ2 and note that for the same assets those positions must be either long,
flat or smaller (in absolute value) short positions in portfolio ψ1. Analogously, we
find larger long positions in ψ1 for those assets with long and flat positions in ψ2.
Hence, holding portfolio ψ1 is more convenient than holding portfolio ψ2 if we need to
execute some transaction θˆ ∈ Y in order to fulfill some liquidity constraint. It seems
that, any reasonable liquidity-adjusted portfolio value for ψ1 can never be smaller
than the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value for ψ2, as stated in Proposition 3.3.7. This
is, however, not true if the liquidity-adjusted portfolio is based on the liquidity policy
LL. Under this policy the optimal adjusting transaction closes all non cash portfolio
positions, which is shown in Proposition 3.3.8 below. The nature of this adjustments
is essential for the non-monotonicity under LL. To see this, consider again portfolios
ψ1 > ψ2 ∈ P . Under partial execution, it is possible that only positions ψ2 can be
closed but positions ψ1 not, which yield V L
L
(ψ2) > V L
L
(ψ1) = −∞.
Proposition 3.3.8. Let ψ ∈ P and consider the total liquidation policy LL. The
solution of optimization problem (3.10) is given by θˆ∗ = (0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) and
V L
L
(ψ) = ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗),
if θˆ∗ ∈ Y. Otherwise, V LL(ψ) = −∞.
Proof. By definition of LL, we have
CLL(ψ) =
{
θˆ ∈ Y
∣∣∣ψ − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) = (x, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ P for x ∈ R} .
Clearly, if θˆ∗ := (0, ψ1, . . . , ψN) ∈ Y , then CLL(ψ) = {θˆ∗} and V LL(ψ) = ψ0 +L(θˆ∗).
If θˆ∗ /∈ Y , then CLL(ψ) = ∅ and V LL(ψ) = −∞.

We discuss now some additional properties of LU ,L(a) and LS(a). If all MSDCs
are strictly decreasing, the optimal transaction θˆ∗ ∈ Y that solves problem (3.10)
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under the unrestricted liquidation policy LU is a non-trade transaction, i.e. θˆ∗ = 0,
independently of block trading and partial execution effects.
Proposition 3.3.9. Consider some ψ ∈ P, the unrestricted liquidation policy LU
and assume that for all i ∈ I the MSDC is strictly decreasing, i.e.
mi(x) < mi(x
′),
for x, x′ ∈ R\ {0} with x > x′. Then,
V L
U
(ψ) = U(ψ, 0),
in other words, θˆ∗ = 0 solves problem (3.10) for ψ under LU .
Proof. Let ψ ∈ P and LU . Assume optimal transaction θˆ∗ 6= 0 where θˆ∗ ∈ Y .
Hence,
V L(ψ) = vψ(θˆ∗) =
∑
i∈I+
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I−
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I0
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ),
where I+, I−, I0 ⊆ I such that for all i ∈ I+ we have θˆ∗i > 0, for all i ∈ I− we have
θˆ∗i < 0, and for all i ∈ I0 we have θˆ∗i = 0. Since we assume θˆ∗ 6= 0, either I+ 6= ∅,
I− 6= ∅, or both subsets are not empty. From Lemma 3.7.3 of the Appendix we know
that vψi is strictly increasing on [yi, 0) and strictly decreasing on (0, y¯i]. Hence,
vψ(0) =
∑
i∈I
vψi (0) >
∑
i∈I+
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I−
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I0
vψi (0) = v
ψ(θˆ∗),
which contradicts optimality of θˆ∗. Since last inequality holds for all θˆ∗ 6= 0 and
CLU (ψ) 6= ∅, then the non-trade transaction, i.e. θˆ∗ = 0, must be the solution of
optimization problem (3.10).

In addition to the cash policy L(a) of Acerbi and Scandolo we introduced previously
a similar cash policy LS(a) which admits only sell transactions. By analyzing closer
L(a) we see that it allows buy trades as optimal solution of optimization problem
(3.10). To illustrate this possibility regard the following example.
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Example 3.3.10. Assume N = 2 and consider the following bounds
y
1
= b1 < 0, b¯1 = 2 · 103, y¯1 = 6 · 103, y2 = b2 = 3 · 103, y¯2 = 0.
Let the portfolio ψ ∈ P consist of a flat cash position ψ0 = 0, of a long position
ψ1 > y¯1 in asset A1 which is liquid and of a long position ψ2 > |y2| in asset A2
which is sale-illiquid. Accordingly, consider the MSDCs for the assets as follows
m1(x) =
{
−10−2x+ 102 for x ≤ b¯1
8 · 10 else , m2(x) = 10
2 for x < 0.
Recall that mi(0) is not defined. However, observe that m
+
1 = m1(0
+) = 102 =
m1(0
−) = m−1 , i.e. the bid-ask spread is zero, δ1 := m
−
1 −m+1 = 0. For asset A2 we
also suppose a trivial bid-ask spread δ2 = 0. Furthermore, let m
+,b¯1 = 8 · 10. Regard
the cash liquidity policy L(a) where a = 2 · 105. Because the proceeds of selling b¯1
units of asset A1 are not sufficient to cover the liquidity requirement a, i.e.
p1(b¯1) =
∫ b¯1
0
m1(u)du = 1, 8 · 105 < 2 · 105 = a,
the optimal transaction θˆ∗1 solving problem (3.10) must be larger than b¯1. Particu-
larly, the liquidity constraint ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗) ≥ a for an optimal θˆ∗ ∈ Y is given by
8 · 10θˆ∗1 + 102θˆ∗2 − 1, 8 · 105 ≥ 0, (3.19)
where θˆ∗1 ≥ 2, 25 · 103, since p1(2, 25 · 103) = a, and θˆ∗2 ∈ [y2, 0). By Lemma 3.7.2 it
suffices to regard (3.19) as an equality, which leads to
θˆ∗2 = −8 · 10−1θˆ∗1 + 1, 8 · 103.
Hence, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is given by
V L(ψ) = sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗)
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103] ,
θˆ∗2 = −8 · 10−1θˆ∗1 + 1, 8 · 103
}
= sup
{
8 · 10(ψ1 − θˆ∗1) + 102(ψ2 − θˆ∗2)
+a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103] , θˆ∗2 = −8 · 10−1θˆ∗1 + 1, 8 · 103} ,
because ψ1 − θˆ∗1 > 0 for any θˆ1 ∈ (0, y¯1] and ψ2 − θˆ∗2 > 0 for any θˆ∗2 ∈ [y2, 0].
Equivalently,
V L(ψ) = sup
{
8 · 10(ψ1 − θˆ∗1) + 102(ψ2 + 8 · 10−1θˆ∗1 − 1, 8 · 103)
+a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]}
= sup
{
8 · 10ψ1 + 102ψ2 − 1, 8 · 105 + a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]} .
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Thus, the solution set of problem (3.10) satisfying ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗) = a is given by
Σ =
{
θˆ∗ ∈ Y
∣∣∣θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103], θˆ∗2 = −8 · 10−1θˆ∗1 + 1, 8 · 103} .
Note that θˆ∗2 < 0 whenever θˆ
∗
1 ∈ (2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]. Furthermore, consider some
c > 0 and m2(x) = c · 102. Thus, optimal transaction for A2 is given by
θˆ∗2 = −
8
c
· 10−1θˆ∗1 +
1, 8
c
· 103,
and the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value has not changed
V L(ψ) = sup
{
8 · 10ψ1 + 102ψ2 − 1, 8 · 105 + a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]} .
In view of Assumption 3.2.8 we introduce a nontrivial bid-ask spread for A2, such
that
m+2 = 9, 5 · 10, m−2 = 102,
the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value becomes
V L(ψ) = sup
{
−4θˆ∗1 + 8 · 10ψ1 + 9, 5 · 10ψ2 − 17, 1 · 104
+a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]} .
Hence, the solution set is a singleton given by
Σ =
{
(2, 25 · 103, 0)} .
Note that this result holds for any δ2 > 0 such that m
−
2 = 10
2 and m+2 = 10 − δ2,
since
V L(ψ) = sup
{
−8 · 10δ2θˆ∗1 + 8 · 10ψ1 + (102 − δ2)ψ2 − (1, 8 · 102 − δ2)103
+a
∣∣∣ θˆ∗1 ∈ [2, 25 · 103, 6 · 103]} .
Under cash liquidity policies, optimal transaction θˆ∗ indicates which trades must
be undertaken in order to obtain at least a − ψ0 money units. If the purpose of
the liquidity adjustment to portfolio values is aimed for risk management and not
for active portfolio management, optimal buy transactions θˆ∗i < 0 fail the purpose
of the adjustment. Alternatively, a cash liquidity policy without buy transactions
LS(a), contemplates only those sell transactions10 θˆ∗i > 0 that must be undertaken
10And, of course, non-trade transactions θˆ∗i = 0.
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in order to satisfy the capital needs. Hence, in a risk management context the liq-
uidity policy LS(a) should be prefer over L(a).
However, if the MSDCs are strictly decreasing for buy trades and the capital re-
quirement is positive, a > 0, then any optimal transaction θˆ∗ under cash liquidity
L(a) consists of sales or no trades.
Proposition 3.3.11. Assume strictly decreasing MSDCs for buy trades, i.e. for all
i ∈ I let mi(x) > mi(x′) for any x < x′ < 0. Fix some cash liquidity policy L(a)
with a > 0, some portfolio ψ ∈ P and denote θˆ∗ ∈ Y a solution of optimization
problem (3.10) for ψ. If CL(a)(ψ) 6= ∅, then θˆ∗ ≥ 0.
Proof. Let a > 0, ψ ∈ P and denote θˆ∗ ∈ Y a solution of optimization problem (3.10)
for ψ, i.e. θˆ∗ ∈ CL(a)(ψ) 6= ∅. Firstly, consider the case a − ψ0 > 0. Since optimal
transaction θˆ∗ must satisfy ψ0 + L(θˆ∗) ≥ a or, equivalently, L(θˆ∗) ≥ a − ψ0 > 0,
there exists a nonempty set I+ ⊆ I such that θˆ∗i > 0 for all i ∈ I+. Assume that
θˆ∗ contains buy transactions, also. Hence, I+ ⊂ I and there exists a nonempty set
I− ⊂ I such that θˆ∗i < 0 for all i ∈ I−. Denote the complement of the union of I+
and I− by I0 and observe that θˆ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I0. Notice that∑
i∈I+
pi(θˆ
∗
i ) =
∑
i∈I+
∫ θˆ∗i
0
mi(u)du > a− ψ0. (3.20)
Regard the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value of ψ given by
V L(ψ) = U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗) =
∑
i∈I+
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I−
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I0
vψi (0).
From Lemma 3.7.3 of the Appendix we know that vψi is strictly increasing on [ui, 0).
Consider the transaction θˆ∗∗ ∈ Y with components
θˆ∗∗i =
{
θˆ∗i if i ∈ I+
0 else
. (3.21)
By (3.20), we have θˆ∗∗ ∈ CL(ψ). Furthermore,
vψ(θˆ∗) =
∑
i∈I+
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I−
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I0
vψi (0)
<
∑
i∈I+
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈I−
vψi (0) +
∑
i∈I0
vψi (0)
= vψ(θˆ∗∗), (3.22)
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which contradicts the optimality of θˆ∗. Now consider the case ψ0 ≥ a and CL(a)(ψ) 6=
∅. Because the function vψi is strictly increasing on [yi, 0), it is evident that for any
transaction θˆ∗ ∈ Y that solves problem (3.10) the set I− must be empty. Hence,
any optimal transaction θˆ∗ ∈ CL(a)(ψ) is nonnegative, i.e. θˆ∗i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I.

3.3.3 Block Trading and Partial Execution Effects
By Corollary 3.2.18 we know that in absence of block trading effects the post-
execution portfolio value vψ coincides with the pre-execution portfolio value v˜ψ. In
addition, by Proposition 3.3.4 there exists a transaction θˆ∗ ∈ Y such that V L(ψ) =
vψ(θˆ∗) for every ψ ∈ P . Hence, in absence of block trading effects, for every ψ ∈ P
we have
V L(ψ) = v˜ψ(θˆ∗).
Consequently, if there are no block trading effects, the results encountered in (Acerbi
& Scandolo 2008) apply also for the present framework’s liquidity-adjusted portfolio
value V L. In particular, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L is concave on P
for any liquidity policy. Additionally, for ψ ∈ P with ψ0 ≥ 0, L ∈
{L(a),LS(a)}
and any λ > 1, we have
V L(λψ) ≥ λV L(ψ).
However, these observations do not explain how the liquidity-adjusted value V L
behaves in presence of block trading and partial execution effects. We address this
question by defining governing market conditions as follows.
Definition 3.3.12. Consider the sets Y ,Bc,X ⊆ P with Y ⊆ X , where Y is the set
of executable transactions and Bc the set of non-block transactions. The governing
market conditions reflecting block trading and partial execution is given by the pair
MC := {Y ,Bc}.
The pair
• MC¬PEBT := {P ,P} excludes block trading and partial execution effects from
governing market conditions,
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• MC¬BT := {Y ,X} excludes block trading effects from governing market con-
ditions,
• MC¬PE := {P ,Bc} excludes partial execution effects from governing market
conditions.
Remark 3.3.13. Note that MC¬B satisfies the condition in Proposition 3.2.11.
In order to conduct an efficient comparison between market conditions consider
the following extension of the notation.
Definition 3.3.14. Let ψ ∈ P and some liquidity policy L be given. The liquidity-
adjusted portfolio value for ψ subjected to L under market conditionsMC = {X ,X ′}
where X ,X ′ ⊆ P is denoted by
V L (ψ |MC ) = sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ |MC )} ,
with
CL(ψ |MC ) =
{
θˆ ∈ X
∣∣∣ψ − θˆ + (L(θˆ), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ L} ,
and where X ′ is the set of non-block transactions.
The presence of either block trading or partial execution effects represents further
restrictions to which we must optimally adjust the post-execution portfolio value
vψ. Consequently and consistent with economic intuition, these effects impair the
liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L.
Proposition 3.3.15. Assume some governing market conditions MC = {Y ,Bc}
where Y ,Bc ⊆ P. Consider some portfolio ψ ∈ P and some liquidity policy L. Then
V L (ψ |MC ) ≤ V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) ≤ V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ) , (3.23)
and
V L (ψ |MC ) ≤ V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬BT ) ≤ V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ) . (3.24)
Proof. By the definition of L, L, Definition 3.3.14 and since Y ⊆ P we have
CL(ψ |MC ) ⊆ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) = CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ), (3.25)
and
CL(ψ |MC ) = CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬BT ) ⊆ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ). (3.26)
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First, consider the case CL(ψ |MC ) 6= ∅. The first inequality in (3.23) follows
straightforwardly by the first inclusion in (3.25). By Proposition 3.2.19 and Bc ⊆ P
we obtain
V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PE ) = sup{U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE )}
≤ sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ, 0) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE )}
= sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT )}
= V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PEBT ) . (3.27)
Similarly, the second inequality in (3.24) follows straightforwardly from the second
inclusion in (3.26) and the first inequality from
V L (ψ |MC ) = sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ |MC )}
≤ sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ, 0) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ |MC )}
= sup
{
U(ψ − θˆ) + L(θˆ)
∣∣∣ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬BT )}
= V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬BT ) .
Finally, consider the case CL(ψ |MC ) = ∅. Notice that V L (ψ |MC ) = −∞. More-
over, we have either CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) 6= ∅ or CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) = ∅. For the former
case ∣∣V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PE )∣∣ <∞,
which holds by Proposition 3.3.1 and for the latter we have V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PE ) =
−∞. Whenever CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) 6= ∅ we also have CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ) 6= ∅ and
hence V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PE ) ≤ V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ). If CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PE ) = ∅, then
CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ) = ∅ and thus
V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PEBT ) = −∞.
Furthermore, note that in the case CL(ψ |MC ) = ∅, we have CL(ψ ∣∣MC¬BT ) = ∅ by
definition of MC¬BT . Hence,
V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬BT ) = −∞,
and the first inequality in (3.24) holds with equality. Analogous to previous argu-
ments, we have either∣∣V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT )∣∣ <∞ or V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬PEBT ) = −∞.
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Remark 3.3.16. Notice that the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value of the Acerbi and
Scandolo’s setup in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008) is equivalent to V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬PEBT ).
3.4 Measures of Risk under Liquidity Adjust-
ments
In this section we introduce the liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL put forward in
Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008), which is a risk measure implied by
a coherent measure of risk and defined on the set of portfolio weights P . Also in
this section we find one of the main contributions of the chapter, which indicates
that in presence of block trading and partial execution effects liquidity-adjusted
risk measures are not convex on P . In addition, we also examine other properties
of liquidity-adjusted risk measures ρL under consideration of those effects. At the
end of the section, we investigate the probability distribution of liquidity-adjusted
portfolio values and show that block trading and partial execution effects increase
the probability of large losses.
3.4.1 Coherent Measures of Risk
As mentioned at the beginning, we study a one-period model. Hence, given some
future point in time we model MSDCs, post-execution best bids and post-execution
best asks to be random, while we assume that all other parameters are deterministic.
In particular, we suppose that the set of executable transactions Y ⊆ P and the set
of block trades B ⊆ P are deterministic and given. Assume that some probability
space (Ω,F ,P) governs the uncertainty on the market. Accordingly, consider the
following definition of MSDCs, post-execution best bids and post-execution best
asks for non-cash assets.
Definition 3.4.1. For every non-cash asset the MSDC and the post-execution best
bid and ask prices are real-valued random variables, i.e. for each i ∈ I, x ∈ R\ {0}
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and θˆi ∈ Yi
mi(x) : Ω → R,
ω 7→ mi(x)(ω) for ω ∈ Ω,
and
m∗,θˆii : Ω → R,
ω 7→ m∗,θˆii (ω) for ω ∈ Ω,
where ∗ ∈ {+,−}.
Hence, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is a random variable as defined
below.
Definition 3.4.2. Consider governing market conditions MC = {Y ,Bc} where
Y ,Bc ⊆ P, a liquidity policy L and some portfolio ψ ∈ P. Under MC and policy
L, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L (ψ |MC ) for ψ is a real-valued random
variable, i.e.
V L (ψ |MC ) : Ω → R,
ω 7→ V L (ψ |MC ) (ω) for ω ∈ Ω.
We set V L(ψ) = V L (ψ |MC ) whenever there is no chance of confusion.
Furthermore we assume that whenever V L(ψ) 6= −∞ P-a.s., then V L(ψ) ∈
L1(Ω,F ,P). Following Acerbi and Scandolo’s concept, we define the liquidity-
adjusted risk measure ρL, which, differently from Acerbi and Scandolo, represents a
measure of risk reflecting block trading and partial execution effects as part of liquid-
ity risks. Formally, consider a measure of risk ρ :M→ R where M⊆ L1(Ω,F ,P).
Given a liquidity policy L and a risk measure ρ, the implied liquidity-adjusted mea-
sure of risk ρL : P → R is defined by
ρL(ψ) = ρ(V L(ψ)), ψ ∈ P .
In case V L(ψ) = −∞ we set ρ(−∞) = ∞. The liquidity-adjusted risk measure
introduced in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008) uses a coherent risk measure ρ. Coherent
measures of risk are risk measures satisfying the following four axioms presented by
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Artzner et al. in (Artzner et al. 1999), which we call ADEH axioms.
(M) Monotonicity : For all x, x′ ∈M with x ≤ x′ a.s., we have
ρ(x) ≥ ρ(x′). (3.28)
(TI) Translation Invariance: For all x ∈M and e ∈ R we obtain
ρ(x+ e) = ρ(x)− e., (3.29)
(PH) Positive Homogeneity : For all x ∈M and λ > 0
ρ(λx) = λρ(x). (3.30)
(S) Subadditivity : For all x, x′ ∈M we have
ρ(x+ x′) ≤ ρ(x) + ρ(x′). (3.31)
A less restrictive risk measure class is the convex risk measure family. A measure of
risk ρ :M→ R satisfying properties (M), (TI) and
ρ(λx+ (1− λ)x′) ≤ λρ(x) + (1− λ)ρ(x′),
for x, x′ ∈ M and λ ∈ [0, 1], is called convex measure of risk. It is evident that a
coherent measure of risk is a convex measure. However, a convex measure of risk is
not necessarily coherent.
Furthermore, note that the liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL is defined on the set
of portfolios P instead on the set of random variablesM, for which the ADEH and
convexity axioms are conceived. A natural question that arises with this remark is
if ρL presents similar properties on P . Acerbi and Scandolo show that the liquidity-
adjusted risk measure is always convex. They also characterize the situations when
the ADEH axioms are fulfilled. Within our setup, we show that the convexity found
by Acerbi and Scandolo does not hold, which is the main contribution of this chapter.
In particular, under block trading and partial execution effects the liquidity-adjusted
risk measure is not convex in general.
Proposition 3.4.3. Consider some coherent risk measure ρ and liquidity policy L.
In general, the liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL is not convex on P.
112
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.4.

By noting that block trading and partial execution effects produce non-concavity
on the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L shown in Proposition 3.3.5, this result
should not surprise the reader. In the appendix we use the non-concavity of V L
and the expected shortfall as a coherent risk measure to show that coherence of
ρ is not sufficient to even out the non-concavity of V L in order to have a convex
liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL on P . Recall from the proof of Proposition 3.3.5
non-concavity of V L can arise when considering a cash liquidity policy and two
portfolios where one of them has a positive cash position and the other no cash.
Now we examine some interesting properties of ρL. The following properties in the
proposition below of the liquidity-adjusted risk measure coincide with the results of
Acerbi and Scandolo.
Proposition 3.4.4. Let L be some liquidity policy and ρ a coherent measure of risk.
1. For every ψ, ξ ∈ P with V L(ψ) ≥ V L(ξ) P-a.s., then ρL(ξ) ≥ ρL(ψ).
2. The liquidity-adjusted risk measure ρL is translation subvariant, i.e. for any
e ≥ 0 and ψ ∈ P
ρL(ψ + (e, 0, . . . , 0)) ≤ ρL(ψ)− e ≤ ρL(ψ) + e.
Proof. 1. Follows from axiom (M) of ρ and 2. follows from Proposition 3.3.6, (M)
and (TI) of ρ.

Both properties have a natural interpretation. The first states that if the liquidity-
adjusted portfolio value for ψ is almost surely larger than the liquidity-adjusted
portfolio value for ξ, then the liquidity-adjusted risk for the former must be lower
than the risk for the latter, which is intuitive. The second property embeds the
fact that the liquidity adjustments to portfolio values are non-linear, which makes
a portfolio with a positive cash position less risky than the same portfolio without
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the cash position.
Furthermore, liquidity-adjusted risk measures ρL for cash liquidity, total liquidation
and unrestricted liquidation policies are monotonic on the set of portfolios P .
Proposition 3.4.5. Let L ∈ {L(a),LS(a),LU ,LL} and ρ some coherent measure
of risk. For any ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P with ψ1 ≥ ψ2,
ρL(ψ1) ≤ ρL(ψ2).
Proof. From Proposition 3.3.7 we have
V L(ψ1) ≥ V L(ψ2), P− a.s.
The results follows from the (M) of ρ rephrased in Proposition 3.4.4.

As shown previously, the total liquidation policy LL implies that the optimal ad-
justment transaction - solution of optimization problem (3.10) - consists of closing
position of the initial portfolio. Consequently, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio can be
easily be characterized, which also facilitates the characterization of ρL
L
presented
below.
Proposition 3.4.6. Let ψ ∈ P and the total liquidation policy LL. Then
1. For λ > 1,
ρL
L
(λψ) ≥ λρLL(ψ).
2. ρL
L
is subadditive on discordant portfolios, i.e. for ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P with ψ1 ↓↓ ψ2
ρL
L
(ψ1 + ψ2) ≤ ρLL(ψ1) + ρLL(ψ2).
Proof. By Proposition 3.3.8 we have
V L
L
(ψ) = ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗) P− a.s.,
where θˆ∗ = (0, ψ1, . . . , ψN). Since L is a concave function, we have for λ > 1
L(λθˆ∗) ≤ λL(θˆ∗), (3.32)
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which is proved in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). Thus, inequality (3.32) holds P-almost
surely. Result 1. follows from (M) of ρ. Subadditivity follows from Proposition
3.2.13, because L is superadditive on discordant portfolios, and from (M) and from
(S) of ρ.

Last, consider the unrestricted liquidation policy LU and assume strictly decreasing
MSDCs. Recall that in this case the optimal liquidity adjustment solving (3.10) is
a non-trade transaction, i.e. θˆ∗ = 0. Hence, the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value
matches the pre-execution mark-to-market value, which is linear in ψ. Because
of this linearity, a coherent risk measure applied on the liquidity-adjusted portfolio
value preserves its properties on the set P . In other words, ρLU is coherent on P . To
see this, note that ψ > ξ implies V L
U
(ψ) > V L
U
(ξ), which guaranties monotonicity
of ρL
U
. Positive homogeneity follows from the linearity of the liquidity-adjusted
portfolio value because it equals U˜(ψ). The remaining properties are shown below.
Proposition 3.4.7. Assume strictly decreasing MSDCs for all non-cash assets, con-
sider LU and any coherent risk measure ρ. The liquidity-adjusted measure of risk
ρL
U
is subadditive and translation invariant for positive cash positions, i.e.
1. For ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P,
ρL
U
(ψ1 + ψ2) ≤ ρLU (ψ1) + ρLU (ψ2).
2. For ψ ∈ P and e ≥ 0,
ρL
U
(ψ + (e, 0, . . . , 0)) = ρL
U
(ψ)− e.
Proof. Subadditivity. By Proposition 3.3.9 and Proposition 3.2.13 we have for
ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P
V L
U
(ψ1 +ψ2) = U(ψ1 +ψ2, 0) ≥ U(ψ1, 0)+U(ψ2, 0) = V LU (ψ1)+V LU (ψ2) P−a.s.
The result follows from (M) of ρ.
Translation Invariance. Follows from (TI) of ρ, from Proposition 3.3.9 and by noting
that for ψ ∈ P and e ≥ 0
V L
U
(ψ+(e, 0, . . . , 0)) = U(ψ+(e, 0, . . . , 0), 0) = U(ψ, 0)+e = V L
U
(ψ)+e, P−a.s.
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For the unrestricted liquidation policy LU and strictly decreasing MSDCs, the
liquidity-adjusted risk measure of risk is subadditive and translation invariant be-
cause block trading does not affect the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value.
As shown earlier, whenever block trading effects are not present, the liquidity-
adjusted portfolio value L preserves the properties put forward in (Acerbi &
Scandolo 2008). Accordingly, the liquidity-adjusted measure of risk ρL also pre-
serves all the properties presented in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). However, partial
execution and block trading effects lead to greater risk. This issue is discussed next.
3.4.2 Probability Distribution of V L(ψ)
In this section we analyze the probability distribution of the liquidity-adjusted port-
folio value under governing market conditions MC and under market conditions
excluding block trading MC¬BT , partial execution MC¬PE and both MC¬PEBT .
We find that block trading and partial execution produces a shift of the probability
distribution to lower values, i.e. the probability of large losses increases under these
market imperfections.
Let governing market conditions beMC = {Y ,Bc} where Y ,Bc ⊆ P , consider some
liquidity policy L and some portfolio ψ ∈ P . The cumulative probability distribu-
tion function F of the random variable V L (ψ |MC ) is denoted by
P
(
V L (ψ |MC ) ≤ x) = F (V L (ψ |MC ) ≤ x) = FV L(ψ|MC )(x),
for x ∈ R. Regard two real-valued random variables X, Y . We say X dominates
stochastically Y in the first order and denote X 1 Y , if for each x ∈ R we have11
P(X ≤ x) ≤ P(Y ≤ x).
If the random variables are integrable, then we have the following well known result
for which we abstain to present the proof.
Lemma 3.4.8. Observe two real-valued random variables X, Y ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P). If
X 1 Y , then E[X] ≥ E[Y ].
11Following Fo¨llmer and Schied (Fo¨llmer & Schied 2004).
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Previously we have examined the impact of block trading and partial execu-
tion on the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L. Under stochastic MSDCs and
post-execution best bids and asks, liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L is a ran-
dom variable and the results in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 must be understood as
almost surely statements under probability measure P. By this consideration and
the following convention, the next proposition follows straightforwardly.
Notation 3.4.9. For the remainder, let Λ be either PE, BT or PEBT .
Proposition 3.4.10. Consider some given governing market conditions MC =
{Y ,Bc} where Y ,Bc ⊆ P, some liquidity policy L and some portfolio ψ ∈ P. Then
V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬Λ ) 1 V L (ψ |MC ) .
If V L (ψ |MC ) ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P) for any MC, then
E
[
V L
(
ψ
∣∣MC¬Λ )] ≥ E [V L (ψ |MC )] .
Proof. Since inequalities (3.23) and (3.24) of Proposition 3.3.15 hold P-almost surely
we have
FV L(ψ|MC )(x) ≥ FV L(ψ|MC¬Λ )(x),
for all x ∈ R. The second part follows from Corollary 3.4.8.

This result points out that block trading and partial execution effects shift the
probability distribution of the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value towards left to lower
values. Furthermore, by considering these effects the expected value drops to lower
values also.
To conclude this section, we throw a glance to the quantiles of the probability
distribution of V L. In particular, we focus on the most popular quantile used in
practice: Value-at-Risk (VaR). Following McNeil et al. (McNeil et al. 2005), let the
probability distribution function of the random variable X be denoted by FX . For
α ∈ (0, 1) the right α-quantile of FX is given by
qα(FX) = inf {x ∈ R |FX(x) > α} .
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Additionally, the VaR at level α ∈ (0, 1) is given by
V aRα (X) = −qα(FX).
Although VaR is not a coherent risk measure, its usage has a wide range for which we
make it part of our analysis. According to results presented above, the quantile of the
liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is lower when block trading and partial execution
effects exist. Hence, VaR is larger under block trading and partial execution.
Proposition 3.4.11. Consider MC = {Y ,Bc} where Y ,Bc ⊆ P, any liquidity
policy L and ψ ∈ P. For α ∈ (0, 1)
qα
(
FV L(ψ|MC )
) ≤ qα (FV L(ψ|MC¬Λ )) ,
and
V aRα
(
V L (ψ |MC )) ≥ V aRα (V L (ψ ∣∣MC¬Λ )) .
Proof. Since FV L(ψ|MC )(x) ≥ FV L(ψ|MC¬Λ )(x) for each x ∈ R, we obtain for each
α ∈ (0, 1)
qα
(
FV L(ψ|MC )
)
= inf
{
x ∈ R ∣∣FV L(x)(ψ|MC ) > α}
≤ inf
{
x ∈ R
∣∣∣FV L(x)(ψ|MC¬Λ ) > α} = qα (FV L(ψ|MC¬Λ )) .
Since V aRα(X) = −qα(FX) the proof is complete.

3.5 Numerical Example
In order to illustrate our results by comparing them with (1) the framework of
Acerbi and Scandolo and (2) a framework without liquidity adjustments, we present
a numerical example in line with the analytically solvable class of V L exhibit in
(Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). Accordingly, the MSDCs are strictly decreasing of the
form mi(x) = Aie
−kix with Ai, ki > 0 for x ∈ R, i ∈ I. Hence, the transaction
proceeds are given by
L(θˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Ai
ki
(
1− e−kiθˆi
)
, θˆi ∈ Yi.
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We consider the cash liquidity policy without buy trades LS(a) for some a > 0.
Whenever block trading is not present, Y ⊆ Bc, the optimal transaction θˆ∗ that
solves problem (3.10) is given by12
θˆ∗i =
1
ki
log
( ∑N
i=1
Ai
ki∑N
i=1
Ai
ki
− a
)
,
for i ∈ I, and the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value is given by
V L
S(a)(ψ) =
N∑
i=1
Ai(ψi − θˆ∗i ) + a, ψ ∈ P .
For the Monte Carlo simulation we consider the cases Y ⊆ Bc and Bc ⊂ Y where
the vectors A := (A1, . . . , AN) and k := (k1, . . . , kN) are randomly generated from
a lognormal distribution. We impose post-execution best bid and ask prices that
conform with Assumption 3.2.9. Additionally, we also compute the portfolio value
without any liquidity adjustment. Figure 3.1 exhibits the histogram resulting from
the simulation of (i) the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value with block trading and
partial execution effects, (ii) the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value without those
effects corresponding to the framework of Acerbi and Scandolo and (iii) the portfolio
value without any liquidity risk adjustment.
Table 3.1 displays the means and quantiles for all three cases. According to
Proposition 3.4.10 and Proposition 3.4.11 we observe lower values for case (i) than
cases (ii) and (iii), which indicates greater risk for (i).
Table 3.1: Quantiles from Simulation
Quantiles 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% Mean
(i) Block Trading and Partial Execution 8719.2 8848 8957.6 9159.2 9323.5 9522.4 9342.5
(ii) Without Block Trading and Partial Execution 9311.1 9442.5 9568.2 9775.8 9969.4 10159.6 9975.5
(iii) Without Liquidity Risk Adjustment 9335.6 9467.1 9590.7 9798 9990.7 10181.6 9997.2
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In the present chapter we have investigated the consequences of block trading and
partial execution on the setup from Acerbi and Scandolo (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008).
12For a formal proof see (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008).
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Figure 3.1: Histograms from Simulation
We undertake the same liquidity adjustment to portfolio values as in (Acerbi &
Scandolo 2008), which produces the liquidity-adjusted portfolio value V L. Via a
coherent risk measure we define the liquidity-adjusted risk measures ρL put forward
in (Acerbi & Scandolo 2008). Acerbi and Scandolo show that V L is concave on P
and ρL is convex on P . By introducing block trading and partial execution effects,
we show that, under these circumstances, V L is not concave on P and ρL is not
convex on P . In addition, we show that the existence of block trading and partial
execution effects induces a shift of the probability function of V L to lower values,
i.e. the probability of large losses increases.
Measuring liquidity risk is evidently not a simple task. This may rely on the fact
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that liquidity risk expresses itself through several channels. The lack of a unique
definition of liquidity risk or, more precisely, the ample variety of definitions, effects
and consequences of liquidity risk represents a cumbersome issue that researchers
may need to solve first. As this analysis points out, by ignoring some aspects
of liquidity risk, we arrive at wrong conclusions, which may cause catastrophic
damages.
Our model does not reflect all forms of liquidity risk, and those which are included
are introduced in the most simple manner. In this sense, researchers may find
worthy augmenting more forms of liquidity risk to our model or to handle more
elaborated concepts.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Additional Lemma in Proof of Proposition 3.3.4
Lemma 3.7.1. Consider the function
vψi (θˆi) = m
+,θˆi(ψi − θˆi)1{ψi−θˆi>0} +m−,θˆi(ψi − θˆi)1{ψi−θˆi<0} +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du,
for i ∈ I.
1. If y¯i ≥ ψi > b¯i or ψi > y¯i > b¯i, then
vψi (b¯i) ≥ vψi (θˆi) for θˆi ∈ (b¯i, y¯i].
2. If y
i
≤ ψi < bi or ψi < yi < bi, then
vψi (bi) ≥ vψi (θˆi) for θˆi ∈ [yi, bi).
Proof. 1. For y¯i ≥ ψi > b¯i,
vψi (b¯i) = m
+
i (ψi − b¯i) +
∫ b¯i
0
mi(u)du,
and
vψi (θˆi) =
{
m+,b¯ii (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du for θˆi ∈ (b¯i, ψi]
m−i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du for θˆi ∈ (ψi, y¯i].
Thus, for θˆi ∈ (b¯i, ψi] we have
vψi (b¯i)− vψi (θˆi) = m+i (ψi − b¯i)−m+,b¯ii (ψi − θˆi)−
∫ θˆi
b¯i
mi(u)du
≥ m+i (ψi − b¯i)−m+i (ψi − θˆi)−
∫ θˆi
b¯i
mi(u)du
=
∫ θˆi
b¯i
(
m+i −mi(u)
)
du ≥ 0, (3.33)
and for θˆi ∈ (ψi, y¯i],
vψi (b¯i)− vψi (θˆi) = m+i (ψi − b¯i)−m−i (ψi − θˆi)−
∫ θˆi
b¯i
mi(u)du
≥ m+i (θˆi − b¯i)−
∫ θˆi
b¯i
mi(u)du ≥ 0.
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1. For ψi > y¯i > b¯i, we have (3.33) for θˆi ∈ (b¯i, y¯i].
2. For y
i
≤ ψi < bi, we obtain
vψi (bi) = m
−
i (ψi − bi)−
∫ 0
bi
mi(u)du,
and
vψi (θˆi) =
{
m
−,bi
i (ψi − θˆi)−
∫ 0
θˆi
mi(u)du for θˆi ∈ [ψi, bi)
m+i (ψi − θˆi)−
∫ 0
θˆi
mi(u)du for θˆi ∈ [bi, ψi).
Hence, for θˆi ∈ [ψi, bi),
vψi (bi)− vψi (θˆi) = m−i (ψi − bi)−m−,bii (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ bi
θˆi
mi(u)du
≥ m−i (θˆi − bi) +
∫ bi
θˆi
mi(u)du
=
∫ bi
θˆi
(
mi(u)−m−i
)
du ≥ 0, (3.34)
and for θˆi ∈ [yi, ψi),
vψi (bi)− vψi (θˆi) = m−i (ψi − bi)−m+i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ bi
θˆi
mi(u)du
≥ m−i (θˆi − bi) +
∫ bi
θˆi
mi(u)du
=
∫ bi
θˆi
(
mi(u)−m−i
)
du ≥ 0.
2. For ψi < yi < bi we have (3.34) for all θˆi ∈ [yi, bi).

3.7.2 Liquidity Restriction
Lemma 3.7.2. Consider some a > 0 and ψ ∈ P with a−ψ0 > 0. For every θˆ∗ ∈ Y
that solves optimization problem (3.10) for L ∈ {L(a),LS(a)}, there exists some
θˆ∗∗ ∈ Y that also solves problem (3.10) for L with13
ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗∗) = a.
13Note that if there is some θˆ∗ ∈ Y that solves (3.10), then V L(θˆ∗) 6= −∞.
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Proof. Let a > 0, L ∈ {L(a),LS(a)} and ψ ∈ P with a − ψ0 > 0. Assume
θˆ∗ ∈ CL(ψ) 6= ∅ solves problem (3.10), i.e.
U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗) ≥ U(ψ − θˆ, θˆ) + L(θˆ) ∀ θˆ ∈ CL(ψ) 6= ∅, (3.35)
such that
ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗) > a. (3.36)
Hence, there exits K ⊆ I such that θˆ∗i > 0 for all i ∈ K. This implies the existence
of a some nonempty subset J ⊆ K such that transaction θˆ∗∗ ∈ Y is given by
θˆ∗∗i =
{
θˆ∗i for i /∈ J
θˆ∗i − xˆi for i ∈ J
,
where 0 < xˆi ≤ θˆ∗i such that ψ0 + L(θˆ∗∗) = a. Clearly, J 6= ∅ because of condition
(3.36). Thus,
U(ψ − θˆ∗∗, θˆ∗∗) + L(θˆ∗∗)
= ψ0 +
∑
i/∈J
(
m
+,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i>0} +m
−,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i<0}
)
+
∑
i∈J
(
m
+,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i (ψi − θˆ∗i + xˆi)1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi>0}
+ m
−,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i (ψi − θˆ∗i + xˆi)1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi<0}
)
+
∑
i/∈J
∫ θˆ∗i
0
mi(u)du
+
∑
i∈J
∫ θˆ∗i−xˆi
0
mi(u)du
≥ ψ0 +
∑
i/∈J
(
m
+,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i>0} +m
−,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i<0}
)
+
∑
i∈J
(
m
+,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi≥0} +m
−,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi<0}
)
+
N∑
i=1
∫ θˆ∗i
0
mi(u)du
≥ ψ0 +
N∑
i=0
(
m
+,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i>0} +m
−,θˆ∗i
i (ψi − θˆ∗i )1{ψi−θˆ∗i<0}
)
+
N∑
i=1
∫ θˆ∗i
0
mi(u)du
= U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗).
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The first inequality follows from the decreasing shape of MSDC and condition
m+,b¯i ≥ mi(x) for x ≥ b¯i of Assumption 3.2.9, since∑
i∈J
(
m
+,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i · xˆi · 1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi≥0} +m
−,θˆ∗i−xˆi
i · xˆi · 1{ψi−θˆ∗i +xˆi<0}
)
≥
∑
i∈J
∫ θˆ∗i
θˆ∗i−xˆi
mi(u)du.
For the second inequality we must consider the following three cases for i ∈ J : (i)
ψi − θˆ∗i > 0 which implies ψi − θˆ∗i + xˆi ≥ 0, (ii) ψi − θˆ∗i < 0, ψi − θˆ∗i + xˆi < 0
and (iii) ψi − θˆ∗i < 0, ψi − θˆ∗i + xˆi ≥ 0. Considering Assumption 3.2.9, for those
i ∈ J satisfying cases (i) or (ii) the second inequality becomes an equality and for
those i ∈ J satisfying case (iii) it is a strict inequality. By construction we have
θˆ∗∗ ∈ CL(ψ). Hence, it must hold
U(ψ − θˆ∗∗, θˆ∗∗) + L(θˆ∗∗) = U(ψ − θˆ∗, θˆ∗) + L(θˆ∗),
by condition (3.35) and optimality of θˆ∗. In other words, θˆ∗∗ solves problem (3.10)
and satisfies ψ0 + L(θˆ
∗∗) = a.

3.7.3 Additional Lemma in Proof of Proposition 3.3.9
Lemma 3.7.3. Assume that for all i ∈ I the MSDC is strictly decreasing, i.e.
mi(x) < mi(x
′),
for x, x′ ∈ R\ {0} with x > x′. Then, for any ψ ∈ P and every i ∈ I the function
vψi is strictly increasing on [yi, 0) and strictly decreasing on (0, y¯i].
Proof. First, we analyze the function vψi on [yi, 0). Note that v
ψ
i can take only the
following values
vψi (θˆi) =

m−i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi ≥ bi and θˆi > ψi
m
−,bi
i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi < bi and θˆi > ψi∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi = ψi
m+i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du else.
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For the two first cases we have the following derivative
dvψi (θˆi)
dθˆi
=
{
−m−i +mi(θˆi) if θˆi > bi and θˆi > ψi
−m−,bii +mi(θˆi) if θˆi < bi and θˆi > ψi,
and for the fourth case the derivative is given by
dvψi (θˆi)
dθˆi
= −m+i +mi(θˆi).
Since mi(x) is strictly decreasing and by Assumption 3.2.9, we obtain
dvψi (θˆi)
dθˆi
> 0
for these three cases. Furthermore, from Lemma 3.7.1 we know that vψi increases
at discontinuity points θˆi = bi. Because we assume strictly decreasing MSDCs, v
ψ
i
strictly increases at discontinuity points. For the case θˆi = ψi, consider some  > 0
and observe that by strictly decreasing MSDCs we have
m−,ψi−i · +
∫ ψi−
0
mi(u)du <
∫ ψi
0
mi(u)du < −m−,ψi+i · +
∫ ψi+
0
mi(u)du,
or equivalently,
vψi (θˆi − ) < vψi (θˆi) < vψi (θˆi + ).
Hence, vψi is strictly increasing on [yi, 0) for any ψ ∈ P . We find symmetrical
arguments of the function vψi for θˆi ∈ (0, y¯i]:
vψi (θˆ
∗
i ) =

m+i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi ≤ b¯i and θˆi < ψi
m+,b¯ii (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi > b¯i and θˆi < ψi∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du if θˆi = ψi
m−i (ψi − θˆi) +
∫ θˆi
0
mi(u)du else.
Following the same steps as before, we find
dvψi (θˆi)
dθˆi
< 0,
and for the first two cases θˆi = b¯i and θˆi = ψi
vψi (θˆi − ) > vψi (θˆi) > vψi (θˆi + ),
for some  > 0. Hence, vψi is strictly decreasing on [yi, 0) for any ψ ∈ P .

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3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
Consider the same scenario as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.5 for the portfolios
ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P and choose some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
λV L(a)(ψ1) + (1− λ)V L(a)(ψ2)− V L(a)(ψλ) > 0, (3.37)
as shown in the mentioned proof.
Assume there are only two states of the world. Hence, for any portfolio ψ ∈ P its
liquidity-adjusted value equals V L(a)(ψ; p) with probability p < 1/2 and V L(a)(ψ; 1−
p) with probability 1−p. Assume that the MSDC is so distributed that for the chosen
inequality (3.37) holds in both states of the world λ ∈ (0, 1). Let
V L(a)(ψ; p) < V L(a)(ψ; 1− p),
and
V L(a)(ψ; p) 6= −∞,
for ψ ∈ {ψ1, ψ2, ψλ}. Furthermore, choose α ∈ (0, 1) such that p < α and consider
the following lower α-quantile
qα
(
V L(a)(ψ)
)
:= inf
{
x ∈ R|P (V L(a) ≤ x) ≥ α} ,
and set qα (ψ) := qα
(
V L(a)(ψ)
)
. Hence,
qα
(
ψ1
)
= V L(a)(ψ1; 1− p), qα
(
ψ2
)
= V L(a)(ψ2; 1− p),
qα
(
ψλ
)
= V L(a)(ψλ; 1− p).
Consider the expected shortfall ES which is a coherent risk measure and the repre-
sentation of Acerbi and Tasche (Acerbi & Tasche 2002). Accordingly, the expected
shortfall at level α ∈ (0, 1) for a discrete random variable X is given by
ESα(X) = − 1
α
E
[
X1{X≤qα(X)} +X
α− P (X ≤ qα(X))
P (X = qα(X))
1{X=qα(X)}
]
.
In our case, the expected shortfall is given for portfolios ψ ∈ {ψ1, ψ2, ψλ} by
ESα (ψ) = − 1
α
E
[
V L(a)(ψ)
]− 1
α
E
[
V L(a)(ψ) · α− 1
1− p · 1{V L(a)(ψ)=qα(ψ)}
]
= − 1
α
[
pV L(a)(ψ; p) + (1− p)V L(a)(ψ; 1− p)]
− 1
α
(α− 1)V L(a)(ψ; 1− p)
= − 1
α
pV L(a)(ψ; p)− 1
α
(α− p)V L(a)(ψ; 1− p).
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Thus,
α
[
λESα
(
ψ1
)
+ (1− λ)ESα
(
ψ2
)− ESα (ψλ)]
= pV L(a)(ψλ; p) + (α− p)V L(a)(ψλ; 1− p)
−λ [pV L(a)(ψ1; p) + (α− p)V L(a)(ψ1; 1− p)]
−(1− λ) [pV L(a)(ψ2; p) + (α− p)V L(a)(ψ2; 1− p)]
= −p [λV L(a)(ψ1; p) + (1− λ)V L(a)(ψ2; p)− V L(a)(ψλ; p)]
−(α− p) [λV L(a)(ψ1; 1− p) + (1− λ)V L(a)(ψ2; 1− p)− V L(a)(ψλ; 1− p)] < 0,
which follows from inequality (3.37) and α > p. Hence,
λESα
(
ψ1
)
+ (1− λ)ESα
(
ψ2
)− ESα (ψλ) < 0,
or, equivalently,
ρL
(
λψ1 + (1− λ)ψ2) > λρL (ψ1)+ (1− λ)ρL (ψ2) .

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